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# Editorial

Last Monday May 24, a suicide bombing attack at the Manchester Arena left 22 people dead and injured 59 after an Ariana Grande concert, an American singer admired and followed by many teenagers around the world.

Less than 24 hours later the terrorist group Dáesh published its claim of the attack through one of its mass media "Amaq".

It should not be a surprise that this attack occurred during the election campaign. A similar terror attack happened three days before the first round of the French elections in April, leaving a French policeman killed on the Champs-Elysees Avenue.

These attacks make people to vote for a more extreme option that seems to give some benefits to the terror organisation. Daesh is thus developing his extremist ideology in the West and seeks to strengthen that dichotomy of thought that helps them to establish their desired world caliphate.

What happened on Monday night terror attack in Manchester in which innocent children died, is still one step forward in the evolution of these murderers who, seeking to create terror in our societies, evolve in their way of attacking, in order to create chaos with each of their crimes. But these attacks and claims where the victims were children and adolescents weaken the discourse of supremacy and courage of these terrorists vis-a-vis the West.

Education is imperative to reverse the radicalization of this terrorism of jihadist aetiology. It is fundamental to be able to fight against this type of globalized terrorism investing more in formation and prevention in order to be able to identify the radicalization processes and to prevent violent radicalized indoctrinated by the terrorist groups kill innocent victims. On the other hand, it is essential to foster the continuous collaboration among different countries and the exchange of information on these terrorists through different intelligence services to hinder their movements and block their actions. The cowardice of attacking defenceless teenagers not only would have to shame the militants of the terrorist group for belonging to it, but also, it is contrary to the so proclaimed courage of the warriors of the caliphate.

*David Garriga*
Director

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# Sections:

**Fuerzas Antiterroristas del Mundo**

**On the front page:** Kommando Spezialkräfte, known by its acronym KSK, is a special unit of the Bundeswehr composed only of elite soldiers, chosen one by one within the various branches of the German army.

*-Informatioon of the unit at the end of the Bulletin-*

# The phenomenon of terrorism

## Handbook of Barbarism

*by Enric Caballería*

Just like the Declaration of the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders, it is essential to analyze the manual of barbarism management when it comes to jihadist ideology. This manual has the following points:

1. Introduction
2. The order that governed the world since the time of Sykes-Picot
3. The illusion of power. Superpowers as a function of its military superiority and false means
4. Management of barbarism definition and the scene of its historical background
5. The way to install an Islamic State
6. The fundamental principles and policy measures to implement the stages of barbarism management
7. The obstacles and the most important problems facing us.
8. Is there a simpler solution than ours?

Abu Bakr Naji wrote this work in 2004 and it is a declaration of intentions. This name is most likely a pseudonym, the authorship of this book relates Muhammad Khalil al - Hakaymah. In any case, I will always refer to Naji. The work of about113 pages was used by Osama Bin Laden for his fight against the West and it is a reference work for the DAESH and their leader Al – Baghdadi too. Naji, Al - Zawahiri, Abu Qatada and Mustafá Setmarian are the most influential modern thinkers of the current jihadism.

As most jihadist ideologist, Naji claims that his main source of inspiration is the XIII century scholar Ibn Taymiyya.

This manual gives a series of instructions and guidelines for the jihadist to invade Western countries in a struggle that could last years. This is important because the terrorist organizations are so convinced of his victory and that they will dominate the world, they have no hurry to do so. It is a war of attrition, and without a doubt, Western countries will tire before them. This invasion will not be peaceful; it will be through weapons, bombings, intimidation methods to terrorize society and to physically, mentally and economically deplete the military and police forces from different countries.

Our battle is long and is still in its beginnings [...]. However, its long term provides an opportunity for infiltration between the adversaries. We must infiltrate the police forces, armies, private security companies and sensitive civil institutions.

In the text there is a constant that the author emphasizes over and over again on creating a sense of permanent insecurity in Western countries. Once conquered Western countries, the "infidels" will let themselves be governed by jihadists, who will look "saviors" of the chaos. Once the Islamic order has been implanted and Sharía's harmony has been restored, the promenade of Caliphate will flow by itself. Now I will present some very relevant paragraphs:

We have youth in large numbers seeking Jihad. Their desire for martyrdom indicates an adequate condition of faith; it is possible to divert some of them to work in security areas and infiltrate themself in the institutions.

When the number of dead Americans is one-tenth of the number of Russians killed in Afghanistan (about 14,000), Americans will reach a stage of effeminacy that will make them unable to hold battles for a long period of time and that will be compensated with a set of misleading information.

Naji in the book talks about the priority areas for the Islamist conquest, which are: Saudi Arabia, North Africa, Nigeria, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco. Obviously Naji does not forget the rest of the world that also has to be under the rule of the Caliphate. According to him, only

through war and violence it is possible the conquest of the West.

The only medicine that can save even the greatest of the sins is war.

In this book the author sets out a series of objectives that are based on controlling the chaos that will emerge in the breakdown of the order caused by the attacks. The requirements that Naji refers for the barbarism management are:

- Establishment of security internal
- Provision of food and medical treatment
- Security of the borders against the invasion of the enemies
- Establishment of Islamic law
- Establishment of a society of struggle at all levels and among all the individuals

In this same line Naji announces two upcoming stages to achieve his objectives and implement the universal Caliphate.

The first phase refers to the phase of humiliation and exhaustion. At this stage it is essential to undermine the confidence and morale of Western countries through terror, i.e., that no citizen will be safe wherever they go. The book explains how atrocities committed by Western countries to the Middle East, along with possible executions of Westerners, serve and are entitled to exhaust and paralyze the West, but this is only a part of the overall strategy.

The increase of barbarism it is not the worst thing that can happen now to the West [...] Our enemies will not have mercy on us if we seize, therefore, we make them think thousand times before attacking us.

The politics of violence must be followed; so if the requested demands are not fulfilled the hostages must be liquidated in terrifyingly, sending fear into the hearts of the enemies and their supporters.

Second phase will start when the destruction of Western societies is a fact and allow what Naji called "the landing of the saviors", as sole remedy front widespread chaos and will be the time to establish a new Islamic Caliphate.

Barbarism is a stage prior to the victory of the Caliphate, it is not the destination desired for the jihadists.

For the author, one of the key measures of the Jihad is the 'pay the price' politics:

any act must be faced with a reaction that makes pay the price for the crime committed, so they are dissuaded from doing so again and think a thousand times before attacking us again.

In my point of view, this means that any action that West makes against the Caliphate will be priced. Naji finally makes the following declaracion:

Our battle is a battle of tawhid [the oneness of Allah] against unbelief and polytheists faith. It is not an economic, political or social battle.

This manual did not cause a great impact in the antiterrorism world when it was written, but after the creation of the Islamic State it was studied and analyzed. What is troubling about this manual, is that when the self-proclaimed Caliphate or DAESH disappears and go into hiding, this book will still exist. And jihadists who will come will have a very precise guide on how to do Jihad in the world.

(1) Sykes-Picot agreement: this agreement that divided the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, has always been considered an insult in the Arab world and for the jihadists is a humiliation and obsession in many communications remember this treaty, Because I divide Muslim land, I eliminated the last great caliphate and was also made by "infidels".

(2) The so-called Trojan Horses is a subject of great concern to Western countries, because they infiltrate very sensitive organizations and have firsthand information.

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# Prevention and counter-narrative in terrorism

## The counter-narrative to Daesh from Arab-Islamic countries, is it effective?

*by David Garriga*



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The terrorist group Daesh has perfectly studied the type of messages that it wants to address to the different societies, depending on the target audience. It is not the same impact sending attractive messages to Western countries that to Arabic countries, and the messages do not have the same format when they are sent to adults or to minor people. So, would it be effective to use the counter-narrative developed by the different Arab-Islamic countries against Daesh's discourses in the Western countries?

In 2010 there was a first counter-narrative attempt in Western countries. The film "Four Lions" directed by Chris Morris, where the terrorists who were joining al Qaeda to create a terrorist cell with the aim of attacking the West world were ridiculed.

This movie created a great media impact because, behind that mock at the intellectual level of those who decided to join the ranks of terrorists, it detailed actions and strategies actually used in the manuals of these groups of jihadist aetiology.

With the appearance of Daesh, we find some examples in neighboring countries that are

characterized mainly in the use of humour to discredit the discourses of courage and pride of belonging to this group. For example, the Iraqi "Mythical State" series written by Thaer al-Hasnawi was an audience record in its first broadcast in al-Iraqiya where the main objective of the production company was to laugh at the Islamic state. The serie shows a supposed dysfunctional and chaotic state ruled by Daesh.

For the coming-up Ramadan 2017 an emirate TV chain offers something unpublished until now; it is a series of 30 chapters know in Spanish as "Cuervos negros" (black crows in English), it shows the real and violent life in the caliphate of Daesh. The MBC1 network will show us children learning to kill and playing to torture infidels, women sold as slaves and used as sexual objects under the terrorist's power, showing people's lives who have, voluntarily or not, to live under the laws of Abu Bakr al Baghdady.

It is a discourse from fiction where the lives of those who have joined Daesh are openly exposed and have been indoctrinated by this terrorist group under its radical ideology. According to actress Dima al Jundi who starred the leader of the group Al Hansa in charge to keep the women of the caliphate controlled: "To act in a work with beheadings, slaughters and destruction has not resulted an easy work, "she said.



This series is produced by a team of more than 200 people and filmed in Lebanon. According to the editors, it is undoubtedly an anti terrorism tool, and they encourage other countries to translate their production in to other languages. Daesh's terrorism

is global and we must fight against it at the international level.

We will see the evolution and the effectiveness of this series that breaks with the schemes of the counter-narrative that we have been using so far. It is essential to prevent young people from falling into the networks of these terrorists bringing from the society more attractive resources than those offered by these killers and above all taking into account that, without training, information or prevention measures focused on these more sensitive groups of radicalized, we will lose an entire generation and the terrorists will continue to win the battle. If the television series can help to act against terrorism, then we welcome them.

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# Prevention and counter-narrative in terrorism
## Terrorist Radicalization in Prison. Detection and prevention

*By Ramón M Chippirrás (Translation Irene Gómez Martín)*



Painted by Daésh appeared in the courtyard of common prisoners of the Estremera Penitentiary Center.

Recently social media reported on an interview in which the InfoTalQual portal interviewed Fouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist who was imprisoned in 1996 for writing a critical article against Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul Karim al-Kabariti. What Fouad did not know is that, in that same prison, he was happening to meet with Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, former al Qaeda leader in Iraq. His skills as a journalist got him closer to Zarqawi and as well as hearing how it was in prison that the former leader of Al Qaeda became radicalized. Owing to torture before his imprisonment and his subsequent regime of isolation for almost nine months, the calm and charismatic Zarqawi, as he was known, will become reactionary and violent attituded towards the forces of law and order.

Zarqawi's spiritual precept and fellow prisoner, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, evaluated his passage through prison in a document he wrote in September 2004: "They thought the prison would undermine our ideology. They were too stupid to know that jail and suffering would intensify our call. God made prison one of the stages during which we learned and at the same time educate others", proclamed Maqdisi.

How Zarqawi commanded Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003 to make way for Daesh after his death, is well-known.

There is no possible comparison between the prisons of any country in the Middle East and those at our country. But we can notice that imprisonment and radicalization go hand in hand. Earlier this year, a common prisoner was being followed up in module five at the High Security Penitentiary Center of Topas (Salamanca); He was imprisoned due to common crimes, nothing to do with terrorism. However, thanks to the monitoring carried out by prison officials, they noticed that the prisoner, Mouad Ahaik, had been radicalized within the penitentiary. Already in 2016, there was another female prisoner who suffered a jihadist radicalization in this same prision.

In the course of 2017, more than twenty alleged jihadists have been arrested in Spain. They have been charged of belonging to or integrating with a cell attached to Daesh, belonging to the propagandistic or recruitment organization's network, promoting jihadist ideology through social media, terrorism enhancement and terrorist threats and / or self-indoctrination for terrorist purposes among others.

Radicalization, from the terrorism perspective, is a dynamic process in which an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. This violent extremism is nothing more than promoting, fomenting or committing acts that can rise terrorism and that aim to preserve an ideology that, above all, preaches a religious supremacy, opposite to the fundamental principles of democracy. The reasons that motivate this process are mostly religious and personal.

The heyday of Islamist terrorism has forced administrations to favor measures that prevent and stop the processes of violent radicalization. In Spain, from the General Secretariat of Prison Institutions, in recent years, it is being affected by various programs to fight against Islamist radicalization inside prison, since penitentiary centers are considered a highly dangerous focus for radicalization.

Upon entering jail, these prisoners are included in the F.I.E.S. (Internal Files of Special Monitoring), control instruments of the penitentiary administration; These prisoners specifically enter FIES 3 (Armed Group), intended for the prevention or punishment of terrorist crimes or links with armed gangs, as well as those who support and / or collaborate with them.

There are three categories to classify Islamist prisoners: FIES group A (highly radicalized), FIES group B (moderately radicalized) and FIES group C (susceptible to radicalization).

The inmates of FIES group C were not included in the special FIES file until Instruction 2/2015.

The primary purpose of the Penitentiary Institutions is the social reintegration of those condemned to prison sentences and criminal measures, as well as the detention and custody of detainees, prisoners and convicts, as well as to achieve re-education and social reintegration, so that

the Punished at the end of the sentence return to society with the ability to respect the law. This becomes particularly important when the inmates belong to a terrorist organization and their inclusion in prison may lead to recruit followers for their extremist ideology.

Several initiatives have been carried out from Penitentiary Institutions, as I indicated above, to detect and dissuade potential recruitment and radicalization processes in prison. These prisoners present singularities that need to be approached with a specific strategy.

Instruction I-8/2014 brought the "Intervention Program with Islamist Interns in Penitentiary Centers" whose purpose is to restrict the terrorist phenomenon in prison. This instruction is intended for the observation, knowledge and information of officials to find out and limit incipient or entrenched processes of radicalization. It is mainly necessary to monitor the networks that the terrorists imprisoned stablish with the rest of the prisoners, observing the communications and visits of these and the relations that they can have with the organized crime. If there is a reasonable certainty of high risk or maladjustment, the intervention of the communications should be evaluated to verify this possible radicalization, as well as a special monitoring and control of the judicial and administrative procedures of expulsion of the inmates in order not to loose the extremist detection of the convict.

Instruction I-2/2016 about "Framework Program for intervention in violent radicalization with Islamist interns" means to work with those inmates who are already radicalized, in order to return them to their previous thoughts and prevent others from falling into theirs radicalization. Although the difficulty of reinstating these doctrines is extreme, it is the State's obligation to try to give back to society all those convicted.

This Framework Program is intended for three groups of inmates:

• FIES group A: those most relevant, with higher risk and most radical ideology, since its members are condemned by membership or linkage to Jihadist terrorism; The treatment for this group should be intensive, individual and continuous; It is imperative that the intern confirms his rejection of violence and disengagement with the terrorist organization.

• FIES group B: composed of inmates who have carried out an indoctrination mission against other inmates.

• FIES group C: radicalized and in the process of radicalization, as well as inmates vulnerable to recruitment and inmates who despise non-Muslim prisoners or Muslim prisoners who do not follow their canons.

(A group treatment is proposed for groups B and C, but differentiating well that group B tends to uptake and group C is more fragil and risky)

Common elements in the treatments are the possibility of using Muslim inmates to counter those elements of risk, continued and intense treatment, as well as, get helped by moderate Imans, since the radical interiorization of religion of these inmates. Cultural integration (learning Spanish language) and improving the educational level are other common priority points.

Imprisonment is always a traumatic event for most inmates. The arrival to a hostile environment can make the prisoner feel the need to be part of a group that provides emotional support and physical security. The analogy to inmates of their own nationality or religion may be a key element that favors radicalization.

It is usual in our prisons that inmates of FIES 3 share prison yard. It is usual that prisoners with terrorist offenses or links to armed gangs charges get linked to other prisoners with common crime charges such as drug traffic but who are interned in FIES 5 because they are Muslims, whether they are radical or not (as referred above with prisoner from Topas prison). Just the fact of sharing yard with those firsts may lead those last mentioned to being radicalized in prison upon contact.

Regarding religious issues, taking the opportunity that they are few days left for Ramadan's celebration, it is frowned upon, that certain Muslims will not do Ramadan within

a single cell block, which brings pressure among the inmates, so that in the end every Muslim ends up fasting in the block.

Prison staff are trained to maintain protection, security and order in prison, as well as to help rehabilitating detainees. They must be instructed to maintain intercultural mediation in case of crisis management among inmates.

Those officials who act in the first line should be instructed in the detention of possible symptoms of radicalization, they must be able to differentiate religious practices from the adoption of violent extremist behavior. For example, there are prisoners who, go from not praying at all to pray five times a day, preach out low phrases from the Koran while working or praying mentally while they hold a rosary in their hands. Another characteristic sign of radicalization may be growing a long beard and shaving their heads. To do this, they must be

prepared and trained to neutralize this radicalization and report the matter to their superior authorities. It is important to have a civil service that is not distant from the prisoners in terms of language.

In order to prevent radicalization, different programs must be developed, in which those who are more likely to radicalization are "controlled" in different ways through "tutors", public officials, fully educated and prepared, or through other Prisoners who have turned their backs on violent extremism and can redirect them against those who may fall into radicalization, or even religious representatives, such as moderate imans in consonance with the Administration. It is necessary that the preparing and the work will be collective, well coordinated and professional. As well as, to control the massification in the prisons, since can result even more in the radicalization of the inmates.

As a personal criticism of the Administration in favor of measures to prevent and stop the processes of violent radicalization, I wonder why these Framework Programs have taken so long to reach our prisons. Why did it take a decade from 11M to influence the prevention of radicalization in prison?.

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# Cyberterrorism

## Cyber-financing of the Caliphate: Global Strategy

*by Marc Fornós*



Capture by the author of the article.

Some time ago we were informing about the new trends involving the new technologies and the new methods of the DAESH caliphate. With the announcement of the new sections of their cyber-regiments we also informed that the Daesh would initiate a financing campaign through the hacking. For once the massive attack of WanaCry occurred, the UCC has initiated its own attacks to raise funds, and also directly to the Kufar land, and coinciding with the date of beginning of Ramadán, advocating greater purity within their allies.

The new financing of the Caliphate is throught the virtual currency, the bitcoin, and the method "Ransomware". Bitcoin is an anonymous cyber currency, with multiple uses, legal and illegal. Till today, funding within the Caliphate or by their followers, wherever they be, was used the Islamic finance called "Hawala".

To understand this kind of method I try to explain in most simplicity i can, hawala is a type of money transfer without this travel it on any way, it is done by trust,we have to understand that in this transaction the real money does not move from the place where it is deposited, is an act of faith between the two parts of hawaladans, and to be In this way, is difficult to monitor and detect, of course easy to avoid the legalities of financial regulation, and it is much more difficult to detect it by the security forces. The Hawala method is always done using cash, imagine that the Mr. A who lives in Colombia wants to send money to

Mr. D who lives in Syria, if he did it through normal ways, tax entities, security forces, an others.. they would know it that mr. A is sending that money to Mr. D, so he does not want anyone knows it that he sends the money. Mr. A is going to an establishment where he knows that there is the method of hawala owned by Mr. B. Mr. A deposits the establishment Hawala to Mr. B 100dollars in cash + a commission (gain for the hawaladin), where he tells him who has to be the recipient of that money, being Mr. D. So now this is how starts the Hawala, Mr. B is in Contact with a trusted person in Syria who is Mr. C, who is his Hawala connection, and who has an establishment in Syria, then Mr. B communicates to Mr. C that he has to give 100 dollars to Mr. D, then Mr. D is going to collect his 100 dollars. In this transaction there is no transfer of currency, or financial in any way, but is established by the relationship of trust of Mr. B and Mr. C, the same happens in reverse situation, for someone from Syria wants to send money to Colombia.

Now with the Bitcoin in circulation to the Cibercalifato finance, the method of the Hawala becomes much more interesting in the Cyber space, where the free circulation of this Digital currency through anonymity, now it will make this movement of money much easier an with fast immediacy.

What threats does the Bitcoin represent in the land of the Cibercalifato? The threats are quite important and especially strategic, we are talking

about being able to give financial support to any place in the world where you can connect a computer and internet, where from the very heart of the cybercaliphate, can finance, pay or donate cyber currency to a terrorist cell , Lone Wolf or mujahidin to carry out an attack, wherever he is.

until to day, the cases used with bitcoins by ISIS terrorists had been anecdotal or of little importance and they did not describe a usual pattern of financial behavior important, in some occasions from Gaza had been detected use of this virtual currency, but in so sporadic and no represented a real importance. But with the new faction of the FMCC (Fighter Moeslim Cyber Caliphate), it has taken a difference and possibly more usual and global perspective.

CyberSPhreak, the alias of one of the FMCC hackers, with more impact, more active and more dangerous, is currently developing most of the attacks, and now leading the ransomware attacks. He is someone accustomed to cyberspace, and can become an important and representative role within the structure of the DAESH Caliphate. We know that for the execution of attacks, the costs of logistics and planning are not expensive, and with this new form of funding, it becomes a strategic asset for the activation of the lone wolf that join in the DAESH. We need to establish policies and laws based on these new methods used, especially in adapting to the the future and the new strategy from the caliphate.

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# The Jihad Generation

## Children as Silent Recruiters

*by Antonio Martin*



Children today are not as innocent as they were twenty years ago, the elders say that it was different back then. We have always heard that children are innocent, full of joy and have a free spirit. But children who live in an increasingly chaotic and selfish society, are they really like that?

A population with economic crises, wars and social and cultural segregation, automatically eliminates the innocence that once defined those kids. Children seeking leadership are under pressure since they are born, with the social imposition of living faster and faster in a society that, shamelessly, does not offer the same opportunities to everyone.

The constant watching of wars and atrocities committed throughout the world, broadcasted at all times by the media, have led to the dehumanization of these children regarding violence. As always, the terrorist group Daesh has learnt how to take advantage of that dehumanization of minors in the West.

We can speak about a new profile strategically studied by terrorist intelligence: "the minor as Daesh's social liaison silent recruiters". These minors, tactically recruited following the guidelines established for that purpose, will now also have the role of silent recruiters in their community. An injection of radical ideology that will have the mission to recruit all those who made them leaders.

In order to be a good leader, a child must be:

-Charismatic, able to bring out admiration. Loyal to those next to him.

-Committed to the cause, using his great social influence to fight for the cause.

-Communicative, knowing how to spread the message so that others join him to fight for the cause.

-Innovative, breaking established beliefs to achieve change.

-Motivator, knowing how to boost the morale of those who feel lost, strengthening the feeling of brotherhood and getting closer to the cause.

-Optimistic, self-confidence will be transmitted to the group… if one can do it, the group can do it!

The development of this new recruiting figure of Daesh was not invented by them. In today's society, almost everything has been invented already, so they only adapt for their survival the necessary assets to transcend and raise their legacy in order to reach the goal of their Islamic caliphate.

The transmission of radical ideology among minors, in "deprived" or "culturally segregated" areas (ghettos), will become a latent bomb waiting to explode.

Who will notice a child speaking or defaming with other kids? Will a minor question that leader admired by all?

A leader that all children respect and admire becomes a social mentor.

Another need of the terrorist group is the creation of living terror in the Western society, to soften governments up in their irrational requests for the acceptance of an "official" Islamic State in the Middle East.

This plot, invented by the terrorist group to recruit Western minors, is part of their goal to create a state of chaos, as indicated in the "guide to brutality" that Daesh follows faithfully, to strategically obtain the much-awaited global Umma (caliphate).

Child recruitment brings the creation of violent youth gangs in charge of frightening civil society through urban crime and spreading radical ideology. Those gangs copy the way already-existing local gangs operate (for example, in Spain ultra-right gangs, extreme-left gangs, Latino gangs, etc.).

In Spain, groups of violent youth gangs fight and vindicate their laws in an extreme and violent way, towards everyone and especially against those who think their opposite. Sympathizing or using psychology are two ways of convincing children to recruit other kids.

According to a study published by the Public Criminology Center for the Study and Prevention of Crime (Centro Crimina para el Estudio y Prevención de la Delincuencia), gang members may exert on other children a certain influence that could lead to antisocial behavior, in many cases simply as an exploratory behavior and to seek self-affirmation, even if that can lead to the commission of criminal acts, and thus start a criminal career that could be lengthy and persistent.

Radical ideologies brought to Western minors is the next war won by Daesh. Those children will grow up spreading their fanaticism wherever they go, and that is an unstoppable force that will lead society to surrender and, once again, become part of a world dominated by tyrants.

Children are the future and it is up to us to establish policies and prevention programs to stop them from being recruited and used to spread the word and recruit others, maintaining a meaningless struggle in which only believe those who interpret a peaceful religion as they please.

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## Security College US

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# European stance against terrorism

## 4 notes on the Manchester attack

*by Javier Torregrosa*



Manchester attack: A young woman is assisted by police after the attack.

Like the rest of the attacks that have stunned Europe in recent times, the terrorist act carried out in Manchester has raised a great wave of outrage, anger and sadness over the European population. Once again, the awful day-to-day reality in certain parts of the world knocks at the door of Europe, thus being installed in the current news for the coming weeks. During the same, the data will come and go, new clues will be found, some hypotheses will be demonstrated and everything related to such terrible act will be clarified (as it seems to be happening right now). As has already happened in Germany, Sweden or France. As happens every day in Syria or Afghanistan.

However, there are certain elements that have happened related to this attack that deserve to be analysed with some caution and rigor. All of them have emerged over several days mixed with the experiences and stories of the circumstances that happened during the attack, and still today (as I write this article) come up completely new data. Today, therefore, I would like to talk about these elements to try to give a more generic approach to a apparently isolated act.

### 1. Change of victims and attacks.

If something has more particular importance on this act (similarly to the assault on the Bataclan room in Paris) it is the great change that is taking place in the objectives of radical Islamist groups. In this way,

we see how the attacks are increasingly directed, mostly, to the civilian population that is performing acts considered as "specific" of Western culture. In the two cases cited, the assault to a concert or to a dance hall with rock music is no longer a claim attack, but a direct blow to the way of life that western people maintain.

In this way, the attack happens to be also a reminder, and not only pure revenge. "You will not forget us," they seem to mean. In fact, there are two important facts to add to this thesis. First of all, we must not forget that part of the command that attacked Bataclan also was headed to a football stadium: another type of leisure specific of west people. And secondly, the statement that DAESH made after the attack in Manchester: "What lies ahead will be even harder." They do not want us to forget them. They want us to live with permanent fear of the next attack.

### 2. Problem with security leaks between US and UK.

Both the type of bomb used and the name of the terrorist (as well as the belongingness of the attacker to an organized cell) were data that leaked to the American press shortly after the attack, while it was being investigated by United Kingdom to clarify what had happened exactly. To understand the significance of the situation, we can see an example: there is a video on the Internet in which people is

able to see how the media harass the brother of Salman Abedi, and how he criticise them at the door of his home. All these data, if not filtered, would not have allowed the media to know the identity of the individual. If one does not know the identity of the individual, it would not be publicly sending a message to all the individuals of the radical cell: "run, because we are behind your track." Such a failure in security can pose a major problem at international cooperation level in the fight against terrorism and to the exchange of information for intelligence purposes.

**3. DAESH asks its followers to stop using social networks.**

Although it is ironic that DAESH uses online social networks (the paradigm of globalization), the fact that now transcends the news seems to have more to do with an internal management problem than a real strategy. At the end of the day, it is very difficult to battle the West with weapons that do not come from that territory (fighting fire with fire), but this loses a lot of force when the DAESH itself attributes the authorship of a terrorist act through social networks. Taking into account, also, that social networks are one of the main means of propaganda and recruitment with which the radical Islamist groups. To what extent is the incongruity of the beliefs of the radicals of DAESH and Al Qaeda with their actions?

**4. The profile of the terrorist who acted in Manchester.**

Salman Abedi was a second-generation immigrant with a conflictive childhood, problems of abuse of substance, education, a very strange change of appearance, and who prayed in the middle of the street shouting (according to the news). He considered himself as part of a culture discriminated and victimized by West. But above all, he was an individual with strong radical and extremist views, uncomfortable with the political situation which he considered certain Islamic countries live in.

All those named are just some of the risk factors that determine the risk of radicalization of an individual, but it seems that up until now (or at least, it has not emerged yet), that individual was not being monitored. This, in fact, highlights two very important ideas. The first is the importance of being able to monitor and track individuals with a high (and so obvious) risk of radicalization. The second, also very important, is the of training not only police, but also ordinary citizens (professionals, but also "normal" people), to be able to detect these risk factors and put on aware to the competent authorities.

As happened with other attacks, the Manchester attack is a awful reminder of the multitude of factors currently affecting to Europe. One after another, these terrible acts devastate the western and eastern countries (without difference), causing a situation of fear and panic among the population. But there is something important to remember: that is precisely what the radical Islamist strategy aims; to create fear. Therefore, and without forgetting how important it is to take measures to avoid new attacks, as well as to treat victims with the greatest possible respect, we must learn as much as we can from all those data that are observed after the act, in order to be prepared and to prevent this kind of situations. Only by knowing the phenomenon in depth we will be able to end it.

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# Intelligence and terrorism

## The Intelligence Center of the Spanish Armed Forces (CIFAS): New address

*by José Manuel Ávalos Morer*

Last Friday, the 26th of May, 2017, Francisco Rosaleny Pardo de Santayana, Major General of the Spanish Land Army took office as the new Director of the Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces (CIFAS), replacing Major General Francisco Jose Gan Pampols.

On his back, Rosalen adds 6 international missions. In 1989, he took part in the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola(UNAVEM), one of the first missions of the Spanish Armed Forces abroad. In 1991, he was an observer in the Monitoring Mission of the Europan Community in the formerly called Yugoslavia. Two years after, in 1994, he went to the United Nations Protection Forces mission (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and, in 1999, he went to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). After that, in 2007, he woul become the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Sector of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and, finally, in 2010, he

wento to Afganistan and took part in the ISAF operation as head of the Strength in Qala I Naw.

Among its awards we can find, six crosses of the Order to the Military Merit, a cross of the Order to the Aeronautical Merit and the cross of Caballero of Isabel the Catholic.

But, what is the Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces?

According to its official web page , it is the entity responsible for providing the Spanish Defense Minister, through the Chief of Defense Staff and the military autorithies, with the necesary military intelligence susceptible of creating crisis that could affect the national defense as well as to give support to the different operations.

It also advises the Chief of Defense Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armies and Armed Forces on military counterintelligence and security within the Armed Forces and contributes to advice at the strategic level of military operations.

Thus, it is the only inteligence militar entity in a strategic level and is part of the Spanish Intelligence Community, being the only contact of the Defense Minister in terms os Milirary Intelligence.

How do the produce this intelligence?

According to an interview  with former Director of CISFAS, Major General Francisco José Gan Pampols, they work mainly with OSINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, SAR, IMINT sources and sources of cyberspace. That is, open sources from media, social networks, etc., human intelligence extracted from interviews and case studies, for example. Sources from geospatial, radar and image information, such as those provided by the Satellite Center of the European Union (SatCen) located in Spain . Finally, sources from cyberspace, that is, networks and information systems.

Therefore, the information that they generate from CISFAS is of a great strategic help for the internal and external interests of Spain. Such is the case that the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the

National Police, the Civil Guard and the Intelligence Center against Organized Crime have recently joined the Terrorism Threat Assessment Board, And Terrorism (CITCO) , among others, presided over by the minister of interior and where it is advised whether or not to raise the level of alert for terrorist threat, currently in Spain at level 4 (high) over 5 (very high )..

**Notes:**

(1) Official website of the CIFAS: http://www.emad.mde.es/CIFAS/
(2) General Gan: "Without the services of Intelligence the Defense would be more expensive and less efficient": https://cisde.es/observatorio/sin-los-servicios-de-inteligencia-la-defensa-seria-mas- Face-and-less-efficient
(3) See Bulletin No 3 of the Triarius magazines, 'Intelligence Service of the European Union?' Http://www.fuerzasmilitares.org/triarius/Boletin-Triarius-0003.pdf
(4) See bulletin nº 4 of the journal Triarius, 4. "The transversality of Intelligence in Spain: Center of Intelligence against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO)." Http://www.fuerzasmilitares.org/triarius/ Bulletin-Triarius-0004.pdf

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**Images:**
(1) General Rosaleny Pardo de Santayana takes command as DICIFAS. Source: EMAD.
(2) Shield of the Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces (CIFAS). Source: EMAD.

**Bogotá, 4 al 6 de diciembre de 2017**

# Expodefensa

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# Terrorism and Geopolitical

## Terrorist militiamen of the Fulani ethnic group. Phased Threat in West Africa

*by Daniel Martínez*



*Members of the 3R Group*

Among the terrorist groups most known for their atrocities are the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, Taliban, Boko Haram, but very little information is available from the extremist Islamist Fulani (the world's largest nomadic people), which Mainly affects Nigeria and the Central African Republic, under the name of 3R (Return, Claim and Rehabilitation).

The Fulani, Fula, Peul or Fulbe, live in West Africa (Mali, Chad, Guinea, Cameroon, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Mauritania, Togo, Sierra Leone), most in the Sahel, where Together with the Hausa, totaled 30 million. They speak the language fulfulde (jumping) and were the first African groups that embraced Islamism.

3R emerged in late 2015, under the command of the proclaimed General Sidiki Abass, to protect the minority Muslim Pehul population in the Central African Republic from attacks by Christian fighters, called "Anti-Balaka."

14DIC2015: Central African rebel leader Noureddine Adam, rejects the elections of 27DIC2015 and declares an autonomous state, the Republic of Logone.



República Democrática del Congo
La república de **Dar el Coti** (*République de Dar el Kuti*, en francés) o **República de Logone** es un estado secesionista proclamado el **14DIC2015**

Among the most noteworthy events are:

In NOV2016 fighting begins between the FPRC (Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic) and the UPC (Union for Peace in

Central Africa), of Fulani majority, in Bambari. FPRC is accused of ethnic cleansing of Fulanis.

21NOV2016: 85 killed in fighting between factions of Séléka in Bria. Factions: UPC and FPRC



21 to 27NOV2016: 50 civilians killed in Bocaranga and Koui (Ouham Pendé Province), women and girls raped, villages looted and burned by the new terrorist group 3R (Return, Recovery, Rehabilitation).

17 thousand displaced 14 thousand fled to Bocaranga and 3 thousand to the border with Cameroon

02FEB2017: "3R" attacked Bocaranga, looted Catholic churches, set fire to several houses and robbed, leaving a balance of more than 20 dead.

12FEB2017: 4 dead in Ippy. Attack of a helicopter of the MINUSCA, United Nations Mission in Central African Republic against the FPRC column - Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central African Republic, that went to Bambari, passing General Joseph Zoundecko, Head of the military wing Seleka and FPRC

Conclusion:

The immediate objective of 3R would be to take control of the western region of the Central African Republic, which shares borders with Cameroon, for geopolitical and historical interest and for the purpose of consolidating territory, unite and expand with its fighters in Nigeria

The social crisis would increase in the face of growing food and water shortages and the possibility of Ebola returning because of a new outbreak of the disease in the north of neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo

Foreign terrorist terrorists from ex Seleka, would come from Chad and Sudan, to fight the "antibalaka" Christians and the Muslim armed structure "3R" (Fulani ethnic group)..

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# Terrorism and Geopolitical

## Jihadist radicalism in the north of Morocco

*by CRAS Vigilans Group S.L.*

This analysis aims to reflect the current state of the northern region of Morocco, specifically in the Tangier-Tetouan-Castillejos triangle, which has a population of over 2.5 million inhabitants, based on data obtained from sources (OSINT) and social network research (SOCMINT) conducted by CV2Group, for use in prospective, assessing the post-DAESH scenario in Syria and Iraq and its referrals for the Maghreb..

Situation

In 2015, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (1) publishes a study about "Moroccan Foreing Fighters", pointing to "Push and Pull" elements based on political, logistical, sociological and ideological factors. This analysis points to a devastating fact: "the cities of the north of Morocco export more foreign fighters than the other cities. In 2014, the city of Fnideq, with 77,057 inhabitants, sent around 200 fighters to Syria, which is about 13% of Moroccan foreing fighters."

The publication also cites the DGSN: "the cities of northern Morocco, Tangier and Tetouan, with about 1.5 million inhabitants, contribute 30% of Moroccan foreing fighters in Syria." This problem is much greater if we compare to Casablanca and Fez, the two biggest cities in the country and that tripled in population to the two previous ones.

At the Center for Analysis and Prospective (CAP) (2) of the Spanish Civil Guard indicated a year ago that 30% of foreign fighters fighting in Syria and Iraq come from Morocco, while another 300 fighters were in Libya.

On 2017.05.23, Aldelhaq El Khayyam, director of the Central Office of Judicial Investigations (OCIJ), in an interview for El Español points out that, from Morocco, about 1,600 people have left to fight in Syria and Iraq, in the ranks of DAESH or affiliates of Al Qaeda, of which have returned, according to the available data, 211 individuals.

The data provided by the director of the Moroccan OCIJ, as will be seen below, do not express the reality of the serious problem of radicalism in Morocco. In a study carried out by the Royal Elcano Institute (3) about DAESH in Spain, professors Fernando Reinares and Carola García-Calvo indicate that 41.1% of the detainees in Spain had Moroccan nationality and that 45.6% had as country of birth Morocco, mainly born in the Tangier-Tetouan-Alhucemas region.

Following the previous study, 86.1% of those detained in Spain for activities related to DAESH are Muslims of origin, with 52.7% from Morocco and 39.5% from Spain, but with roots in that country.

These numbers are very similar in other European countries, such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands, where if we count foreing fighters displaced to Iraq or Syria of Moroccan nationality or origin, the numbers can be vertiginous.

CV2Group investigations

Over the last few years, CV2Group has carried out various investigations about individuals related to terrorist cells in Spain, following techniques OSINT and SOCMINT, where the constant has been the connection with Morocco in first or second degree of "friendship". From these investigations the following conclusions are drawn as a scheme:

• The majority of investigated from Ceuta have deep socio-economic connections with the cities of Tangier, Tetouan or Fnideq. Therefore, the rate of detentions or degree of radicality is closely related to the influence of the Moroccan side.

• Geolocations of the Moroccan jihadists in Ceuta and the Iberian Peninsula are very usual, along with family connections and friendship in France and Central Europe.

• Normally, on Moroccan soil, young people between the ages of 18 and 30 are detected, with an apparent marginal life, closely related to retail or small crime.

• Moroccan individuals who appear in investigations, in a first or second circle of friendship, have in their networks jihadist iconography, close to DAESH, when they are still in Morocco. Later, once displaced in Syria, the iconography changes towards the one of Harakat Sham al Islam (HSI), disintegrated and at the moment its members including mainly in Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), closer to Al Qaeda.

• It is observed that hooligans of soccer teams are nexus of union in a first phase of radicalization, where they quickly collect the radical discourse. Subsequently, they would go on to victimization in social networks, providing continuous references to the occupation of Palestine, videos and images of the destruction in Syria or continuous references to grievances and humiliations of the present, along with allusions of painful, historical and legendary events with much emotional load (Al Andalus).

• Similarly, although in a lower percentage, there are claims in favour of the Amazigh (Berber) movement and against the Moroccan monarchy, accompanied by victimhood towards the suffering suffered by the Umma (Muslim community).

• In many cases, there is also a common center of study, whether verified or not, the Université Abdelmalek Essaadi de Fnideq.

**Conclusions**

It is evident that a high percentage of radicalism in Morocco is very focused on the triangle Tangier-Tetuan-Fnideq. These are both terrorists displaced to Iraq-Syria and individuals detained for their activity in Morocco. It should also include here the activity of these in countries such as Spain, France or Belgium.

In his interview, the Director of the OCIJ gives an example of the Moroccan model for the control of the activity of Images and Mosques and of the fight against terrorism, but it should be asked if the strategy carried out in the north of the country is adequate and if the counterpart of the Gulf monarchies (implementation of Wahhabi doctrine by the more tolerant Maliki) by various financing projects, is convenient for Morocco.

Without undermining the Moroccan fight against terrorism and its invaluable collaboration in dismantling networks based in Europe, it is essential that Morocco, in turn, implement integrative policies, especially in Tetouan and Fnideq, to avoid situations that crystallize in radicalism (marginality, youth unemployment, abandonment by Rabat, etc.).

Another point that should be taken into account is the discourse of the study centers. Let us be aware that one of the germs of radicalization, both in Morocco and in the Moroccan diaspora in Spain, comes from the birth of Salafia Jihadia, in the 90s, in line with the Muslim Brothers (Al Qaeda) and achieved Infiltrate in study centers in Morocco.

With the gradual fall of cities under DAESH and / or Al Qaeda affiliates control in both Syria and Iraq, it is presumed that fighters could attempt to return to their countries of origin. It would also have to take into account people who would want to move to combat zone but who, for one reason or another, could not do so (frustrated jihadists). With all of the above, it is expected that returnees, together with their support in the country of origin, will generate tensions in the area, going from a peaceful protest activity to another possible combat activity, something for which they are formed and already have a long experience in the Middle East.

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# Terrorist technical means

## The perfect trident of vigil and silent attack

*by José Luis Franco*



*Chilean Special Forces. (HALO/HAHO)*

Leaving aside the uniform he wore, I use a phrase from German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel as an introduction to this work: "Too much shoveling is better than too little. Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives and the brain saves both. "

Here is what our armies (FAS), police (FCS) and secret services (SS) are doing in the fight against Jihadist terrorism as a global and hybrid war: using the Brain.

Adapt to the new war environment. With the Second World War, the concept of War ended as a defined war scenario, with regular uniformed armies and protected by the laws of International Law that defined norms of behavior.

The arrival of Vietnam led to the launching of Special Operations Units, recovered from those first projects of Demolition and Sabotage units, which had served the US military with such good results during World War II.

It could be seen the beginning, starting from that contest of the role of the "military advisers"

(SEAL Units newly created by JFK) helped and even directed by Intelligence Centers supporting or defining what the actions of these "advisers" should be. In Vietnam, what was known as the "Backsliding of Conflict" was openly applied, actions that were not approved by the law of war and which can not be carried out openly, since in this type of action the principle of " the media".

At present, the role of Special Operations in the war against Jihadist terrorism throughout the world makes it necessary, more than ever, for the staging of the TRIDENT to combat it. This will help reduce blood, sweat and bring appropriate resolution of kills and collateral damages to complicated scenarios with non-belligerent civilian population.

The Secret Services as the trident's main axis will obtain from their sources the information necessary to design operations of either punishment, execution, sabotage or capture of terrorist leaders. To do this they would have agents

on the ground, protected by these Special Operations troops.

The information collected must be converted into intelligence in order to prepare the execution of the precise Attack Plan according to the type of operation to be carried out. They will have to transfer this information and intelligence to the Special Operations Command, which will adapt human resources, materials and specific equipment (weapons and communications) for the operation, as well as means of infiltration and exfiltration and, above all, Drones and Satellites, as well as coverage in case you need it.

What role do Security Forces and Bodies have? Fundamental. Any information they collect should be directed towards the Secret Services as a link between the Operation and the end of it. We must remember that any action there will entail the possibility of a reaction here. That is why the communication between FCS and SS must be bidirectional. A capture of documentation to a jihadist group in Iraq may lead to the dismantling of a jihadist or indoctrinated returnee cell in any country in the world.

And from here I would like to express the peace of mind that our FCS, the CNI and the FAS (with their Special Operations component, the MOE) are a TRIDENT in the service of peace and democracy, as well as the TRIDENT of perfect attack, under the denomination of CITCO (Center of Intelligence against Terrorism and Organized Crime).

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## Follow us and stay informed.

# Terrorism and Cyber terrorism in the Southern Cone of South America

**Ransomware: "Extortion Kidnapping" of global user archives, or "general rehearsal" of future Cyber Devastating Critical Infrastructure Attacks from diverse countries?**

*by Roberto Uzal*



Ransomware: Distintos niveles de los ataques

Conflictos entre estados naciones (frecuentemente simulados como Ciber Crímenes o actos de Ciber Terrorismo de grupos no controlados por el estado

Ciber Terroristas que bloquean Historias Clínicas Electrónicas de instituciones. Hospitalarias, paralizan Sistemas de Seguridad Social, paralizan el Sistema Financiero de un país.

Organizaciones Criminales Transnacionales que seguramente también incluyen al Ciber Lavado Transnacional de Activos en su "paquetes de negocios"

"Ladrones de gallina" del Ciber Espacio. Empleados resentidos. Empleados sobornados. Autorizaciones de acceso no definidas correctamente o no controladas. Ausencia de Control Interno. Sistemas de Información con vulnerabilidades extremas

This article formulates hypotheses related to the nature and purpose of the Cyber Attack on a global scale registered during the month of May, 2017. Cyber Aggression consisted in the "kidnapping extortion" of user files, using "ransomware" type tools.

After the encryption of the files of certain users, the Cyber Aggressors proceeded to demand the payment of a "rescue" to be concreted in bitcoins. This was the requirement of the attackers to provide the necessary key for the des-encryption of the locked files.

In this paper, two hypotheses are formulated: a) It highlights the possibility that Cyber Modular Weapons have been used as intermediaries between the true command and control of Cyber Aggression servers and the tools that effectively acted globally on thousands of targets in Form almost simultaneously and, b) It is pointed out that Cyber Attack was not an end in itself; In reality it would have been a kind of "general rehearsal" associated with possible future attacks of even more devastating characteristics and in which "Cyber Modular Weapons" would be used again as an auxiliary to the management of a new global activity.

In the article, reflections are made and proposals are made to avoid or at least mitigate the consequences of the forthcoming distributed Cyber Attacks materialized on a global scale and possibly target critical components of Critical Infrastructure in a large number of countries.

Extortive kidnappings of user files on a global scale

As is widely known, malicious software WannaCry, targeted at "extorting kidnapping" of user files (to "extortionate encryption", in fact) affected, in the early stages of the global aggression materialized in May 2017, the National Service of Salud, to some of Spain's most important business corporations as well as computers and computer networks installed in Russia, Ukraine and Taiwan. In a couple of days of "hostilities" the victims were thousands and distributed in more than one hundred countries. In all cases, after the encryption of the files of the users, a rescue was required that had to be made effective in bitcoins. This was the requirement to provide the necessary encryption key for the affected files. Massive attack was understood globally which

showed important coordination capabilities and tools, given the simultaneity and geographical distribution of aggressions.

How is mass aggression supposed to take shape through ransomware?

In order to attempt a consistent answer to this question it is necessary to mention the concept and the instrumental characteristics of the so-called "Modular Cyber Weapons". The aforementioned modular approach makes it possible to have a platform that i) coordinates other "Cyber Weapons" generating an "integrated whole" to be used to fulfill various "missions" (aggressions); ii) adapts to this "integrated whole" Diverse characteristics and dispersed in a very wide geographic space. In a certain way, "Modular Cyber Arms" can act as a sort of "intermediate management instance" between the Cyber Attack Command and Control servers and the malware (ransomware in this case) that i) performs the encryption in each of the (Ii) transmitting the terms of the extortion and (iii) providing the key to release the blocked files after the victim of the attack has made the ransom payment. The possible use of "Modular Cyber Arms" as "intermediary management

simultaneity of numerous attacks, the coordination achieved, the very effective task of "bribe collection", the precision in the delivery of "asymmetric keys" of des-encrypted (specific for each victim) and the correct decisions of Self-elimination of malware, lead to the strong presumption of using "Modular Cyber Weapons" effectively fulfilling some of the "responsibilities" commonly assigned to Cyber Attack Command and Control servers.

A non-minor theme: The delivery of the "asymmetric keys" of de-encrypted.

Encryption algorithms can be cataloged between those using "symmetric key" and those using "asymmetric key" as described by the two figures that illustrate.

AES: It is a symmetric encryption (encrypted) algorithm. It was developed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen, both of Belgian origin. His first name was Rijndael (pronounced "Rain Doll" in English). ASE became an effective standard on May 26, 2002. Since 2006 AES is perhaps the most widely used algorithm in symmetric cryptography.

RSA: The asymmetric RSA public key algorithm was created in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adlman. It is

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instances" is one of the two hypotheses proposed by the author of this article.

It is known, with regard to the WannaCry type ranomware that, when the target is infected, the malware contacts its Command and Control server requiring instructions for its effective activation, ie i) initiate the encryption tasks of the files Of the user - victim, ii) require the rescue when the user files are blocked and iii) manage the communications related to the delivery of the de-encrypted key when the "rescue", in bitcoins, has been made effective. WannaCry malware, commands from the Command and Control server through, proceeds to self-delete to increase backtracing difficulties (attribution of the attack to a perfectly identified and localized Command and Control server).

However, in the case of Mass Cyber Attack in analysis, there are numerous indications that lead to the presumption of the use of "Modular Cyber Weapons" effectively fulfilling a large part of the "responsibilities" commonly assigned to Command and Control servers. The geographic spread, the

the most well-known and used asymmetric cryptographic system. Rivest, Shamir and Adlman founded RSA Data Security Inc., one of the best positioned in the data protection environment.

It is evident that, in order to deliver a specific key to each victim who agrees to pay the ransom, the asymmetric key approach emerges as the most appropriate for the Cyber Criminal, Cyber Terrorist or Military Commander who conducts Cyber Attack using ransomware .

The use of symmetric keys could, among others, present the following disadvantages:

- That the victims get in touch with each other and exchange the unique encryption key.

- That the transmission of thousands of copies of the same key for the des-encryption of the files "kidnapped" to all victims, increases the probability of that key being located by the teams that are facing the Cyber Attack.

Since it is highly likely that cyber aggressors have used "asymmetric" algorithms in the case of "extortionate kidnappings" of files under study, a

greater computational effort should be presumed, as required by this encryption / decryption approach. On the other hand, the delivery of a "personalized" des-encryption key to each victim requires a very important management effort; This has an additional difficulty, considering the overall scope of the attack.

In addition, the effort associated with the management of the collection of "bribes" is added.

The mentions and arguments contained in this point of the article support, at least in part, the hypothesis of the existence of an "intermediate layer" between the Command and Control servers of this Global Cyber Attack case and the thousands of Cyber Weapons Type ransomware specifically in charge of

The figure that heads the article proposes a sort of "hierarchical cataloging" of different levels of attacks, made by "ransomware", by different aggressors on different targets.

- "Thieves of hen" of the Cyber Space. Resentful employees. Employees bribed. Use of access authorizations not defined correctly or uncontrolled. Absence of Internal Control. Information systems with extreme vulnerabilities

- Transnational Criminal Organizations that surely also include the Transnational Cyber-Laundering of Assets in their "business packages" (association detected by collaborators of the author)

- Cyber Terrorists who block Electronic Clinical



*La clave que se usa para encriptar es distinta de la que se utiliza para desencriptar (que es única para cada receptor)*

"extortion kidnapping" files on each target.

Additional mentions about Cyber Modular Weapons

As anticipated in a way, a modular approach in the architecture of the Cyber Arms, allows them not only a simplified change of the "payload" but also a simple adaptation of the configuration files, methods of encryption, complementation with other diverse Cyber Arms and also facilitates the approaches of "masking".

References for some Cyber Modular Weapons

- Flame also known as Flamer or Skywiper, is a modular malware discovered in 2012. The program, of great versatility, was detected performing Cyber Espionage tasks in countries of the Middle East.

Its discovery was announced on May 28, 2012 by MAHER, the Cyber Emergency Response Center of Iran, Kaspersky Lab and CrySyS Lab of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics.

- On the other hand, a detailed analysis of the Cyber Weapon Modular Shamoon, which is playing a very important role in the Cyber War Iran - Saudi Arabia, has been possible to be realized when this malware was detected in diverse servers in which there were Been set up for future employment.

Shamoon became apparent when it was used to infect about 30,000 workstations in 2012 at the world's largest oil company: Saudi Aramco.

The current versions of Shamoon have been perfected, both in their effectiveness and in their masking abilities.

Attacks using ransomware: Different levels of attack and attackers and targets

Histories of hospital institutions, which paralyze Social Security Systems, paralyze the financial system of a country.

- Conflicts between nation states (often simulated as Cyber Crimes or Cyber Terrorism acts of groups not controlled by the state). This includes terrorist organizations with a jihadist etiology whose actions are almost indistinguishable from the acts of the theocracies that provide them with protection.

The second hypothesis contained in this article supposes to the greater level of the mentioned "hierarchical cataloging" intervening, in planning and in the execution, of the global Cyber Aggression, using ransomware, that was carried out during the month of May of 2017 .

Reflections

1. If the first hypothesis of this article is correct, "Cyber Modular Armas used as intermediary instances of the Command and Control system during the attack in May 2017, the attacker has acquired an invaluable experience in the planning and execution of important Cyber Aggressions distributed globally.

2. The possible use of Modular Cyber Weapons will make it possible for Cyber Attacker to execute new Cyber Attacks but, for example, by exchanging ransomware type tools for Stuxnet type "super worms". The so-called "super worm" was used to realize the partial destruction of the Uranium enrichment plant that Iran was putting "ready" in the town of Natanz.

3. In cases of attacks such as May 2017, potential malware detection approaches of the "Network Flow Analysis" type are particularly useful.

4. Also in this type of attacks can be facilitated the operations of the type "backtracing" (real detection of the servers of Command and Control used by the attacker)

5. In the opinion of the author of this article, the attacker (in the case analyzed) had both a solid know-how and consolidated skills in the field of Modular Cyber Weapons.

6. The author of this article also considers that, if a clear attribution of the Cyber Attack through ransomware is achieved to its true executor, there would be no surprise. Surely the responsible nation state or terrorist organizations under its protection, are already categorized among those accustomed to maximize the global balance by frequently using for high tech use.

7. If the Cyber Attack studied with the criteria generally used for the study of the profitability of investment projects is evaluated, this Cyber Attack would undoubtedly constitute a financial loss. On the other hand, if we take into account the results achieved in terms of increasing and consolidating capacity to plan and conduct Cyber Impact Global Impacts, we would be facing remarkable success.

Suggestions

1. Do not discard the possibility that Cyber Modular Weapons have been used. This hypothesis should be taken into account in the ongoing investigations into the etiology of the Cyber Attack of global scope carried out in May 2017.

2. Do not discard the possibility of future massive attacks after the "general rehearsal" conducted in May 2017. These possible future attacks could use tools even more devastating than the ransomware type used in the Cyber Attack quoted in this article.

3. Develop / optimize Intrusion Detection Systems capable of acting in this type of global distribution attacks. It is recommended, as it is considered particularly apt, the approach called Network Flow Analysis.

4. Develop / optimize "Backtracking" systems to solve the "Attribution Problem" (identification of the real Cyber Attacker) specially oriented to Cyber Aggression schemes such as those mentioned in this article.

Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, june 1, 2017

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# Colombia: Terrorism, War and Peace

## The Neo-Paramilitares

*by Douglas Hernández*



*Figure 1. The strange criminal career of alias "Otoniel". Source: prepared for TRIARIUS, June 2017.*

In the Bulletin Triarius No. 6, a brief historical introduction was made to what were the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and about the incalculable damage they did to society. It was left there raised that in fact after their demobilization, they had not disappeared but had mutated. In this paper we will address the most important neo-paramilitary organization at present: "The Gulf Clan".

### Difficult to name

The first thing is to clarify that this organization has been changed its name in several opportunities, attending to citizens' complaints. Initially they were called by the authorities "The Urabeños", making reference that their main area of operations was the region known as Urabá. Precisely the inhabitants of this region felt stigmatized by such a name, that associated them with a virulent criminal organization. Faced with this fair claim, President Juan Manuel Santos ordered to change the name by which they would be identified, becoming known as "El Clan Úsuga" referring to the surname of its principal leader and his family, which is the one that Controls that organization. But again there were protests, this time of people surnames Úsuga, who lived in Urabá, and that had nothing to do with the criminal organization. Finally, they were denominated "Clan of the Gulf", referring to the Gulf of Urabá, an unmistakable geographical accident, that does not necessarily associate with specific people who could be alluded to being innocent.

Criminals call themselves "Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia", trying to attribute a political component, although in reality they are nothing more than drug traffickers and murderers.

These preliminary clarifications are important, while some people are misinformed to think that the Clan Úsuga, the Clan of the Gulf, the Urbabeños and the "Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia" are different groups, when in fact they are the same With different name. In short, these criminals call themselves "Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia", trying to manipulate public opinion. Since they are not defending themselves against anyone, they are not victims but perpetrators, the State denies them this possibility by giving them another official name, and this is "Gulf Clan".

### Criminal Activity

The Gulf Clan, is mainly engaged in drug trafficking, illegal mining and extortion in various regions of the country.

The US Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA, and the American Police Community, AMERIPOL, have succeeded in establishing that the "Gulf Clan" exported about 92 tons of cocaine annually to the United States and Europe, And that have also created links with drug cartels in Mexico and Central America.

This delinquency group has a presence in 17 of the 32 departments of Colombia, presumably in its different structures groups about 3,000 delinquents. It acts like a franchise to which small local bands are affiliated, fulfilling orders in exchange of benefits.

Two years ago, the National Government launched, through the National Police, the

AGAMENÓN-permanent operation-whose main purpose is to dismantle the "Clan of the Gulf" and capture or dismiss its main leaders, especially Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias "Otoniel". AGAMENÓN currently has 1,700 men from different specialties of the National Police, and according to official statements, up to now, 12 billion Colombian pesos have been invested in it.

This investment of men, time and resources, has paid off. So far 790 members of the "Clan Del Golfo" have been captured, 15 of them leaders of that organization, lieutenants of alias "Otoniel", besides his sentimental companion, three brothers, an excuñado, a nephew, and other relatives.

Already in 2012, prior to AGAMENÓN, in the town of Acandí, department of Chocó, the brother of Otoniel, Juan de Dios Úsuga David, alias "Giovany" was discharged.

In March of this year, Jairo Durango Restrepo, alias "Guagua", a member of the General Staff of the Gulf Clan, responsible for business on the Colombian Pacific Coast, from Chocó to Nariño, was discharged. This subject was requested in extradition by the government of the United States, for the crime of drug trafficking, like the majority of its leaders.

Another great success of the Public Force in early March was the downfall of Rubén Darío Ávila Martínez, alias "Felipe" or "Lorenzo", leader of the Caribbean Coast of the Gulf Clan.

The persecution to which they are subjected by the operation AGAMENÓN has led these criminals to try a kind of retaliation that contemplates the murder of the Colombian policemen, through the call "Pistol Plan", by means of which 2 million pesos are paid to Anyone who kills a policeman (the monthly minimum wage in the country is 737,717 pesos). At the moment of writing these lines there are already 13 policemen killed, and many more failed attempts.

This situation is on alert for the National Police, since the criminals have turned this into a terrorist operation, to intimidate the institution. The National Government, instead of yielding to the pressures, ordered the National Police, to increase the security measures, and also launched the operation AGAMENÓN II, which will now include a component of Special Forces of the Army, charged with chasing and Combat the stronger structures of the Gulf Clan.

**Alias Otoniel**

Otoniel is a 46-year-old farmer who was raised in the township of Pueblo Nuevo in the municipality of Necoclí in the department of Antioquia. It is a product of the strange and fratricidal Colombian war. This person has lived more than half of his life as a rural

combatant on either side. At the age of 16, he entered the leftist Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and then moved on to the extreme right-wing group called the Centaurs of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. What proves that neither he nor the organizations that hosted it had true ideological bases, it is "labor" that is sold and bought, with objectives that transcend the ideological theme.

Alias "Otoniel" would demobilize as a paramilitary in 2005, taking advantage of the plans presented by the National Government, however in 2007 he would again become illegal when he entered the armed group called "Héroes de Castaño" (name that refers to former Deceased of the AUC), Criminal Band - BACRIM founded by Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias "Don Mario".

Castaño's Heroes were in themselves a neo-paramilitary organization, while they sought to collect their flags after the AUC had been formally demobilized, but unlike those that were effectively dedicated to the extermination of the guerrillas, neo-Paramilitaries are clear that they are to enrich themselves and control territories.

This group, mainly engaged in drug trafficking, faced two other Antioquenoan bands, finding that they had interests that they could not share, especially in farming areas. For this reason, it declared war on "La Oficina" and "Los Paisas". These two last criminal organizations were badly beaten by the Public Force, and their extradited leaders, being very debilitated, there took advantage of the Castaño Heroes to impose their law in the region of Urabá Antioqueño and Chocoano (hence the name of Los Urabeños).

Alias Don Mario, was captured in 2009 and then extradited, leaving Otoniel to command the Criminal Band. The new leader (a clever natural leader) redistributed the personnel in Blocks and Fronts, having as main territories the departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre and Chocó. Also to make it clear that it was no longer the same thing, it began to use the name of "Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia" (AGC). Wherever the CGAs appear, there is death and forced population displacement. They created pseudo-statutes and even hand out pamphlets to try to generate the false image of being a political-military movement, arising from the government's (real) defaults with the reinsertados of the AUC.

**The business**

The media reported that the Gulf Clan dominates about 60% of the drug market in Colombia. For years they have woven a complex network of alliances with

criminal gangs and guerrillas in different parts of the country, in order to distribute areas of illicit crops and routes for the transport of drugs. Where they have not managed to agree there has been a bloodbath, as was the case already mentioned "The Office" and "Los Paisas", clashes where the civilian population took the worst part.

Another activity that has been and is being investigated, is related to the relations of public officials with this criminal band. Alías Otoniel has assured, for example, that seven Mayors of the Urabá region without "his chips" (which are his allies). As of August 2015, nearly 600 civil servants had been captured for alleged links with the Gulf Clan.

This year 2017 has been full of retaliation against the state. From March 31 to April 1, the Gulf Clan declared an "armed strike" in the areas where they are present, indicating to the population the cessation of all economic, labor, or academic activity, in addition to advancing the so-called Plan Pistol, By means of which they pay 2 million pesos per murdered policeman. The strike affected 36 municipalities in 8 departments, which accounts for its power and influence. During that armed strike, 5 policemen died, and two civilians, but in compensation there were the capture of 56 members of the criminal organization.

**Let's go against them**

As of February 2, 2015, there are 1700 police officers chasing members of the Gulf Clan. There are already 27 months of continuous operations, and after 367 operations of registration, assault and interdiction, has a cumulative of 1,034 people captured, 94 tons of cocaine seized, 200 hectares of illicit crops destroyed, as well as 81 laboratories for drug trafficking. They have also captured 427 firearms, have occupied goods valued at more than 338 billion pesos, and have been found with money for 27.447 billion pesos. The whole effort focuses on capturing or bringing down Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias "Otoniel", the head of this cartel of drug traffickers; Luis Padierma, alias "England", third in command of that criminal organization, and Roberto Vargas Gutiérrez alias "Gavilán", a narco who violates the children in the hamlets where he is hiding, adding a macabre note to his already embarrassing record.

In the operation AGAMENÓN have participated policemen attached to the Directorate of Intelligence (DIPOL), the Criminal Investigation Directorate (DIJIN), the Carabineros Directorate (DICAR) and the Anti-narcotics Directorate.

The Colombian State has understood that the repression of delinquency is not enough. There are regions in complete state abandonment where illegality is the only labor and subsistence option, which is why AGAMENÓN also has a social component, in which for example it has benefited 100,542 people with drinking water, and has worked with 49,670 children And girls in the framework of the Prevention of Education for Drug Use and Abuse Education program. In all places where operations are carried out, combat nurses attend to the population that requires it. The fighting continues.

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# Colombia: Terrorism, War and Peace

## FARC terrorism in prospective

*by Jorge Humberto Salinas*



*Photo of the El Nogal club in Bogotá, after the attack on February 7, 2003. Semana magazine*

In the last five years, the FARC in Colombia has faithfully fulfilled the great objective of its Strategic Plan for the seizure of power: "To become part of the political structure of the State"; Articulated since the Seventh Guerrilla Conference there in the 1980s in the jungles of Colombia. It was in their roots to be able to have that link and through the various forms of struggle should find ways to access and start the infiltration of the political scheme of the State.

Not in vain did they risk, and gave a turn to their way of thinking and analyzing the regional and global context of their so-called "subversive struggle," because everything about the FARC has been pure terrorism, and where the way of arms Was not adequate. They were being defeated in the military camp and the social support - allxistent in their totality -, obliges them that the new position before the international community is the one of the dialogue with the government of turn, that surprisingly for many, but for others - As in the author's particular case-they found an extremely flexible ally who forgot that premise of Wiston Churchil: "He who kneels to get peace stays with humiliation and war." The FARC found a scenario more than conducive and tailored to their interests; Thinking that they will change from being classified as one of the most dangerous narco-terrorist groups worldwide, to be a political force in Colombia and keeping their treasure chest full of money from kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking, is more than a victory, Is a strategic achievement achieved, coupled with having a foothold in the precincts of the congress and the political life of the country.

But as the enemy does not sleep, no one has even noticed the true intentions of the FARC; It is true that before the eyes of the world they will stop being a terrorist group and they will be legitimized for the public life, but ... where will be the routes of the narcotraffic that has controlled from the east of the country towards Venezuela and from there with the auspice Of the authorities of the present regime, towards Central America, the United States and Europe? The answer is simple and unfortunately we have been selling it and we know it, but we do not assume it as it is .... The FARC's dissidents in the Eastern, South and South Western blocs are keeping all control of this business and will be the financial arm of the political machinery of this new party. Of course, there must be alliances with other groups outside the law, such as the Gulf Clan, the EPL, and other smaller groups, but the head will remain the same. The former FARC secretariat will now have to become a party congress and from there decisions will come.

La Paz in Colombia is not close, on the contrary, violence is going to intensify, change, mutate and present itself with more force. Now with claws and legitimate visible head in the public life of the country.

In this negotiation without a doubt the great winner have been the FARC and the great loser, the Colombian people.

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# Fight against jihadist terrorism in Spain

## Cooperation between Spain and Morocco in the fight against yihadist terrorism

*by Pilar Rangel*



Capture leader of a jihadist cell.

Cooperation between Morocco and Spain is essential to tackle jihadist terrorism. One of the key tools in the success of the collaboration between Spain and Morocco in the fight against terrorism and the excellent relations existing between the two countries are the Police Cooperation Centers located in Tangiers and Algeciras, which were created in 2012 to facilitate The collaboration between the police forces of both countries in a number of subjects, including the fight against terrorism, the management of migratory flows and the fight against organized crime in the Strait of Gibraltar.

From an organizational perspective, it is important to highlight the work between antiterrorist prosecutors in Spain, France, Belgium and Morocco. From the same perspective, but moving to the police field, cooperation between Spain and Morocco follows the scheme: on the one hand, the General Information Office of the National Police Corps, collaborates with the Moroccan Directorate General of National Security (DGSN) , While the Information Service of the Civil Guard is related to the Gendarmerie of Morocco. In the event that there are differences in these dual contributions go to the Counter Terrorism Division of the Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO). Another point to highlight regarding police measures is the transfer of members of the State Security Forces and Corps to Rabat to perform tasks related to the international competencies of the Ministry of Interior, regardless of the body to which they belong. Proof of the improvements in this area is that between March 2014 and March 2016, the police forces of Spain and Morocco have carried out eight joint operations (seven with the National Police and one with the Civil Guard), in the Which have been arrested a total of 68 people: 42 in Morocco and 26 in Spain.

From the perspective of measures of a religious nature, we can bring up the work of the Moroccan authorities in controlling the designation of the magnets that lead Islamic places of worship in Spain, especially those oratories whose congregation is mostly composed of Muslims of origin With the aim of preventing extremist preachers from fomenting radicalization among their nationals. This decision is very useful for Spain, which does not have the necessary capacities to intervene in this religious sector or on issues of Moroccan culture. For this reason, the National Plan for Prevention of Radicalization approved by Spain in January 2015 includes measures such as:

• Spanish-Moroccan collaboration in the formation of magnets

• the participation of Moroccan teachers in the teaching of language and culture of their country in Spanish schools to descendants of immigrants from the same

• the financing of the Islamic cult in Ceuta and Melilla.

In sum, the counter-terrorism cooperation between the Spanish and Moroccan authorities, centered on Jihadist terrorism, is excellent, and therefore serves as an example to the other members of the International Community. In the current situation, in which both countries are aware of a jihadi mobilization never seen - from Morocco come more than 1,500 individuals incorporated into jihadist organizations active in Syria and Iraq - collaboration with the neighboring country is fundamental to guarantee security to Both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar..

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# Adaptation of forces and security forces to the tasks of the 21st century

## Databases and information management

*by Eduardo Padrón*



Mare Nostrum

A difficult issue to address, because, as I have said on some occasion, the information that an intelligence service has, is one of its most precious assets, we will try to give some minimal notions on this matter.

The network of an information system has to have an air firewall, what does this mean? As the computers and servers of the service network, they must be disconnected from the public network and be a local work network. The physical and logical security of a database is vital, from its confidentiality, integrity, availability and authentication.

The information has to be well labeled for later search by internal search engines, structured by various methods, from thematic to tree. Access to this must be duly registered by databases that record, date, time, person who accesses, search done, to which information access and it would be interesting that how long the file or database has open, obviously has to have a Structured access level, compartmentalizing what kind of information each person can access, depending on their need to know. It is clear that an analyst should have more access to information than a member of physical

security, of the enclosure, that it is sufficient that he has access to the database of which vehicles have permission to enter the facilities and That identification card has entry permit, through a database that does not allow to copy at once, all the information, but you have to introduce some field to have such information and so it is registered in the auditing database.

The databases have to be as much as possible interrelated, by fields, for example, if in a database we have a DNI field, associated with a telephone field, and in another database, a telephone field, associated to an address field, These fields must be related so that the spectrum of information, which is accessed, is greater, which is ultimately what is sought, interrelated information, which translates into more information, which with more information to analyze, Usually translated, into greater knowledge or intelligence.

Regarding physical security, the facilities where the servers are with the information, must have security measures against fire, flood and unauthorized physical access, the latter supported by technical means and armed security personnel.

Security personnel also have the task of preventing the entry of computer equipment, as well as their exit, this can be done by an X-ray security control, as well as a card system that records the progress of employees by the Enclosure, giving access or denying them, to the different dependencies of the complex.

At the software level you must have firewalls and intrusion detection systems, which detect anomalous events in the network, access of computers that are not in the system, robotic behavior by computers in the network, etc.

The communication of information between, for example, a base of operations abroad and the central one in Spain, should be done by reliable human emails, with pendrives, which are properly encrypted, and passed by antivirus, before being introduced into network.

The communication of information between, for example, a base of operations abroad and the central one in Spain, should be done by reliable human emails, with pendrives, which are properly encrypted, and passed by antivirus, before being introduced into network.

These security measures have a practical case, happened in a Spanish intelligence agency, which had personnel deployed in an Arab-speaking country and these were those who knew the identity of the sources, and thanks to the convenient data dump in the headquarters Central, the members who replaced their comrades, knew which doors to touch when they were killed.

It is essential to have different backup copies of the information, the places where they are stored must have the same security measures as the original places, being convenient that they are separated several kilometers between them and the places are secret.

The feeding of these databases, their good structuring and labeling, in storage, is one of the most important missions of those in charge of mechanization and data dump. The information service must have an insatiable appetite, in obtaining information.

The information that can be handled in paper format, has to be treated accordingly, there must be a methodology on the use of paper shredders by employees, since the creation of the LOPD, have made these devices, are more usual in Work centers and therefore more economical. The staff has to have a strict methodology of work, on which wastebaskets throw paper with any type of information and to throw away breakfast wastes, for example. Imagine someone picking up all the rubbish from the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and some official would have run away throwing a folio of part of a cause into the trash, so cheerfully.

Finally, especially in bases abroad or "delicate", there must be protocols to destroy all information, in paper and digital format before a possible takeover of the base or its dismantling.

"Whenever you want to attack an army, besiege a city or attack a person, you must first know the identity of the generals who defend it, their allies, their visitors, their sentinels and their servants; So let your spies find out all about them. "

Sun Tzu-The Art of War

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Kommando Spezialkräfte

## KSK

Officially the KSK began its existence on September 20, 1996 and was reported ready for operations in April 1997. The KSK can only be used with the authorization of the German parliament.

This is a volunteer force with approximately 1,100 members, most in the areas of communications and logistics. Women can not belong to combat platoons, but to the fields of communications, logistics and command.

There are four combat companies, with approximately 100 items each. They are divided into five platoons:

1st platoon: Ground insertion.
2nd platoon: Intelligence, Vertical insertion (air).
3rd platoon: Amphibians.
4th platoon: Mountain / Polar operations.
5th platoon: Recognition and operations of sniper and counter-sniper.



The basic unit of combat is the Kommandotrupp (KdoTrp), which consists of four elements specialized in weapons, combat engineering, communication and first aid. Usually this unit is led by the most experienced member, with the rank of Hauptfeldwebel or Sergeant Major.

If necessary, the unit may also include a language specialist.

If the operation requires several Kommandotrupp, the leader would be an officer or Kommandooffizier (KdoOffz), who has exactly the same training as the other soldiers.

Operations are controlled by the Kommando Führung Operationen von Spezialkräften (KdoFOSK) from the center of operations in Geltow, near Potsdam.

Photos: © KSK.





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# *Experts who participated in this edition*

**(In order of appearance)**

### Enric Caballería
(Spain) Graduated in History from the University of Barcelona and currently studying the Official Master's Degree in Contemporary History and Current World. Parallel to the studies of History, is Director and Head of Security enabled by the Ministry of the Interior of Spain. Other courses include the Technical Analyst in Jihadist Terrorism and International Geostrategy.

### David Garriga
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