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Editorial

From Spain, Aguilera makes a brief review to the problem that exists to achieve a definition of terrorism which is accepted internationally, and exposes some of the difficulties that prevent it.

Followed step, the Colombian analyst Hernandez, presents another interesting analysis, this time referring to the Brazilian problems. It highlights the contrast between the economic progress of the country, and its acute problem of public security. Focusing on the particular case of Rio de Janeiro, and the current intervention of the military by presidential order.

From Spain, Pardo made a detailed reading of the Colombian military logistics, presenting a critique underpinned today's same situation that should reflect to the men and women of the military forces of Colombia. The Saints, since Spain analyst, makes a brief but interesting analysis of the location and functions of some of the most important military bases in the world, and which are of a strategic nature for the country that possesses them.

From Argentina, Viera presents a detailed letter about the "Center of Fusion of intelligence" that is being created in their country to fight organized crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms trafficking and terrorism. This framework of more recent strategies of the National Centre for Criminal Intelligence of Argentina.

Finally, the last article in this edition offers organizational learning, as an alternative to losing the knowledge gained by the military and police personnel, not when he was transferred, amounts or will be low.

Douglas Hernández

Editor



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On the cover, *Isis Hunter from Syria*. See the unit's review at the end of the magazine.

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Special thanks to international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue for free.



Terrorism Concept

By Jesus Aguilera (Spain)



Daily read "terrorist attack" in the written press, we see on television "arrested terrorist", "anti-terrorist operation", but do we know what is terrorism? One thing clear is that it is a term when less

controversial and that throughout history it was not the same nor encompassed the same facts. The reasons that cause this difficulty in formulating

a definition accepted in general are very different.

That best explains these difficulties is Alex Schmid, one of the leading scholars in the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Four reasons to explain the problems in defining the term sets. Let's study the four reasons.

1. The concept of terrorism is hotly disputed, since political, legal, social and popular notions are often divergent.

What for some is liberating or fighters for freedom, for others are terrorists.

2. The second reason is that the issue of the definition is linked to the legitimization, delegitimization and criminalization of certain groups.

Be in the list of terrorist organisations of the European Union, U.S. or U.N., can be a big slab when it comes to its international expansion or

fundraising. In July 2013, a result of the pressure, the European union decided to left wing military Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organisations.

3. The third reason explains why it is so difficult to accept a general definition, is that there are many types of terrorism each with different forms of manifestation.

State, religious, political, environmental are some of the "surnames" that we hear next to the name of terrorism.

4. Finally, the fourth reason proposes that the term itself has undergone many changes of meaning in the more than 200 years of its existence.

Its semantic approach has changed since the French Revolution and the establishment of the rule of terror.

Ultimately, how much better we have defined the fact and greater international support exists for that definition, better are prepared to attack such a phenomenon. Without union conceptual, social, national and international policy will be vulnerable and terrorism will have won.

Carmelo Aguilera

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The instability of Brazil; a multidimensional challenge

By Haylyn Andrea Hernández Fernández (Colombia)



In recent years, Brazil has become a benchmark South American since it has become one of the powers with greater economic growth, because of its reforms to stabilize the economy through the promotion of investment, the momentum of the industry oil company and the consolidation of exports. Not in vain it is considered as the first economy strong in Latin America, the second in America; preceded by the United States and the ninth worldwide, with an economy of almost 1.8 trillion according to the World Bank.

On the other hand, investments in the military field have also been rising, this has a strategic long-range background because it responds to the new needs arising from economic growth, natural resources defence and positioning Brazilian geopolitical region. To 2017, according to figures from the International Research Institute for peace Stockholm (SIPRI), Brazil invested 1.3% (% of GDP) staying in the post 13 of the 15 countries with higher budgets in defence.

By its vast geography (with a surface area of 8.5 million square kilometers and 23.102 kilometers of land and sea borders), having under its jurisdiction one of the most important reserves of fresh water in the world and the protection of the Amazon; which is important for the global climate balance by its immense size and characteristics of its vegetation, the carioca country has a challenge for their influence on major issues of international politics of the 21st century, so its strategy is not strange in military since it is a need for foreign policy development. In addition,

so exercise its leadership role in the region, military supremacy is a factor indispensable for the consolidation of the role.

Now, as any State presents several internal problems that destabilize its development, one of these is the crisis of public security, with high crime incidence rates that have grown significantly over the years (Cano, 2006,) (p. 137).

Despite having a panorama prospero (apparently) in terms of its projection in the region, Brazil suffers from a crisis in public security scenario. According to the latest report of the citizen Council for public security and criminal justice in 2017; 10 Latin American cities among the most violent cities in the world, of the 50 cities in the ranking which ranked 19 are in Brazil. Natal, Belem and Aracaju occupied positions ten, eleven and twelve respectively (security, justice and peace, 2017, p. 3).

Recently, President Michel fear decided to give control of the security of the city of Rio de Janeiro to the military forces, through the promulgation of a decree endorsed a few days later by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, by ratifying the decision to intervene militarily in citizen security until the end of 2018. It should be noted that Rio de Janeiro has been surpassed in terms of violence by many other cities listed in the ranking of the most violent cities, Rio does not fit in the list, what happens is that the case of this city makes it resonates more, because of its popularity and tourist attraction.

The concern for the Federal Government came from the Organization of the football World Cup in 2014 and

the choice of Rio as host of the 2016 Olympic Games. Thanks to the joint efforts of the federal and State Governments, the murder rate fell from 44 to 28 per 100 thousand inhabitants between 2009 and 2012, reaching the minimum level in more than 25 years (Mizrahi, 2018).

In addition to a million-dollar investment, will set up a police pacifying units (UPP) which became a model for other cities, strategy consisted of get by force to the favelas; perceived as marginalized communities and centres of violence and organized crime, move to the bands who had control and instead of abandoning the territory, occupying it with the UPP, which ensured that they would not break into those empty spaces other bands.

However, it seems that the effect was short-term, since for the 2017 6731 murders were recorded, the homicide rate was 40 per 100,000 inhabitants, it is evident that in five years the security returned to the chaotic stage of previous years.



Tasa de homicidios en Río de Janeiro entre 1995 y 2017

Source: Mizrahi, D. (2018, February 25). Rio de Janeiro, samba and death: why the 'Cidade Maravilhosa' fails to control the violence.

January 2018, the number of killings by police intervention opposing grew 57.1% compared to the same month of the previous year (98 in 2017 - 2018 154) (O Dia, 2018), so the figures remain alarming.

Part of the violence is by the war between the first command da Capital (PCC), Sao Paulo, who is trying to take control in Rio de Janeiro against local gangs (Mizrahi, 2018). In addition, next to the Comando Vermelho gang, they have engaged increasingly with international drug trafficking and extortion, and gangs of kidnappers. There is also a presence of militias that are mostly composed of police officers, which are another source of violent crime, extorting entire neighborhoods and carrying out extrajudicial executions (InSight Crime, 2016).

Clearly, criminal organizations do not give truce and this is evident in the exacerbation of insecurity in the biggest annual celebration of Brazil, the "Carnival in Rio". The violence was repeated during the event despite the presence of 17,000 police officers between 9 and 13 February, did not prevent bands of youths assaulted and Qaddafi to tourists in areas that are usually considered to be safe. Similarly, several clashes were with criminals that three policemen dead and two wounded (Gardiner, 2018) left as a result. Rio is a city of paradoxes, a place of festivals and epicenter of extreme violence.

A few days after finishing the Carnival, fear President signed the decree that determines that control of the security operations in Rio will be in charge of the national army, seems to have been the ideal opportunity to demonstrate that a decision should be taken radical to mitigate violence and corruption, however, is a measure that some already considered counterproductive, arguing that the presence of military forces tend to increase levels of violence and abuse.

It also announced the creation of a new Ministry of national security, designed to coordinate the support of the federal Government to the States through the armed forces, the police and the national force of public safety, ultimately, seeks to give a federal response to growing crime in Brazil.

Some critics claim that the measures taken by the non-elected President are a strategy to improve his unpopularity, which has barely 5% of approval of its management, is already evident in any case, that decisions in matters of public security not they are not political strategies that allow the President to stand as a candidate for his own succession. Fear, who rose to power after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, is still Vice President, announced that he would be presented to the presidential elections of October 2018, so this possibility cannot be discarded.

Walter Souza Braga Netto, a general with experience in the coordination of security during the Olympic Games and the intelligence of the army, is in charge of coordinating the intervention in Rio. According to their statements, the intervention in the most emblematic State of Brazil will be a "laboratory" for the rest of the country, the military mission will be aimed to strengthen security with specific operations and for a certain time, and that is what is expected recover the operational capacity and credibility of the police. It seems that the general is trying to persuade the public that the military will participate in operations support, as they have been doing it, most will not be replacement of the police, in addition, there are no permanent military occupations (the plans Colombian, 2018).

Unfortunately, the carioca population must face a harsh reality, on the one hand, the issue of police corruption; According to statistics from the Prosecutor's Office, 20% of 5,219 people reported in recent years because of links with organized crime in Rio de Janeiro are members of security agencies, and on the other hand, complaints against soldiers for human rights registered in recent operations.

Rio de Janeiro Dynamics go beyond this small southern tourist area, it is composed of a cluster of slums that have a high population density and a deficit in the range of public resources. There reside vulnerable citizens who, in the majority of occasions, obtain income only drug trafficking and militias that have territorial borders control, since the opportunities within the framework of legality are rare, not to say null and void.

Based on the foregoing, it can be inferred that the extent of violence in Rio, not only is due to safety factors, but also shortcomings in the fields of social, economic and political, for this reason, the strategies to be implemented should not be confined to the component Police or military, but to integrate effective social and economic programs that promote the improvement in the living conditions of the citizens. In the political sphere, the effort must be even greater, since it is necessary to focus on the corruption which has bled the State apparatus to the point of losing the trust of Brazilians.

It is not an easy task, it is remedied by collateral damage by corrupt actions by former President Lula da Silva and the crime of tax liability of the former President, Dilma Rousseff, by having made up the accounts of three budgetary decrees. Not being sufficient, now is should add charges of corruption against the President fear by the Prosecutor's Office, which creates an atmosphere of political uncertainty that nothing contributes to the economic strengthening. This contributed to that Brazil entered a period of economic slowdown in two years, according to the Brazilian Institute of geography and statistics, the GDP shrank 3.6 percent in 2016, after having fallen 3.8% in 2015. For the 2017 refers to a slow recovery, because that was a weak growth of GDP represented by 1%, this means that still fail to restore the losses of the economic activity in the crisis (Silveira & Gazzoni, 2018).

The scenario is not encouraging, is mined from challenges and expectations, but is clear that it depends on the commitment of decision-makers in Government to address the political, economic crisis and security, this last of particular attention since it contributes to the wear of the Government feared.

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
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


The Colombian military logistics. Ready for a conflict?

By Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo (Spain)

Overview

It seems common sense to infer that one of the first questions to consider when analyzing the influence of logistics in a conflict, is to know the initial state of the logistic military of both sides, i.e. the degree of militarization of societies facing each other, since this factor goes despite decisively, not only to the long conflict, but especially in the early stages of the same. Referred to this degree of militarization or initial state as a Quaternary Sector^[11], defined as "addition to the traditional classification of the population active in three sectors (primario-agricola, (secundario-industrial, terciario-servicios), i.e., the grouping of activities, resources and people to the destruction, the sector of activities polemologicas." ^[2]



In this article we will briefly analyse the main criteria of military logistics in peacetime, applied, to the extent of available knowledge, the Colombian armed forces, to try to determine their strengths and those that, according to the modern military logistics methodology, may be not satisfactory and susceptible of improvement.

POINT 1: LOGISTICS VULNERABILITIES. LOGISTICAL CRITERIA: NATIONALIZATION AND R & D.

According to the literature on military logistics, all purchases of materials and resources that require the armed forces of a nation can be divided into the following four large groups according to specified in them:^[3]

"1. large orders of elements with a low unit price." Typical examples are the items consumed during the performance of military service: individual soldier weaponry, clothing personal equipment, regulatory ammunition, canned food, etc.; or the precise for the normal functioning of units and agencies: household goods, office supplies, furniture, etc.

2. industrially significant series of elements with an average cost. Among them we can mention: buses for transport of personnel, militarized communications equipment, parachute, light vehicles, etc...

3 limited series of articles with a high value. As sample will cite: armoured vehicles, ships, aircraft, etc...

4. unique elements to cover specific missions. "Representative cases are: the communication system of an operations center of

combat, a flight of an aircraft Simulator, an automatic test bench for the maintenance of aircraft or a tactical radar."

This being the case, is defined as objective essential nationalization and r & d to the 'get the total autonomy in the technologies applicable to the materials of the first two groups, stimulating and promoting industries in this achievement; "should also continuously improve their management through the application of the General principles of logistics." ^[4]

If we analyze the different types of equipment and materials that the Colombian armed forces are equipped with, observe that, for example, in the army this last objective is not met, now that both the weapons (pistols, rifles, personal machine guns, etc...), parts of personal artillery (mortars, etc.) as light vehicles (trucks, armoured wheeled, etc...) are designs and materials acquired abroad, with a strong predominance of two countries: the United States and Israel.

In the case of the Colombian Navy, the ships belong to group 3 and, indeed, the bulk of the fleet has been acquired abroad (Germany), even though we have an excellent case of nationalization and revaluation of the Colombian vessels manufacturing r & d d e -policing heavy, medium and light; restlessness born due to the special need of patrolling and controlling the waterways.

And, finally, in the case of the air force and the very expensive aircraft (Group 3), indeed several foreign countries the main suppliers (USA, France, Brazil and Israel), there only a Colombian model of training aircraft and other transportation.

It is worth noting an excessive dependence, both the army and air of the United States and Israel, this puts Colombia in logistics vulnerable in case of a conflict that clash with the interests of these two countries (as already experim (entaron to its regret of Argentines in the Falklands).

LOGISTICAL CRITERIA: STRATEGIC SECURITY.

The main objective of this criterion is to have established a system of strategic security, logistics or production factors, so as to ensure the maximum impenetrability of the core of the industrial infrastructure of the nation, continuously improving your efficiency with effective decentralisation, dispersion and concealment that makes it difficult for the destruction of all our industrial fabric and stocks of war and/or mobilization by the enemy.

The Colombian military industry is run by the State, and mainly consists of the company Indumil (with offices in Bogota and Sogamoso) for the army, and the company Cotecmar and shipyards of Cartagena for the Navy, both with headquarters in Cartagena. It doesn't seem an adequate provision of strategic security according to the objectives set in the previous paragraph.

On the other hand, the design of armament, does allow that multitude of components it can manufacture by small workshops scattered and then transported and assembled finally in another industry? Have been provided the proper elements of distribution with the adequate flexibility and duplicity? Have established normal and emergency routes that will ensure the availability of logistics or factors of production? The Government of the nation and the staff of the armed forces must provide for these matters and give effective responses.

LOGISTICAL CRITERIA: STRATEGIC RESERVES.

According to military logistics theory, the armed forces of a nation must maintain a "reserve of Guerra" ammunition and fuel broad enough, in such a way as to guarantee the continuity of the military operations in the event of conflict until it ensure your replenishment, i.e. until civilian industry has turned to military industry and to meet the logistics needs of units in combat (a period estimated between 6 and 9 months).

In addition, there is a prioritization of objectives and needs of strategic reserves? Both military and civilians? Have been identified sources (human, industrial and economic) obtaining complementary (Allied or neutral countries)? They have studied or taken into account the possible actions of the enemy against them?

LOGISTICAL CRITERIA: HUMAN MOBILIZATION.

With a powerful army of more than half a million men, more reserves of more than 700,000, in addition to a national conscription system tested in time, is as warranted a human staff mobilization capability for the Army fighter. However, this is not enough, since it is the Mission of the State develop plans for an efficient mobilization of the "army of the work", i.e. Select, train and mobilize staff and the necessary workers for the war industry to function at peak performance. And not only that, the society, are aware and involved in their own national defense? Are there any maneuvers or periodic exercises that ensure that human mobilization work optimal and efficient way? "Expected that its military mobilization can be delayed to some very specialized and irreplaceable personal in production volume, and even be excluded from it, if it forms part of vital functions of the companies belonging to the?" national logistics safety? Are planned transfers of staff of some productive sectors to others (especially bureaucratic functions and the primary sector into industrial activities), in accordance with the mobilization Plan?" " 5

LOGISTICAL CRITERIA: INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION.

Through the homogeneity of products military (model No.) of the Colombian armed forces, we can deduce (in an indirect way) one of the main indicators of a proper Industrial mobilization: the degree of industrial mobilization and capacity of transfer from industry to safer areas, since this will indicate the degree of standardization of layouts. We can say, because of the high heterogeneity of models of equipment and materials in the three branches of the Colombian armed forces, that the arms industry that supports such production does not have a proper for a greater degree of standardization and more perfect logistic performance.

On the other hand, ' there is an Industrial Census of the nation, which shall consist of a valued relationship, in terms of productive power, the units of industrial production (Industry Base and industrial plants) of vital importance for the? " military and logistics, and production of all those likely to change its civil production military according to the different stages of escalation of a conflict and the different needs of materials of all kinds by the armed forces or the civilian population, does anticipation of its gradual activation according to this evolution?

" Have been established war national war industry templates, as well as those key positions where highly professionalized and hardly replaceable personnel is required?" ^[6]

It has been determined which sectors of production must be in "permanent conscription"? Has been studied and standardized "lay-out" of these factories to be prefabricated and ready for transport and Assembly fabricas-tipo? And with the bases-tipo? The State protects and funds adequately to these industries?

LOGISTICAL CRITERIA: ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION.

Is envisaged a system of economic mobilization to ensure the transformation of the structure of the economy in peacetime, and based on the principles of the free market, supply and demand, competition and prices, to an economic structure that time of war in which State intervention, the planned direction, controls, rationing, priorities, war taxes, etc., will be studs where you seat the unconditional support of the national economy to the total war effort?

The Government of the nation and the staff of the armed forces must provide for these matters and give

effective responses. You can not expect wartime to "improvise" logistics of the nation. Is a high responsibility to the foresee and prepare to achieve as much as possible, since it will mark the future of the conflict almost permanently, a Quaternary Sector must be less vulnerable logistically that we can, and be aware and prepared to pass a State of peace to a warship in the shortest time possible and optimally for the military purposes.



Appreciation on the geo-strategic military bases deployment

By Stephanie Santos (Spain)



Then presents a series of strategic military bases belonging to different countries, says is its importance, and a bit of foresight is made.

The bases of Rota and Moron (Spain).

Strategically I think that they are well placed, since they are near the Strait of Gibraltar, entry into the Mediterranean Sea with output too towards the Atlantic Ocean, North Africa and the Sahel. There are four naval platforms deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea where you can protect the countries of the Atlantic Alliance's launch of ballistic missiles, with the Russian or Iranian threat.

The four destroyers are the anti-missile defense system of NATO which also has other land facilities in Romania and in the future in Poland, as well as the participation of countries such as Holland (radar of its frigates) and Turkey. This missile shield is one of the clearer NATO deterrent measures.

The base of Sevastopol (Russian Federation).

Located on the southwestern tip of the Peninsula of Crimea and the Black Sea, the Black Sea fleet headquarters. Controlling the Black Sea, limited outlets to the sea of Ukraine, the Russian southern flank defence reinforces projection capabilities. Strategically it has power towards the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean.

The basis of Hainan (China).

It is situated between the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea. Here is where Beijing has built the main naval and submarine bases in the country, controlling this geographical area of influence regarding other players potentially aggressors as Japan, as the existence of a latent conflict by sea of China, as well as counter the influence of the United States with the Okinawa base.

Bases from Okinawa and Guam (United States).

They are strategically well situated as we are located between Taiwan, the East coast of China and South of the Korean peninsula. They are close to the main commercial maritime routes used by Japan to import energy and basic raw materials.

These United States bases would come to provide both a conventional deterrence against non-allied States as to allow the necessary logistics for the supply of personnel and resources to direct action in the area.

Jinnah (Pakistan) base.

Located in the coastal town of Ormara, Balochistan province, in the southwest of the country, is one of the great naval bases of the pakistani army near the large base in Karachi (main commercial city in the country and one of the economic engines). Next to the Jinnah naval base are other three important bases on the coast of Baluchistan that complete the security of Pakistan, on the one hand, protection (input and energy resources) trade to China. On the other hand, to guarantee the security in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.

The basis of Jinnah protects internal and external security of Pakistan.

The basis of Varsha (India)

This base comes to assume a strategic breakthrough for the future military of India before a confrontation with Pakistan and China, as well as assume a greater protection to the trade routes of interest. Thus, the deployment of the database will produce deterrence before competitors military, providing the necessary logistics for their troops and the deployment of its fleet.

The base of Lajes Field (Portugal)

The base has a military use shared, since it is the only airport on the island. It has full capacity to assist in emergency aircraft that require it.

Despite having a base with a few logistics interests diminishing the possibility of being occupied by China makes essential continuity of permanence of the United States. Not allowing in this way to China significant progress geostrategic and dominant in the Eastern Atlantic.

The base Port Blair (India)

It is strategically well positioned because it takes control of all trade that has to cater for the eastern part of the India thus controlling its territorial waters to any possible invasion from China.

The basis of Ascension and Diego García (United Kingdom)

It is strategically located at an intermediate point between the United Kingdom and Falkland Islands that despite having conquered in colonial times continues to maintain interest for the United Kingdom.

In conclusion, all of them are deployed so that they reproduce the geostrategic conventional deterrence model, allowing, in turn, immediate action in the event of conflict, in response to the model of direct action. After the previous analysis it is observed that military bases scattered are by geography, so that they cover, according to each country's national interests or supranational interests of Government coalitions, the needs of protection to the trade routes that supply of natural resources and, at the same time, the political interest of sovereignty. Despite this, the changes that you are watching, on the one hand, the location of a Chinese base in Djibouti, with clear interest colonizers, using the model of indirect aggression geostrategic, will come to make other States with an interest in the area by placing, in one next situation, another military base, attending the same geostrategic model.

Similarly, the Islamist drift of Ankara, with its approach to Russia and its Europe growing disaffection, forces to rethink the installation of bases that counteract the presumable loss of strategic dominance of the area in the event of abandonment of NATO.

Stephanie Santos

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Fusion Center: a step forward in Criminal Intelligence in the Republic Argentina

By Erwin Viera (Argentina)



With the arrival of the engineer Mauricio Macri in the Presidency of the Republic of Argentina, and the appointment of Patricia Bullrich as Minister of security of the nation, has been the focus on a change of paradigm of security management. Among the most prominent is their strong commitment to dismantle organized crime and the phenomenon of drug trafficking and its related crimes. To do this, from 2017 comes working on a change in managing the criminal information, with the creation of the Regional Criminal Intelligence Centers (CICRES), as a comprehensive plan to investigate complex crimes such as drug trafficking, is of people, arms trafficking and terrorism. The seven CICRES will work according to territorial areas, conforming follows: Córdoba, Entre Ríos, La Pampa and Santa Fe (Center); Catamarca, Jujuy, Santiago del Estero and Salta. Tucumán (NOA); Chaco, Corrientes, Formosa and Misiones (NEA); La Rioja, Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis (whose); Buenos Aires and CABA (Buenos Aires); Chubut, Neuquén and Río Negro (Patagonia North) and Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego (Patagonia Sur).

From mid-2017, with the arrival of Secretary Gerardo Millman at the National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence (DNIC), he advanced in a paradigm shift in the management of criminal intelligence, the creation of the Fusion Center.

What is a Fusion Center?

The concept of fusion has emerged as a fundamental process facilitate compartment the intelligence information related to the issues of internal security. The idea comes from an internal evaluation by the United States after the attacks of 9-11-2001, where aware of the internal system of American intelligence shortcomings.

Not only USA has developed fusion centers, but also the Kingdom of Spain (2010), the Federal Republic of United States of Mexico (2012) to account for the increase and the complexity of the agenda of security, transnational organized crime, of the threats international terrorism, among other criminal problems.

The idea of having a center of fusion, is a process that manages the flow of intelligence information through the main and different actors in internal security (federal security forces and police, provincial police forces, Correctional Services, customs, migration, etc).

The fusion of criminal intelligence information process involves the exchange of information from different sources, with the consequent analysis of it. In this way, the merge process becomes the intelligence information in a "practical", being a knowledge for a tactical response knowledge.

The fusion of information also allows dynamic reevaluation of existing data, and its subsequent increase with new data which are provided by constant updates.

From the center of Fusion, the various components of the security sector are an integral part of the process of fusion of the criminal intelligence, since they provide the necessary inputs, risk assessments, threats, analyzed by experts in the field that it facilitate the identification and the nature of the threat to internal security.

In this way, the center of fusion when it identified some sort of threat, it would allow effective, coordinated, so a prompt response tactics, to have access to the databases, with their respective links, added with the analysis of the experts in the matter.

Its mission is to generate the entire criminal intelligence, i.e., collect, integrate, evaluate and disseminate the product of criminal intelligence to a tactic level (quick response), so that the highest level of decision-making within the subsystem criminal (Criminal Intelligence Director).

The CF is a vital tool of rapid response to specific demands or requirements are increased at the request of the highest authorities of the subsystem of intelligence.

The creation of the CFIC responds to a collaborative effort between levels of intelligence from police forces and security, both at the federal level and at the provincial level, together with other federal agencies (customs, national direction of migrations, Ministry of transport, and private entities), to give a rapid response to events, events of any criminal nature that affect public safety, alter or compromising the constitutional democratic order.

Its main objectives to provide a rapid response from the subsystem of criminal intelligence with criminal phenomena of indoles, which affect the public order, security citizen and violate the constitutional democratic order, are:

- Prevent future coming victimizaciones of criminal action.
- Help reduce the criminal indices.
- Integration of public databases and private effort to the problematic delinquent.


Also, both the Minister of security of the nation, Lic. Patricia Bullrich, as for the current National Director of Criminal Intelligence, Dr. Gerardo Milman is essential the development and evolution of the Fusion Center, this has been invested in equipment latest technology, software that is used by the main police forces around the world, as well as, the training provided by the FBI and other agencies of the same level.

Initially launched in February of this year, said Center currently has seven (7) links on a rotating basis coming from the federal security forces and police: Argentina national gendarmerie (GNA), Argentina Naval Prefecture) PNA), Argentina Federal Police (PFA) and police (PSA) airport security. Also note, for the first time in the history of the management of the criminal intelligence, with links to two forces of the provincial level, such as the police of Buenos Aires province (PBAS) and the police of the city of Buenos Aires (newly created).

In the second stage of development, which is scheduled for late March, the bond from the Federal prison system (SPF), joins in this way, working joint, integrated and jointly, various links under the coordination of the Directorate National criminal intelligence on the topics of interest of the public safety agenda.











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
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






Organizational learning, change and continuity

By Douglas Hernández (Colombia)



The armed forces and police every year invest lots of money in education and training. Once trained, the staff goes to acquire practical experience in the relevant field. However, because renewal cycles that are inherent to the uniformed institutions, staff is transferred, promoted, or passes to retreat, walking out of the job for which they had trained and where probably was already perfect. Immediately becomes a replacement and everything will start again, and so again and again.

What's with the know-how of the staff being?, why that know-how is not cumulative?, is there any way that knowledge does not leave with the person who owns it?, perhaps the organizational learning is a solution.

Introduction

Judicious reading of approaches of Brazilian teachers Manuel Alfonso Garzón and André Luiz Fisher, known as *Theoretical model of organizational learning*, allows to understand very interesting elements of the dynamics of the organizations. As noted there, the Organizational learning is a relatively new field, both in practice and in the Academy. The truth is that this new "doctrine" cannot be ignored, by having already demonstrated its usefulness and relevance in the contemporary world. Today's world, characterized by journal Strategic Management Journal (1995), cited by Garzon and Luiz (2008), has four factors that characterize him: the increase in the rate of diffusion and technological change, the information age, the increase in the current knowledge and the emergence of a positive feedback from the industry." This context requires highly qualified managers to meet the increasingly complex challenges that are presented. Apply organizational learning to exploit the competitive advantages of your organization, possibly will allow, not only kept on foot before a crisis, but also to prosper while others succumb. This reasoning is also applicable to military and police institutions.

What is organizational learning

The definition presented Garzon and Luiz (2008), tells us that "it is the capacity of organizations create, organize and process information from their sources, to generate new knowledge, individual, team, organizational and inter-organizational, creating a culture that facilitates it and allowing the conditions to develop new capabilities, design new products and services, increase the existing supply and improve the sustainability-oriented process." They point out also that the term "Organizational learning" first appeared in a publication of Miller and Cangelloti in 1965. Apparently it has roots in the so-called contingency theory. Miller and Cangelloti tried to explain by what only a few and not all organizations managed to survive the demands of your environment through time, which proposed a conceptual model called "adaptacion-aprendizaje".

Organizations do not have the same capacity to learn. This capability is characterized by establishing

what they know, put that knowledge, define how we can access it and how we can use it to improve the individual and collective productivity. In addition, you must determine what so developed is that organizational learning, both conceptual and operational. And especially, to determine how influences that learning about the results of the organization. Of course there have a few indicators to measure progress. Intentional of indicators, Garzón and Luiz (2008) we are warned: "it is important to consider that

are warned: "it is important to consider that organizational performance is a multidimensional concept not always developed properly, and perhaps more complex in terms of description that in terms added measures or financial reasons. Accordingly, there is a unique or superior measure that describes the impact and effectiveness of the management of organizational learning on the results in a timely manner."

Sources of the organizational learning

The authors of reference are clear in saying that the main sources of organizational learning are:



Each of these factors, with its peculiarities and to different extent, provides organizational learning. It is possible that learning occurs spontaneously, but I left the free agency could not impact the organizational results, or not in that could do it. Therefore it requires a proper *Knowledge management*.

Knowledge management Knowledge Management

"This concept can be defined as a systematic search and find; sift and select; organize, arrange and store; retrieve and share the information that is generated by the dynamic of its own company, to transform it through the cooperation of the people involved in the process of knowledge. If the key processes and specific situations are better understood, is leverages the experience and knowledge accumulated by the community for the benefit of the members of the Organization and the objectives which it pursues." (Garzon and Luiz, 2008), the complexity that involves the entire process of knowledge management, makes patent which must be strategically oriented from top management, and that should also be one of the priorities of all those with managerial responsibilities in the

organization. Especially in the early stages of a process of organizational learning, when this has been institutionalized as a policy of the Organization, and it has been established that this will become a community of knowledge.

The first step is to become co-team in a community of commitment to all members of the organization. Ideal starting point upon which the rest can be built. The prior existence of a community of commitment, is no guarantee of success in the process of building a community of knowledge, which have a positive impact on the efficiency and the results generated by the Organization, but if this community commitment does not There, all else will fail or malfunction.

Learning communities and communities of commitment

"Learning communities allow the treatment of the collective knowledge, to optimize and know how is produced, how it is used and their interaction; they are able to learn and act beyond the initial terms of office equipment. They might push to preserve the knowledge networks, allowing individuals of the Organization to acquire knowledge in a flexible

manner and without constraints of time and place, and the formation of the generation of relay.

The communities of commitment are characterized by a team of individuals who create a sense of collective commitment; they develop images of the future that everyone wants to create, together with the values that will be important to get there and goals waiting reached by road (Senge, 2002: 87)."

"They are based on cognitive maps of its members, requiring the construction of a shared vision of knowledge and that of a space for dialogue open and free of risks. "Need to achieve sense of identity of employees for your organization, as well as his personal commitment." "They allow to generate a capacity of learning on the concept of a shared idea. They require a psychological contract in which agree on what to do to turn expectations into reality." (Garzon and Luiz, 2008).

The task force

The shared vision is vital to learning organizations that want to provide their employees with a direction or sense and energy. People learn best when they feel that their expectations are reflected in the Organization, since the shared visions create a communion which gives meaning, purpose and coherence to the activities carried out the organization." "The core values are fundamental, and for the development of this image will depend on how important it is for stakeholders maintain a core set of values and beliefs.

Shared vision

"It is also clear that when the person accepts it, choose to combine their personal interests with the interests of the organization. In this way, the construction of a shared vision becomes greater aspiration of what makes the leader of an organization, it is the ability to share an image of the future that seeks to create. It is hard conceive of an organization that reached some greatness without goals, values, or missions that are deeply shared within it. "When there is a genuine vision (something that is totally opposite to"formulation of vision"), people does not protrude nor learn because they says it is okay but because he wants it."

Under these premises, the knowledge will be an integral part of the Organization, and will transcend individuals. In this way, you can be cumulative, be shared, and be available to all members of the organization. In this case, of the military or police organization that implant organizational learning as institutional policy and management strategy.

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Antiterrorist Forces of the World Audentes fortuna iuvat



Syrian Arab Army ISIS Hunters

This is an elite unit created especially to fight the fundamentalists with their same rules, in the same terms of violence and ferocity. They are handled independently, with flexible controls and adapted to the changing situation of the war. In general, it is about men who lost their families at the hands of extremists, and now seeks revenge. They have been trained by Russian commandos.

The members of this unique group wear green military uniform and most have their faces covered. Its main weapon of combat is the assault rifle Type 56-2, the Chinese version of the Russian AK-47, one of the most malleable and reliable that exist.

They have been instructed by one of the best special operations forces in the world. The famous Spetsnaz, from Russia. The training camps are in Latakia, in western Syria, on the Mediterranean coast, near the Russian bases.

The Spetsnaz is the counterpart of the US Navy Seals, but almost always its senior officers were heads of intelligence services. He was born in World War II and has several divisions, very specific in the type of tasks they perform. His commandos have a highly



professional military training, with very strict requirements and a preparation that includes the use of sophisticated fighting techniques. They have the tremendous experience of brutal wars like that of Afghanistan and Chechnya.

The Russians, allies of the Syrian regime of Bashar al Assad, realized that they could not defeat the ISIS fanatics only using conventional methods. The success achieved in the open battles was reversed dramatically with the attacks committed by infiltrators of the jihadists.

That's why they started looking for another method. The "ISIS Hunters" were the main option, so as not to have to do them personally. To arm the unit they recruited former soldiers, young people with destroyed homes, torn by war. Men who lost parents, wives or children at the hands of jihadists. Thus they turned into weapon the rancid hatred that fired the limitless cruelty of the extremists. It was only necessary to train them.

The elite unit had a prominent baptism of fire in the recovery of Palmyra, the historic city in the Syrian

desert that houses priceless archaeological ruins and which had been captured twice by extremists led by the mysterious Abu Bakr al-Baghdad.

For the moment, the objective of the ISIS-Hunters men is Daesh. "It's time for revenge," they say, and they execute the slogan with absolute resentment.

Source: https://www.clarin.com/mundo/isis-hunters-brigada-especial-siria-dando-caza-yihadistas_0_Sy_jUo-ol.html





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