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KENYA

Prevention and Security Bulletin on
Terrorism and the New Threats

EDITORIAL

We begin this new edition of TRIARIUS with an interesting article by our Argentine analyst Ulises León Kandiko, who enlightens us about cyberthreats to critical infrastructure. Today, a subject with sufficient skills and using only a computer can paralyze essential services in a country, seriously compromising its security. We must be aware of these possibilities, in order to think about how to combat threats before they materialize.

In this magazine, Guadi Calvo, from Argentina, presents us with eight heart-pounding current analyses. The first of which refers to the complex situation being experienced by the Sahel in Africa, and the unfortunate military intervention by France and its allied governments in the region. In another article, he tells us about the situation of Daesh in the Philippines, and in particular what is happening in Marawi, where Daesh is recruiting among the population dissatisfied with the harsh economic and social conditions. Then taking us to India, to learn a little more about the political maneuvers of Modi, who incites Indian nationalism against the Muslim population, to gain a foothold in power, generating situations of tension and violence that could destabilize that country. Then we go to Iran, where there have been a series of protests against the Islamic government of that country, apparently incited by its internal and external political enemies. Guadi calls these protests "the protests of hate." Next, he analyzes the stagnation of the war in Libya, where neither side manages to prevail, but in the process, they subject the civilian population to all kinds of suffering, while the arms dealers and weighty geopolitical actors make profits. He speaks to us in the following article about the situation of migrants and refugees in West Africa, emphasizing Gambia. Returning then to the Middle East, where the anti-government protests in Iraq show a population fed up with the economic situation and the hardships they have endured for years. Guadi closes his important contributions to this edition, with an analysis of the complicated situation in Hong Kong, the surprising presence of Ukrainian neo-Nazis in the protests, and the need for the Chinese government to prevent the spread of violence.

Marco Aurelio Terroni, from Brazil, introduces us to the topic of "social terrorism" that he assures, is lived in the urban areas of Rio de Janeiro and other cities with a strong presence of drug traffickers.

We present here another article by our friend Ulises León Kandiko, in which he explains how Intelligence Oriented Policing (ILP) works according to the model implemented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

We also have a review on air operations against terrorism in the Republic of Colombia, with a detailed description of a typical operation to support surface troops that are being attacked.

Another featured article in this edition is the one presented by Captain Boris Brito, of the Ecuadorian Navy, on drug trafficking on the binational border between Ecuador and Colombia. It has no waste.

We wish everyone happy holidays. Take care and see you in January.

Know to win!

Douglas Hernandez
Editor

This newsletter has a Spanish version.

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Content:

TRIARIUS

With this edition we close the year 2019. A year of great and complex challenges at a global level, but also full of hope for a better future. We have seen how the threats to world peace and security increase every day, but also the professionalization and training of the security and defense forces.

Unfortunately, the actions or omissions of important governments lead to the generation of instability and hatred in different regions of the world, which is inconsistent with the role that those governments that, for example, are part of the Security Council, are not supposed to play. of the UN, whose main function is to preserve world peace. It is also incongruous that these same governments are the ones that lead sales in the world arms market. You cannot preach one thing, and with your actions do the opposite. Thus we will never have stability and peace.

On the cover, **Kenya Army Troops**. See more information at the end of the magazine.

Cyber threats, Critical Infrastructure and poorly trained employees: a devastating mix

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)

Critical infrastructure is exposed, threats are increasing. Measures have to be taken.

Cyber threats are the order of the day and their impact on society is becoming more significant and States are not exempt from being victims, proof of which is reflected in news portals throughout the year. At the beginning of this year (2019), the National Intelligence Strategy document of the United States of America (USA) warned that "cyber threats will pose a growing risk to public health, security and prosperity, since that information technologies are integrated into critical infrastructure, vital national networks and consumer devices", being a little more traumatic the US Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, put it even more succinctly: "The warning lights flash red".

Critical Infrastructure facilities whether they are power plants, national railways and local underground systems or other forms of public transportation, are increasingly under attack. Cyber attacks could cut off electricity supply to hospitals, homes, schools and factories. We are so dependent on the efficient supply of electricity that its loss would also have major implications for other vital services. A series of incidents in recent years show not only that the threat is tangible, but also that on more than one occasion we have escaped its consequences, as the neighborhood kids would say "scraping", that is, by sheer luck.

Daily headlines highlight the latest ransomware attacks, data breaches, and new phishing techniques, bringing to light an epidemic that has resulted in financial, operational, and reputational damage to businesses, governments, and the general public. Without going too far back in time, a few days ago a cyberattack was confirmed at the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu, India.

Today, cyberattacks put much more than just our personal data at risk: Threat actors have increased the regularity with which they target infrastructure that supports mission-critical systems, such as power grids, water utilities, health systems, nuclear facilities and emergency services.

A report by the Ponemon Institute revealed a steady rise in cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, stating that "attacks targeting Nation/States are of particular concern in the industry because they are typically carried out by highly trained, well-funded, targeted cybercriminals. " to critical infrastructure.

During the month of September 2019, E&E News reported on the first cyber attack on the US power grid, as identified by the North American Electric Reliability Corp. In contrast, other critical infrastructure sectors such as health and financial services have suffered.

the fallout from cyberattacks for over a decade, as personally identifiable information that is regularly sought can generate millions on the Deep Web, in addition to the many benefits associated with intellectual property theft.

When the world held its breath 3 times

As we recently saw the cyberattack in India, there were also in the rest of the globe, certainly these cyberattacks do not only occur in power plants, but it is worth mentioning them since they tend to be the ones that society perceives the most, without neglecting cyber attacks that occur in airports, ports, etc. So here I leave the 3 most significant cyberattacks on Power Plants.

1. The 2010 attack on Iran's Natanz Nuclear Plant holds a special place in the history books. The so-called STUXNET Malware that made its first public appearance at that time, managing to stop the nuclear plant. Stuxnet was designed to damage the motors commonly used in uranium enrichment centrifuges by sending them spinning out of control, temporarily putting around 1,000 centrifuges out of commission.

2. Five years later, in December 2015, Ukraine experienced an unprecedented assault on its power grid. The attack caused widespread power outages. Hackers infiltrated 3 power companies and temporarily shut down power generation in 3 regions of Ukraine. It left nearly 1/4 million people without power for up to 6 hours in the dead of winter. The attackers used the Malware BlackEnergy3 to shut down the 3 substations. The malware is believed to have been delivered in phishing emails, where it was hidden in fake Microsoft Office attachments.

3. The most relevant and closest in time took place in 2017. Attackers took remote control of a workstation using a new type of malware, called Triton, to take over the plant's Security Instrumental System (SIS). . Again, the malware was specifically configured for industrial control systems, also known as Operational Technology (OT).

Investigators believe it was an act of sabotage intended to cause an explosion by disabling safety systems designed to prevent catastrophic industrial accidents. Previous attacks have focused on destroying data or shutting down power plants. According to some reports, only a coding error prevented this from happening. The evidence points to another phishing or spear phishing attack.

Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructure today

As we can see and we have mentioned on several occasions, Cyber Security is not unknown to the Critical Infrastructure sectors and certainly to the Nations much less. In response to the integration of information technology systems with operational technology systems and the rise of the Industrial Internet of Things, a greater focus on risk mitigation and regulatory compliance emerged in the US in both the industry and the Federal Government. At the same time, a new challenge came to light: there simply aren't enough Cyber Security workers to fill the number of available jobs.

To limit risk, most Critical Infrastructure Organizations provide some level of security awareness training across the enterprise, but it is often limited to very basic information such as how to identify and report a phishing email? Advanced training is often not provided to ordinary employees, and many tangential but related areas of Critical Infrastructure are never adequately briefed on how to handle suspected cyber threats.

In a globalized world of total immediacy, this is a serious problem, where vulnerabilities and cyber attacks can come from anywhere at any time, including a remote worker, a contractor, a device or even the technology that uses a thermostat smart.

This is not the first time that the words cyberthreats and Critical Infrastructure appear together in an article of mine, but the truth is that it never hurts to give a little perspective to the subject, we must not miss the opportunity that some decision maker reads it and can change something. The vast majority of Critical Infrastructure (CI) companies remotely monitor the status and location of trains, buses and trucks; they can adjust the flow of crude oil and natural gas through pipelines remotely; water and electricity consumption can be controlled and changed from a centralized location and medical devices can be controlled from half a world away. These conveniences reduce costs, increase efficiency, and generally make our lives easier (will they?), but as the number of interconnected systems continues to increase, so does the attack surface. As a result, more employees in a CI ecosystem are a threat, whether they know it or not, or want to know it or not, there is no one more blind than the one who does not want to see.

Training: to infinity and beyond!

CI companies should not continue to train their employees based on cyber security awareness campaigns thinking that their technology and security teams are enough to maintain control, believing that giving a few primers on what Phishing is does not generate a good omen. Instead, all employees must begin to understand that any interaction with technology can play a role in a cyberattack. This represents a change in both culture and strategy, which is never easy to implement despite its necessity.

Ultimately, CI companies must begin to teach every employee and stakeholder, no matter what role they play within the company, that the role they play in protecting CI is vital, it is a global construct. . To impose scare tactics is to ensure failure, only through sharing knowledge and understanding of how cyber

attacks work and how to handle them, can we be guaranteed to be on the right track.

Not only the Chief Information Security Officer's (CISO), but the highest authorities such as the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) of CI companies should consider some of the following aspects or guidelines:

- Practical Training: It is better to train employees in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in practical and simulated cases than to fill them with only theories and concepts that are difficult to visualize and remember.
- Put the right incentives in place: performance management, training, processes, procedures, and other systems to embed the mindset and cultural changes needed instead of the fear of not meeting standards.
- Targeted Training: Training on technologies and processes that are valuable in making CI stronger and more resilient.

- Lead by example: Have all CI Managers and Leaders take CIP training courses to deepen CI cybersecurity and understand how to communicate that information to all involved.

Protecting IC against cyber attacks is a two-part problem. We must put in place better protections, more advanced security protocols, and better incident response plans, but that starts with better cybersecurity awareness across the CI workforce. Ultimately, we must change the way everyone in the CI ecosystem thinks about cybersecurity. The success of Critical Infrastructure protection depends on the steps taken by the workforce to mitigate risks, and that starts with knowing and understanding the nuances that make up CIP Cyber Security. In today's world, you cannot afford not to train all CIP stakeholders on Cyber Security.

Image source:
https://www.las2orillas.co/las-ciberamenazas-mas-frecuentes-la-actualidad-los-consejos-combatlas/

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France: From the mud of Dien Bien Phu, to the sands of the Sahel.

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

French aircraft in Africa. Illustrative image.

France in Vietnam, after eight years of war (1946-1954), not only buried its status as an empire, but also the lives of 93,000 of its men and the honor of its army, if it ever had one. Since 2013, with the *Serval operation* , and since 2014, the *Barkhane* , it has tried to protect the interests of the French companies that exploit the uranium deposits on the border between Mali and Niger and to keep the pro-Western government of Bamako stabilized, which after a coup palace, the invasion of the *Tuareg* , who intend to recover Azawad, its historical territory and the emergence of the *Wahhabi insurgency* , which from the successes in Libya, Iraq and Syria spread through *Islam* , as a biblical evil religious terrorism, was beginning to strike fiercely in the Sahel.

Given the results, the *Elysee* seems to be turning the Sahel sands into Dien Bien Phu mud, the decisive battle with which the *Viet-minh would* expel France from ancient Indochina.

A few days ago, two French helicopters, a *Puma* troop carrier and another *Tiger* attack type, collided at very low altitude while operating in support of the ground forces, which were pursuing a group of *mujahideen* , who were mobilized in several trucks and some motorcycles. The "accident" that left at least thirteen casualties, became the highest in number of deaths since the double attack in Beirut, in October 1983, in which 58 French paratroopers and 200 US *marines died* , after the building was blown up. of four floors of the headquarters of the *24 Amphibious Unit* , for which the *Movement for the Free Islamic Revolution the Islamic Jihad* used about 1200 kilos of explosives.

The reported incident brings to between 38 and 41, according to the source, the number of French soldiers killed since the operations began in Mali in 2013. A relatively low number, if one takes into account the time and the number of troops assigned to that mission, about 4500 men. The area to be controlled covers an area of about five million square kilometers, almost double the size of Argentina, a sparsely populated territory, and divided between Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. France has two main bases: N'Djamena (Chad), where the mission command is established, and Niamey (Niger), the air force's base of operations, which has a significant number of fighter planes, transport planes, helicopters and drones. . Near the

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city of Gao (Mali), there is a third base with a significant number of troops.

In recent months in Niger and Burkina Faso, countries bordering Mali, taking advantage of the porosity of the borders and the lack of government control, attacks have multiplied against both military objectives and the civilian population, by militiamen linked to tax organizations of the *Daesh* and *al-Qaeda,* such as *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin* (Group Support for Islam and Muslims or GSIM) or *al -Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), or *Daesh of the Greater Sahara,* which continue to generate thousands of dead civilians and nearly 300,000 displaced, in addition to provoking the resurgence of the ancient ethnic and tribal tensions in the region between shepherds and farmers, who with crossed accusations of collaborating with the terrorists or with the military broke out clashes that were settled with up to fifty deaths and the destruction of numerous homes, crops and the theft or death of large numbers of livestock.

For their part, the armies of Mali and Burkina Faso, since September alone, have lost almost 200 men, after the intensification of attacks and bombings by fundamentalist forces. The most important occurred in early October when *Daesh militiamen from the Great Sahara* killed at least 53 soldiers and one civilian during the seizure of a military base in the northeast of the country (See: Sahel, the infinite storm). While the troops of *the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali* (MINUSMA) ordered by the Security Council in April 2013, 200 blue helmets died in combat. At the same time, the military unit made up of Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania or the GS5 (Sahel Five Group) is not achieving the necessary results, since the members of that coalition are considered by the French military to be inefficient and corrupt , who take great advantage of the impunity granted, where funds are even diverted for the purchase of military supplies. In fact, the Sahelian countries rank among the most corrupt in the world according *to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index* : Chad ranks 165th out of 180 and Mali 140th.

The crossroads and attrition

With the death of the thirteen soldiers, a profound discussion arose in France about the appropriateness and reasons for their presence in the Sahel. As has already been said, one is for the protection of the uranium deposits and processing plants of French transnationals such as those of Arlit and Akouta in the Agadez region of Niger, which supply uranium to the 19 nuclear plants in French territory. , which generate 78% of the electricity used throughout the country. On the other hand, France has used the entire region as a nuclear dump, for which the authorities fear that fundamentalist groups could access this waste and build some type of weaponry, to attack strategic targets outside or inside France.

The deterioration of the situation in the Sahel highlights the failure of French military participation, which since 2013 has not been able to move towards a solution, quite the contrary, just a couple of years ago in Burkina Faso, the presence or actions of terrorist groups was practically unknown, at present attacks occur on a daily basis and the same is true for each of the countries in the region, and even beyond the Sahel, as is the case of Nigeria, with the overwhelming activity of *Boko Haram* since 2009, or the two new theaters of operations for fundamentalist terrorism, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, countries in which terrorist actions of these characteristics were absolutely unknown. Since the beginning of 2019, his actions in both countries have begun to occupy more and more space in the journalistic media.

The security situation tends to worsen even more despite the French presence is still very degraded today, it is even worse in some border areas, where the inhabitants are the first to suffer. The highest French military authorities are aware that Operation Barkhane will last a long time:

It is for these reasons that, as stated at the beginning of 2018, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, François Lecointre, months before the critical situation in northern Burkina Faso broke out: "the problem in Mali will be resolved in ten or fifteen years.

While the black boxes of the damaged helicopters are beginning to be analyzed, President Macron's Defense Minister, Florence Parly, rushed to declare trying to save France's shipwreck in the desert: "This is not the time to question the merit", for the military commitment of Paris in the Sahel. At the same time that journalists, experts and intellectuals begin to condemn the French presence in Africa.

According to Jeremy Keenan, a research associate at the London School of Oriental and African Studies , he opined that: "Since the start of French military operations in the region, everything got worse", while parliamentarians from the left-wing party *La France Insoumise* (LFI) demanded: "a serious and rational discussion to find a way out of the war, whose meaning is lost on a large number of our fellow citizens as well as the Malians themselves". While General Lecointre referred to the issue again, he stated that "we will never achieve a definitive victory"

in the Sahel, although he was of the opinion that the military operations that France is carrying out in that territory are "useful, good and necessary", such as the They were in the mud at Dien Bien Phu.

Image source:
http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20191126/mali-mueren-13-militares-franceses-operacion-contra-jihadistas-caer-dos-helicopteros-mali/1992583.shtml

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fuerzasmilitares.org
el portal militar colombiano

Political and social terrorism in Brazil

By Marco Aurelio Terroni (Brazil)

Police from Rio de Janeiro carrying out an operation in a favela.

Similar to the Middle Eastern terrorists who use the population as a human shield, the narco-terrorists in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil also use the people of the poor neighborhood for the protection of their business.

The big drug sorting points meet in the poor neighborhoods, but not because the traffickers are poor and without opportunities, they are there because the local population, including women, children and the elderly, serve as a human shield and warning system against the forces of cop.

Every time you read a headline saying "Young Man Shot in Exchange of Fire" remember that. These people are not shot by chance, their injuries or deaths serve as protection for traffic with the bonus for the military to demonize the police and lead society to empathize with drug terrorists.

That empathy is essential for business, stimulated by the misinformed media and by the "human rights" NGOs that are in most cases the department of narco-terror.

Numerous testimonies of families of victims of "stray bullets" accusing the police, do you know any family testimony accusing drug traffickers?

You may have seen the poignant and convenient children's drawings from the "communities" showing helicopters shooting at people. What you may not know is that the helicopter offers essential protection for police operations against nacoterrorists hidden in poor neighborhoods and therefore preventing its use

is essential. The helicopter preserves the lives of good, but it is a threat to drug trafficking.

The tactic of using children for protection is propaganda, exactly the same as the terrorist organization *Hamas* carries out in the Gaza Strip.

Reading the newspapers and listening to some NGOs and community networks, it is inevitable that you, a common citizen, conclude:

- The police do not know what they are doing and it is a threat to the welfare of the poor,
- The trafficker is a social entrepreneur who does not bother anyone and is loved by the community.

The truth is that the narco-terrorists impose a regime of terror in the poor neighborhoods they occupy, using their residents as a shield. They are hated by the good citizens and workers who are the majority in all communities and who are permanently held hostage.

The narco generates the finances of a good part of criminal activities, spread of crime, corruption and fear everywhere. Robbery or kidnapping that you were a victim of, likely stemming from drug trafficking. But in some newspaper you will know.

Rio de Janeiro can once again be a quiet place to live, as well as New York, Miami, Milan, Frankfurt, London and Brussels. In all these cities there is traffic, but in none of them is there drug trafficking.

No society will be free of drug trafficking, however, we can *get* rid of drug-terrorists and in a short time. Funny that the media and some political parties have stopped asking who killed Mariele? And do you know why? It wasn't the police, it was drug trafficking itself.

If he had been a policeman, the media would be pumping, but when they killed a black, poor and homosexual policewoman, days after Mariele's death, I didn't see those same outraged with her death!

One hundred percent of the time the left participates in a debate about fighting crime, a fact needs to come up. It is a physiological, cosmic, universal necessity.

Raúl Reyes and the Colombian FARC actively participated in the meetings of the Sao Paulo Forum, created by Lula and brought together almost all the great leftists, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Ciro Gomes. The FARC supplied weapons and drugs to organized crime in Brazil.

The major left-wing parties have always been openly *Allies* of organized crime, it is not a conspiracy theory, it is found in the minutes of meetings.

It is of course that the police can do anything, nothing changes. No matter what they do, the left is always against it. They are supporters of the greatest enemy of the police!

The time is to talk that "you have to fight organized crime, but with intelligence, not with weapons." There is no debate on merit, yet the reality of the matter is, do they want to defeat the criminals themselves, their usual friends, or do they just speak ill of the current government?

The word terrorism today is in everyday use, and is used to define anything. Its true definition has been lost. Etymologically, terrorism is the imposition of one's will on other people, through the systematic use of terror, which can be political, psychological, or economic terrorism. One of the current modalities is social terrorism.

Among ramifications applicable to the theme, it is certain: the psychological damage that terrorism imposes always exceeds the environment of the victims to include the rest of society, victimized by terrorist acts, in consideration of the period after the 1964 coup that lasted until 1984. Brazil was the victim of political terror, emanating from the brutal regime imposed on the country (?).

Once that is overcome, we are going to consider that today we live in a democracy and Brazil is not the target of international terrorists.

With the death of Osama Bin Laden by US troops, the Western world is on high alert and al Qaeda's fanatical Islamic heirs have vowed retaliation against Uncle Sam's allies.

Although Brazil is not a victim of Islamic terrorist attacks, it faces and suffers from social terrorism, the type most feared by Brazilian families who are terrified by social problems that the country has lived through for centuries.

In Brazil, the black still suffers prejudice even having black ministers sworn in before the Federal Supreme Court, Dr. Joaquim Barbosa and Gilberto Gil of Culture. Women are still discriminated against at work, receiving lower salaries than men, having recently elected the first female president in the country's political history, the same homosexual with advances in the jurisprudence of the Superior Courts and in the National Congress, even dies daily by pure discrimination of impostors frightened by prejudices rooted in caveman times, this is social terrorism.

Terrorism in Brazil is inserted in another context: in civil war and drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro and in other Brazilian cities, in the terror caused to the parents and relatives of the victims of the murder of Realengo, in Rio, in the high rate of infant mortality, in the mothers who abandon their children in garbage dumps and backyards throughout Brazil, that is social terrorism, the worst of them all. It is more feared than Islamic terrorism.

Table of poverty statistics in Brazil

Situation	Numbers	Percentage	Location	Condition
Deaths	17,000	1,062 per month	Rio de Janeiro	35 a day
	16,000,000	8.5%	in Brazil	poverty
North Region	2.6 million			R$70.00
	1.4 million		For	misery
Rural area	840,000		For	
Urban area	582,000		For	

Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) and IPEA (Institute of Applied Economic Research).

The NGO *Rio da Paz* , in a very recent statement signed by its president Antonio Carlos da Costa, concluded that in the last 16 months some 17,000 people have died in Rio de Janeiro, which gives an average of 1,062 per month. 35 per day.

More than 16 million people live in extreme poverty in Brazil, which represents 8.5% of the country's total population. In the northern region, there are 2.6 million people with income equal to or less than R$70 (seventy reais). Of this total, 1.4 million live in Pará.

The vast majority is concentrated in the rural population, where approximately 840,000 people live in extreme poverty. In the urban area, 582 thousand live almost in misery in Pará, a source provided by IBGE and IPEA. Brazil, host of a World Cup and an Olympics, prefers to tell the world that it is "fine" here, when in fact it is not.

Is it better to invest public money in social issues and public security, to improve the root causes of social terrorism or to build modern football stadiums and Olympic villages?

Despite all this scenario, there is always hope at the end of the tunnel and Brazil is included in the list of countries with a high human development index: the HDI. Although there is much work to be done on how to improve income distribution in the country, access to education and better health, this value of the Brazilian HDI is positive because it provides a measure of the country's progress and we can also compare it with the growth of other countries. In this way we can move towards human development.

It is necessary to continue investing more and more in the social area, this is the way forward, it is a challenge, as it has always been, to improve the education and health of the population, so that all Brazilians can feel part of this country that it is growing and not excluded or abandoned from it, so that the sensation of social terrorism, so worrying and current, fades more and more from the daily reality of our nation.

Two days after commemorating the police action, which killed a man who kidnapped and threatened to burn a bus on the Rio-Niteroi bridge, Rio de Janeiro Governor Wilson Witzel defended his role in public security in the state, saying that the country is experiencing a moment of terrorism. He said: "Society has not yet understood that we are in a war against terrorism. We always hide, in some way, from the population that terrorism is in Brazil. When society sees the deaths, it only sees the consequences, it does not see the cause". After the completion of the bus hijacking on the Rio-Niterói bridge, Witzel related the case to a terrorist action. The Houaiss dictionary defines terrorism as: "The systematic use of violence for political purposes, especially the perpetration of attacks and destruction by groups aimed at altering the existing society and seizing power; threatening the use of violence to intimidate a population. or government, usually motivated by ideological or political reasons."

In an increasingly harsh tone, much like his campaign in the 2018 elections, Witzel defended his policy of confronting violence with more intensive police action in favelas where traffickers are active. "There is no way to fight crime with books and flowers. People who are into crime don't want to know about schools or books. The police have to arrest, if there is no surrender, they have to eliminate, they have to kill," he said. Speaking about the killing of innocents during police actions, the governor tried to distance himself from responsibility and suggested that traffickers had killed local residents to hamper police work.

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Philippines, back to Marawi

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Bombing of the city of Marawi by the Philippine Air Force (15JUN2017)

The consequences within *Daesh* , after the death of its leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdadí, (See: Al-Bagdadí, the opportune dead), are still far from dimensioning to draw conclusions about the complex succession process, although Some names already appear, but it would be useless to conjecture about them. Especially when we will never know how penetrated the terrorist organization was or continues to be by the intelligence services and the real links between the dead Caliph and the agents of the services available to the Pentagon, which at some point, given that the actions of the *Daesh* seemed to be in accordance with the tactical and strategic needs of the United States, in Mali, in Nigeria, Libya or Afghanistan, just to name a few of the places where *Daesh* had branches.

I insist, it is still too early to understand the reconfiguration of the orphaned *mujahideen* , but to begin with, we should consider the insular region of Southeast Asia, given its geographical characteristics, highly interconnected, but difficult to control, given the large number of islands that make it up , large forested areas, and with important Muslim communities, appears as one of the most favorable places to embark on an adventure, in addition to those fanatics who tried to reach Syria and Iraq, to carry out their own *jihad* , since 2018 they have been complicated the possibility of traveling to the Middle East, so the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, has become an auspicious place. It is known that since 2014, *Daesh*

settled in Southeast Asia, and since then about a thousand fighters from that region were sent to fight in the Middle East, three hundred of them fought in a single unit in Iraq known as *Katibah Nusantara* , which developed a important military aptitude, some of those veterans have returned to their countries again to continue their war.

While two years after the "phenomenal" feat of Marawi, (See: Philippines: Daesh defies the sheriff) the provincial capital of Lanao del Sur, on the island of Mindanao, a city of 200,000 inhabitants that the fundamentalist organization *Abu Sayyaf* , and the *Daesh* tributary *Maute group* , took over on May 25, 2017 and held until November 16 of that year, despite the siege and bombardment by the Philippine army, which, with the collaboration of the United States and Australia, tried to picks it up from the start. The fighting officially left 1,100 dead, although the real figure is believed to be at least double that. Among the dead was Isnilon Hapilon, the Daesh *emir for* Southeast Asia, appointed by al-Baghdadi.

A few days after two years since Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared the liberation of the city, a liberation achieved after reducing the city to rubble and sacrificing the lives of hundreds of civilians who had been taken hostage by terrorists, it is known that new militants are being recruited again, mainly among the children of families that were displaced from the city, and whose most basic needs nobody

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has taken care of, after having lost everything during the fighting, perhaps stigmatized for being Muslim.

More than 100,000 displaced people, of the almost 350,000 who had to be displaced during the months that the fighting lasted, have not been allowed to return to their places to start rebuilding their homes and businesses, two years after the fighting ended, they continue living in camps with little health and food care, without the central government in Manila resolving their increasingly dire situation.

In the southern Philippines, home to the country's Muslim minority, dozens of new recruits have reportedly declared their allegiance to the now-defunct *Caliph* . A few hundred displaced fighters from Syria are suspected of having arrived in the Philippines in recent months to regroup with survivors of *Abu Sayeff* in the Marawi area, where they began the recruitment campaign and established training camps and more terrorist bases. .

The campaign, in full expansion, ranges from social networks, education centers, schools and universities, and has even reached the most remote Muslim villages in the province. Where the militants arrive with money, basic consumer products, to distribute among the civilian population and offering weapons and a fixed salary for those who join the organization.

With some frequency it is known that, in the tight jungle of the island of Mindanao, the Manila troops are attacked by groups of militants, who in addition to causing casualties, steal weapons and communication elements.

Two years after Duterte's liberation and restoration rhetoric, millions of tons of rubble have not been removed from the city center, while demolition and the search for unexploded ordinances continues.

The latest actions after Marawi

The government agency *Task Force Bangon Marawi* , in charge of the reconstruction of the city, which of its 96 zones, 24 were reduced to rubble, due to the excessive use of bombing and artillery fire, reports that the works are delayed, due to the complex that results in the search, deactivation and removal of explosive devices that the terrorists have planted not only in the most affected areas, but also in the neighborhoods where there were practically no clashes, so the demolition work is excessively slow, particularly in what is known as *ground zero* or *Meranaos, Ground Zero,* the oldest part of the city and the most damaged.

The company reported that they estimated to finish the search for latent explosives on October 31 and in another month they would finish with the removal of debris to just start the reconstruction work. It is estimated that this reconstruction will end in June 2022, a date that coincides with the end of the Duterte government.

The most influential person in the Marawi Muslim community, the *Sultan* of Abdul Hamidullah Atar, said that the victims of the fighting are "angry, frustrated, at how slow the rehabilitation and relocation work has been", which undoubtedly facilitates the task of recruiters. Some analysts have detected a great annoyance in the population that still continues to live in the improvised camps, for which reason it is also believed that the violent protests could break out around the date that marks the two-year anniversary of the end of the fighting, the November 16, the day that Manila has organized several commemorative events. While different *Daesh -aligned groups* such as the remnants of *Abu Sayyaf* , *Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters* (BIFF) and *Moro Islamic Liberation Front* (MILF) are suspected and increasingly operating in different areas of Mindanao, are waiting for those days to make a big splash.

The last major operation consigned to *Abu Sayyaf* occurred last January, when a series of explosions in Jolo, the capital of Sulu province, killed around 30 people, (See: Philippines: Abu Sayyaf is back.), In August 2018, a van blew up outside a military checkpoint in Basilan, killing eleven.

Given the consequences of al-Baghdadi's death, for many veterans and hundreds of young recruits, remembering the glories of Marawi is the best way to honor their dead leader.

Image Source:
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Marawi_(2017)

LA FERIA DE DEFENSA Y DE SEGURIDAD TERRESTRE Y AEROTERRESTRE

2020

EUROSATORY

8 AL 12 DE JUNIO 2020 / PARIS

LA FERIA
MUNDIAL
INELUDIBLE

1,802 +14,7%
expositores
de 63 países
65,9% son internationales

65 startups en Eurosatory LAB

98,721
Asistencia total
(expositores, visitantes,
prensa, organizadores)

227
Delegaciones oficiales
de 94 países
y 4 organizaciones
(en representación de 760 delegados)

696
periodistas
de 44 países

75 Conferencias
2 102 Reuniones de negocios realizadas

2018 Cifras clave

India: A dangerous drift to fundamentalism.

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Muslims in India pray in front of the Taj Mahal. This population, which represents 13% of the population of that country, is being mistreated by the policies of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Since the partition of India in 1947, the conflicts between the *Hindu majority* and the local *Muslim community* have not stopped finding excuses for confrontation, beyond the ever-bleeding Kashmir, from large-scale killings, isolated attacks and lynchings. spontaneous acts that have been a constant, always fed back by the hatred that starts the cycle of revenge over and over again, a situation from which *Hindu politicians* have been able to take great advantage, so that no ruler, except for Nerhu, has tried stop the periodic crises, which end up being settled with increasingly important quotas of deaths.

From the deepening of this problem, no politician in the history of modern India has known how to take greater advantage than Narendra Modi, who since his days as Chief Minister (Governor) of the state of Gujarat (2001-2014), articulating religious hatred has got to be elected as Prime Minister of India in 2014 and re-elected last May for a new mandate.

On February 27, 2002, just after Modi took office as governor of Gujarat, a confusing episode occurred in which 59 *karsevaks (religious volunteers) and Hindu* pilgrims died in the *Sabarmati Express fire*, which broke out near Godhra station, who traveled to the temples of Ahmedabad,

Islamic radicals were immediately blamed , which led to the beginning of a "hunt" that lasted for the following weeks and ended with at least 2,000 dead Muslims, in the face of the passivity of the police and the state authorities headed by Modi who ruled between 2001 and 2014, using *Hindu nationalism* as his best government proposal. In his election campaigns in Gujarat he encouraged the *Gujarati asmita* (Gujarati pride), leading crowds to welcome him at their rallies to the cry of *Dekho kaun aaya, Gujarat ka sher aaya* ." (The Gujarat lion has come).

As Prime Minister Modi radicalized society and incidents and attacks, particularly against *Muslims,* multiplied during the first five years. In September it became known that the government was building mass detention camps in the northeastern state of Assam for the nearly two million people who were stripped of their citizenship, mainly migrants , their descendants from neighboring *Muslim* Bangladesh, who live in the country for decades. In a campaign of *the National Registry of Citizens* (NRC), thousands of

poor peasants are required to show their birth certificates in order to verify their identity, which the vast majority lack. So the authorities are legislating to grant citizenship to *Hindu*, *Sikh* and *Buddhist immigrants* from neighboring countries, which is not contemplated for *Muslims*.

anti *-topiwala* (Muslim) preaching escalates to highly dangerous limits in his new mandate, beyond the situation in Kashmir, which he used to get his re-election last May, always accompanied by the far-rightists of the *Bharatiya Janata party.* (BJP, Indian People's Party), the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (VHP, World Hindu Council), a fundamentalist religious political organization, and its original movement, the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak San* gh (RSS, National Patriotic Association), a paramilitary organization inspired by the Hitlerite *Sturmabteilung* (SA Assault Section) better known as the *brownshirts* , now incorporated into its political conglomerate the supremacist *Abhinav Bharat* (Indian Youth Society *)* , founded in 1904 and originally secret, whose primary objective is to establish a *Hindu rashtra* (state) , not only in India, but also in Pakistan and Nepal. One of its leaders Pragya Singh Thakur, elected MP in May, days before the elections at a rally referred to Nathuram Godse, the man who assassinated Gandhi, as a patriot, since, in the heated worldview of *Hindu nationalism*, Mahatma he is considered a *Muslim* sympathizer .

Modi in his second term will try to strengthen the *Hindutva concept* , which compares and defines the Indian as the Hindu, beyond the nuance of an "H" in short, it is only Indian who professes *Hinduism and defends Hindu* values , almost 80% of the 1300 million inhabitants leaving out the approximate 190 million Muslims 14.2%, the 25 million Christians 2.3% and the rest minorities such as *Sikhism and* Buddhism , *truly* very minorities.

The *Muslim community* has only managed to promote 26 candidates to the Indian parliament in May, which makes it practically impossible to manage laws that protect them. While his story has been removed from school textbooks and reports of *Hindu mobs* murdering *Muslims* on the sole suspicion that they have slaughtered cows, sacred to *Hinduism* , for food, are increasing day by day.

A divine lawsuit

In this highly sensitive reality, the dispute over the almost two hectares located in the small city of Ayodhya, in the state of Uttar Pradesh (Northern Province) for which the Supreme Court of India has just issued on November 9, could lead to a new source of conflict between *Hindus* and *Muslims*.

The court ruled that the disputed property for 150 years pass into the hands of the followers of God Rama, avatar of Vishnu, considered a historical figure and the most virtuous of *Hindu mythology*, where Modi had promised to build a great temple, since according to the scriptures is the place of his birth. Some archaeological research has concluded that there is evidence that a *Hindu temple* stood on the site before the construction of the mosque in 1528.

Mosque was located on that site, built by the *Mughal* Emperor Babur in the 16th century, according to *Hindu arguments*, it was built on the ruins of a temple dedicated to *Rama*.

In December 1992, gangs of *Hindu fanatics* destroyed the *mosque* in just a few hours, shortly after BJP members began a persecution against *Muslims*, which would end up producing about 2,000 deaths. The breakdown of secularism and the installation of the religious struggle takes place, fracturing the country and politically exploiting that conflict.

Since then, in Ayodhya, the legal dispute over these lands began, which resulted not only in a verdict in favor of the *Hindu position*, but also brought a new victory for Prime Minister Modi, six months after his overwhelming electoral victory. In 2010 a ruling had divided the land between *Muslims* and *Hindus*, but the ruling was rejected by both parties, so the case was brought to the high court in August.

The construction of a temple for Rama in the city of Ayodhya is a long-awaited wish of Hindu nationalists *and* a major goal of the *Bharatiya Janata*.

The decision of the five judges was unanimous, accepting the *Hindus ' claim* that it is the birthplace of God Rama, and that the mosque "was not built on wasteland" and that the *Hindu belief* could not be disputed, which it increases the chances of further deepening the religious conflict.

The court that awarded title to the disputed land to the god Rama himself, since, in Indian jurisprudence, a god can be considered a legal person, will allocate to the Muslim community land not far from the disputed site for the construction of a new *mosque*.

The entire country was placed on high security alert after the court ruling, expecting new disturbances. Thousands of police and paramilitary troops were sent to the state of Uttar Pradesh and around 500 *Muslim activists and Hindu* fanatics were arrested in the previous days. Strong security controls and movement restrictions were observed both on the streets and on routes surrounding the city, where the police also erected barricades. While both protests and celebrations have been banned in Ayodhya.

Since Modi and the BJP took power in 2014, the reconstruction of a Rama temple in Ayodhya has been a fundamental issue, since Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in India, has been key since then in view of the disputed elections. in 2019, which consecrated Modi for a second term. Yogi Adityanath, a hardline *Hindu monk and state Prime Minister, was one of the key voices in the judicial fight, which on Saturday ended a long conflict, although it deepens a* dangerous drift to fundamentalism.

Image Source:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/image/6629780-3x2-940x627.jpg

Intelligence-oriented Police Activity: A concrete path in Public Security the OSCE model

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)

On several occasions I have dealt with the subject of Criminal Intelligence, Criminal Analysis, the process or cycle of Intelligence, the profiles of the analyst and other issues of the activity, I have also dealt with the subject of Policing models and tangentially on that of Intelligence Driven Policing (ILP).

In this opportunity the idea is to delve into the ILP model, bringing as the axis for this article the model standardized by the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)* , where we will see its main components and I will break down in detail the key requirements in the operationalization and implementation of ILP. Although it is tempting to present a matrix or form to implement ILP, there is no universal template nor should there be, because local and national circumstances vary considerably. Each country should assess its status and develop its own implementation plan in light of the existing legal framework, culture, needs, resources, and other basic national/local factors, and tailor its approach to these key requirements. However, based on some commonly accepted principles, the OSCE has developed a framework model for the implementation of ILP and on which we will pivot throughout these installments.

Although national circumstances vary, case history has shown that the success of national ILP policies, strategies and implementation generally depends on the following key success factors:

- A clear legislative framework for the ILP, which is in compliance with international human rights and data protection standards, and includes clearly defined powers and processes for agencies to collect, analyze and share relevant intelligence;
- Organizational structures that facilitate clear strategic direction and operational cooperation, as well as decision-making processes in a multi-agency environment and adequate oversight;
- Technology to facilitate the exchange of information through the interoperability of systems;
- Knowledge and skills of all relevant personnel; Y
- A collaborative culture of intelligence sharing to support decision-making across all operational domains1.

The OSCE model

As we saw in past articles, the ILP is a top-down management and decision-making framework. Provides a structure, methodology and multiple processes for a systematic collection, exchange and analysis of relevant information, which serves as a basis for planning and decision-making for the management of Public Security (law enforcement), some refer to the ILP as a business model of law enforcement, that is, a methodology that guides the conduct and management of surveillance.

Hand in hand with the ILP, one cannot fail to deal with the I-4 or 4-I Model (intention, interpretation, influence and impact) it is useful to explain the roles and the relationship between the key actors of the ILP concept: the criminal environment , the criminal intelligence analyst and the police decision maker. All 4 "I" components must

be in place and working properly for ILP to function to its full potential. The model emphasizes the relationship between criminal analysis and decision makers. Decision makers (Directors) perform tasks, direct, advise and guide criminal intelligence analysts. First, decision makers must ensure that their intentions are explained and understood. Second, analysts interpret the criminal environment, and third, they influence decision makers with the results of the analysis. Based on these findings, decision makers impact the criminal environment through strategic management, action plans, investigations, and operations as presented in Figure below:

"Intelligence-driven policing is a business model for policing […] capable of incorporating areas of policing that are not related to crime per se but remain significant issues for communities and law enforcement agencies. With these developments, intelligence-driven surveillance is becoming the "all crime, all danger, all harm" business approach that many look to in surveillance." - Ratcliffe (2016: 67).

Implement ILP

Below is a simplified chart of the main steps, key players, procedures and products to put the ILP concept into practice. The model can be applied partially or totally at the various levels of Public Security (National, Provincial or Local).
The ILP model includes the following main steps and components:

TAREAS

Política - Estrategia - Necesidades - Amenazas
emergentes

PROCESO ICIA CRIM

Análisis

PRODUCTO ICIA CRIM

Productos
Operativos
de Icia

Productos
Estratégicos
de Icia

TOMA DECISIONES

Mandos medios
de Investigación

Creador Políticas
Alta Conducción

- Actividades
- Operaciones
- Investigaciones

- Políticas
- Prioridades
- Recursos
- Planes
  Estratégicos

ACTIVIDADES OPERACIONALES

Política
en Gral.

Grandes
Eventos

Política
Comunitaria

Delitos
Graves

Anti
Terrorismo

RETROALIMENTACIÓN - EVALUACIÓN

DATOS – INFORMACIÓN - INTELIGENCIA

MONITOREO, CALIDAD Y CONTROL

Tasks

Based on policies, strategic and operational plans, emerging threats or identified needs, Public Security management tasks at its 3 national, regional or local levels and provides instructions for analysis management, which distributes tasks to individual analysis departments, units or individual analysts.

Analysis within the Criminal Intelligence Process

Following the instructions and tasks of the Directorate or the requests of the investigators, the analysts develop intelligence in line with a defined intelligence process. While analysis forms the core component of the processes, the process also includes the collection, processing, and collation of information.

Criminal Intelligence Products

The analysis process generates strategic and operational criminal intelligence products, which are used as a basis to develop strategic and operational plans, and to support criminal investigations and other Public Security operations, as well as to prioritize and allocate human and technical resources.

Decision making

OSCE guidance recommends that each Country maintain an ILP decision-making structure at the national, regional and local levels, where analysis reports/intelligence products are used as the basis for decisions.

Operating Activities

In the previous graphic, we see that five examples of police areas are listed where the principles of ILP can be applied. This is not an exhaustive list, and proactive application, based on evaluated and analyzed data and information, can be applied to many other areas. Operational surveillance areas generate data, information and intelligence that are sent through clearly defined communication channels and stored in databases that allow for further analysis.

Data and Information Flows

For ILP to function properly, all law enforcement officials must share and forward, through clearly defined communication mechanisms and channels, the relevant data, information and intelligence they receive and gather throughout their activities. and daily work. The sharing of data, information and intelligence should be an obligation of all law enforcement officers defined in national law or other formal instructions.

Comments and Evaluation

Analysts and Chief Analytics Officers receive feedback on the quality of their criminal intelligence and analytics products from Public Safety Decision Makers, investigators, and other users of their reports. The main quality indicators of criminal intelligence products are their compliance with defined methodologies and standards, and the degree to which they meet the expectations and requirements of their users, especially with regard to strategic and operational decision-making.

Monitoring and Quality Control

Creating and maintaining a monitoring and quality control system for the ILP model is the responsibility of the administration at the highest level of Driving. This applies to all plans, objectives, processes and steps, including the evaluation of criminal intelligence products, the monitoring of tasks and decisions, compliance with human rights and data protection regulations and the resources assigned to tasks. . Each country must establish its own quality management and control system. In addition to internal oversight and quality control, ILP-related functions such as the collection, storage, processing and sharing of data, information and intelligence should also be subject to independent oversight.

Although the ILP model is divided into five main steps and sub-processes, it should be emphasized that all components of the model are interactive and feed off each other, which often makes it necessary to review previous steps. For example, the analysis process often reveals intelligence gaps, sometimes requiring a new task or investigation.

As mentioned above and frequently highlighted in OSCE guidance, all Security Forces or Law Enforcement personnel are active participants and providers of ILP. The ILP model is based on data and information from all

levels, departments and units of Law Enforcement. Therefore, there is a need to establish awareness and training, as well as a clear ILP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for all levels, as well as appropriate safeguards, accountability and oversight mechanisms.

Key Implementation Challenges and Requirements

The casuistry and the section carried out by the OSCE have identified various challenges and preconditions for ILP to function to its maximum potential. It has been revealed that ILP can have a significant and measurable impact only if it is delivered through substantial change in organisation, culture and leadership. It has also been noted that the reluctance to make such reforms has proven to be a significant obstacle to the implementation of ILPs. The dominance of performance culture and operational statistics, where the emphasis is on measuring results, has been highlighted as a major reason for reluctance to change within law enforcement. Therefore, the introduction of ILP as a new law enforcement decision-making framework poses a particular challenge because it often requires new management methods and cultural change within police leadership. To maximize the potential of ILP, comprehensive change management must be carried out that includes extensive preparation, consultation and awareness-raising measures at all levels of the organization before and during implementation.

"Ultimately, the prospects for any organizational reform are always limited by the degree to which those with real power in the institution believe the change is in their best interest and will deliver practical benefits to the institution." - James (2016: 26).

In addition to the above challenges, other identified prerequisites for a successful ILP implementation include:
- Selection of quality personnel, adequate training and qualified personnel;
- Competent direction, management and control of intelligence work;
- Adequate databases, computer equipment and analysis software; Y
- Qualified Directors / Managers who know how to use intelligence analysis products5.

The following points provide general guidance for planning the adoption and implementation of ILP. Although the basic ILP model can be applied everywhere, these points must be put into the national and local context.

National legal framework that allows to implement ILP, in line with international legal standards
- National legislation must include specific provisions on ILP and allow its implementation.
- The collection, storage, processing and sharing of data and information must be based on national legislation, which strictly complies with international human rights and data protection standards. The OSCE guide encourages participating States to request technical assistance and advice to assess the compliance of these laws with international standards.
- The ILP framework, methodologies, internal processes, and the sharing and use of criminal intelligence products must comply with the OSCE Democratic Policing Principles, which reaffirm the importance of the rule of law, human rights, the protection of data, police ethics, responsibility and transparency. and external monitoring and control6.

Political support, high-level government and management commitment.
- Political support and the highest levels of government leadership (Minister, Secretary of State, etc.) and Police must be clearly aware of the level of commitment before adopting or implementing ILP.
- The full potential of ILP will not be realized unless all levels of law enforcement are aware of the model, its structures and processes, and their roles and responsibilities within it.

Organizational approach
- ILP can be applied to all surveillance areas.
- The ILP must be applied throughout the organization, not just in specialized units.
- Efforts to change the culture to one that emphasizes the "need to share" information should be an integral part of managing change in the introduction and implementation of ILPs.
- ILP has analysts who work in direct support of decision makers at all levels of the organization.

National Strategic Planning for Public Security, based on strategic analysis, including threat assessments

- National strategic plans, including prioritization, should be formulated and based on strategic analysis and assessments.
- These plans should be developed into operational action plans.
- Human, technical, and financial resources must be allocated in accordance with these plans.

Strategic and operational task meetings.

- Both operational and strategic task meetings should take place regularly at the local, provincial and national levels.
- The effective collection and analysis of criminal intelligence has been shown to generate more investigative and operational opportunities than police can find. Therefore, identification and careful tasking and prioritization should be an integral task of strategic and operational meetings.
- To ensure intelligence-driven decision making, strategic and operational intelligence products must be integrated into task and decision-making frameworks.

Collection and exchange of data, information and intelligence.

- All law enforcement officials should be required by law or other formal regulations to share information they have received about a suspected crime or suspected criminals through communication mechanisms and channels that are clearly defined and in accordance with national law and international standards.
- Sufficient safeguards must be in place to protect the human rights of individuals named in the information that has been collected for analysis purposes.
- Arrangements must be in place to protect the identities and safety of informants and the safety of whistleblowers.
- Within the applicable national and international legal frameworks, management codes and data protection law, the authorities must allow the exchange of data and information between state agencies and other official institutions.
- Relevant authorities may make formal arrangements to obtain and use relevant data and information from sources outside state agencies, including local authorities, non-governmental organizations, civil society, private industry, regional and international organizations, the media and the public on the condition that these agreements are within the limits of the applicable national and international legal frameworks.
- National information evaluation systems, including management and dissemination codes, need to be decided and introduced in a formal decision.
- All law enforcement officers should be familiar with these codes and apply them to all information they receive and send.

Organism/Centralized Criminal Intelligence Agency

- The OSCE guide recommends that each country operate with a National Organization that centralizes Criminal Intelligence activities (according to the OSCE, called the National Criminal Intelligence Department -NCID for its acronym in English- this may vary according to the organizational structures of each country).
- The NCID must be made up of members from various agencies (Security Forces, Police Forces, Intelligence Agencies).
- Representatives of different law enforcement entities and other authorities represented in the NCID must have access to your agency's data and information, and must be permitted by law to share it with representatives of other entities/authorities represented within the NCID, relevant for national and international affairs.
- NCID should be responsible for a national criminal intelligence database.
- NCID should be responsible for conducting strategic and operational analyses, including threat assessments, at the national level.
- NCID should assist regional/local criminal intelligence analysis departments/units where relevant7.

Criminal Analysis and Threat Assessments.
- National authorities should present formal decisions and standard operating procedures on transparent analysis and threat assessment methods and processes.
- The types and structures of criminal intelligence products should be decided at the national level, providing all law enforcement officers with a common reporting framework.
- Criminal intelligence reports based on commonly accepted international standards and formats clarify and inspire cross-border and international cooperation in criminal matters.

IT security and interoperability
- Interconnected, interoperable, or single platform IT structures that support ILP must be operated at national, regional, and local levels.
- NCID must have access to all available data, information, and intelligence held by regional and local criminal intelligence departments and other law enforcement agencies.
- Appropriate security features should be established in accordance with formal decisions and SOP, national legislation and international standards, including detailed logging and internal control mechanisms, as well as clearly defined and logged access levels.
- These formal decisions and SOPs should cover physical security, document security, IT security, and personnel security, including personnel background checks and background checks, where applicable.
- Criminal intelligence databases and the exchange of data, information and intelligence must be subject to the monitoring and control of an independent external control authority established by law to ensure compliance with national legislation in line with international human rights standards and data protection provisions, and provide effective and accessible remedies in the event of breaches.

Feedback and Practice Mechanisms
- Directors/Heads and analysts who receive information from law enforcement officials should give feedback to encourage sharing.
- Managers, researchers, and other users of analytics products should give analysts feedback on the quality of analytics products to stimulate progress and improvements.

Management and quality control.
- The leadership of the Public Safety Effort is responsible for: developing and maintaining a monitoring and quality control system at all levels of ILP implementation; tasks and decision making; objectives and results; internal processes; criminal intelligence products; material and equipment; and human resources, including staff training and performance.
- The entire intelligence process in each country must be subject to internal and external oversight mechanisms.

Cooperation and exchange of intelligence with the police community at a regional and international level.
- In accordance with national legislation, international standards and mutual legal assistance instruments, national strategic analysis and threat assessments should be shared with relevant cooperating countries and applicable regional and international organizations.
- Intelligence sharing with the authorities of a foreign state must be based on national law that outlines clear parameters for intelligence sharing, including the conditions that must be met for information to be shared, the entities with which intelligence can be shared and the guarantees that apply. to intelligence exchanges.
- Proactive steps should be taken to establish joint intelligence-led investigations and operations at the regional and international levels, based on common criminal challenges identified and presented in threat assessment and analysis reports.

So far we have seen the generalities of the ILP model transposed through a guide to good practices prepared by the OSCE. Certainly the good use of ILP, added to the use of Technologies and concepts such as real-time crime treatment and fusion centers are vital for any State that wishes to systematically reduce crime and guarantee a more efficient and effective public security service.

In the next installment, I will be developing in greater depth the topics related to the analysis and the levels of operations within the framework of the ILP and the good practices issued by the OSCE.

Iran, hate protests

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Anti-government protests in Iran

While the United Nations and all its media partners cover up the ethnocide that is once again "celebrated" in Bolivia, because it is nothing more than that, a true celebration of hatred of the Indian, and hides the Pinochet repression in Chile or Ecuador or Colombia , stands out with big headlines and the respective denunciations of the Chinese government's repression in Hong Kong, or the genocide that Saudi Arabia caused in its war against Yemen. The fabulous information mechanism, around the world, has been launched to expose once again the Islamic Republic of Iran, which since last November 15, has had to implement measures in defense of its Revolution.

The protests began as soon as the government's plan was known by the government, due to a severe plan of restrictions and an increase in gasoline by around 50 percent. After the announcement of the measures, demonstrations broke out "spontaneously" in more than a hundred cities throughout the country, in which the origin of the protests was quickly forgotten and they ended up demanding: "Death to Rouhani" by the president of Iran, Hassan Rohaní, in addition to "Death to Khamenei" and "Death to the dictator", by *Ayatollah* Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the revolution.

The government of the Iranian Revolution, which supports a sneaky war and not so much, for forty years carried out by the United States, and its two great regional partners Israel and Saudi Arabia, knowing that doubting could be the end of the Revolution, It quickly took the initiative and repressed the protests, which according to *Amnesty International* caused a hundred deaths, although the number of the most fervent anti-Iranian groups, many of whom proclaim themselves exiled as monarchists operating mainly from London, have denounced that the dead would be more than 200; They would have been killed by snipers stationed in buildings and helicopter gunships, which openly fired on the crowds. Tehran authorities have acknowledged that security forces made more than 1,000 arrests. And although it is not confirmed, opponents of the revolution also reported that "the regime" imposed an Internet blackout throughout the country and prohibited the media from covering the protests.

Despite the two measures, there have been countless images showing dozens of buildings and commercial premises, looted and set on fire, despite the fact that "all" the country's repressive forces, such as the Revolutionary Guard (GR); the *Basij* (mobilization) a volunteer corps founded by *Ayatollah* Khomeini in November 1979, after the start of the war with Iraq, subordinate to the GR; agents from the Ministry of Intelligence, the police and the army were mobilized to contain the "spontaneous demonstrators".

Last Wednesday the 20th, President Rouhani announced that the disturbances were finally controlled and blamed the foreign enemies of the country.

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A country under lockdown

Although Iran has been harassed in every possible way since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, with economic sanctions, boycotts and trade blockades, as well as war actions on its territory such as the *Eagle Claw* operation in April 1980, whose resounding failure to rescue the famous American hostages would cost Jimmy Carter his re-election at the hands of Ronald Reagan; the proxy war that Saddam Hussein declared against the young revolution, which forced Iran to use its meager resources to wage an eight-year war, costing more than a million lives, against the powerful Iraqi army, armed and financed by the United States and countless European and Middle Eastern allies. During the 2000s a series of assassinations of scientists, in different operations by the *Zionist and* American services in Tehran itself, tried to decimate the Iranian nuclear plan. In January and September 2018, different attacks against civilians, soldiers, and government buildings claimed almost a hundred lives in different parts of the country (See: The Persian Spring and *Je ne suis pas l'Iran*). Iran was also accused of collaborating with the Yemeni *al-Houthi resistance* , which has not only prevented the invasion of Saudi Arabia, but thanks to its actions has forced Riyadh to negotiate a peace agreement, before the entire Saudi south finished catch fire, as happened after the attack on the Saudi-Aramco refinery, on September 14 (See: Saudi Arabia between Vietnam and 9/11)

With the arrival of Donald Trump in the Casablanca, the detente policies practiced by his predecessor Barak Obama, in the last stretch of his government, were reduced to rubble, in May 2018, as promised during the election campaign, Trump broke with the nuclear agreements, between Russia, China, Germany, the United Kingdom and France, in 2015, which with the addition of the United States were known as "5 + 1" with which it had been achieved after laborious negotiations, the commitment of Iran not to continue with its research to achieve the construction of nuclear weapons. Trump also ordered the reinstatement of sanctions that were choking the Iranian economy. Iran, in response, continued its investigations in open defiance of the New York tycoon, surpassing last July the levels of uranium enrichment that the "5+1" had agreed upon.

Particularly in 2019, Donald Trump's foreign policy reached near points of no return against Iran in June, and was on the verge of starting a conflict that could have had devastating consequences, for the entire world. When in full flight he ordered the return of the planes that were flying towards Iran, to bomb in retaliation for the shooting down of a spy drone in Iranian territorial waters, by the Revolutionary Guard. The event brought a cataract of denunciations and threats from the ruddy president, which ended with the hijacking of some Iranian and British oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. In May several false flag attacks occurred against two Saudi oil tankers, one Norwegian and one Emirati, in the Gulf of Oman off the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In June two other oil tankers, the Norwegian *Front Altai* and the *Kokuka Courageous* from Singapore, came under attack again. Attempts to hold Iran responsible for the "incidents" have come to nothing. In Gibraltar, the English navy raided the Panamanian-flagged oil tanker *Grace I* , suspected of transporting Iranian crude to Syria (See: Iran: Hawks over Hormuz.).

Once the operations of November 15 were controlled, millions of people took to the streets in support of the revolutionary government, which is far from giving a final cut to the pro-American movements that operate inside the country.

Organizations such as *Jaish al-Adl* (Army of Justice), a Sunni fundamentalist group that, since 2012, has frequently attacked bases and checkpoints of Iranian security forces, arriving from inside Pakistan. Between October 2013 and November 2015, the *Jaish al-Adl* carried out a dozen attacks in which they killed around 60 Iranian soldiers and policemen.

Jaish al-Adl emerged in 2012 from the *Jundullah* (Army of God) after Iranian authorities arrested and prosecuted its leader and founder Abdul Malik Riggi in 2010. Although it may be the *Moyahedin-e Jalq* (Organization of the People's Mujahideen of Iran) or MEK, the anti-Iranian organization closest to the United States, are the ones who are most active in the hate protests.

Image Source:
https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/estallan-protestas-iran-exigir-renuncia-del-lider-nid2323177

Colombia: Air Operations against Terrorism

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)

AH-60L Harpía helicopters, of the Colombian Air Force.

In the early hours of the morning, the town's police station shakes with three successive explosions, opening the way to a heavy fire of rifles and machine guns, they are being attacked by about two hundred FARC terrorists. The situation is quite unfavourable, since only 20 men work at the station and not all of them are on duty.

The explosions are due to the "tatucos", a name given to domestic gas cylinders filled with explosives and shrapnel, which are launched with very little precision through a system similar to a mortar, which causes serious collateral damage to the civilian population. and the infrastructure.

The policemen react and take position in the trenches or behind the sandbags that surround the police station. The radio-operator immediately reports the news to the higher level, and the reaction and counterattack plans are activated, the walls are full of hundreds of small holes, the police know that if reinforcements do not arrive quickly, when the ammunition runs out they will be captured by the enemy and your future will be uncertain. They could be executed on the spot, or kidnapped to spend years in remote jungles, it is not known which is worse.

The Command and Control Center of the Colombian Air Force is alerted to the situation and instructions are immediately broadcast to the air units in the area. Precisely, the FAC has bases in different regions, and also deploys its aircraft in direct support of surface troops, to reduce reaction time in the face of these eventualities.

It is established that an AC-47T "Ghost" plane will fly to the area to serve as an Air Intelligence Platform, this taking into account its great flight autonomy. Upon reaching the vertical of the town, he begins to slowly orbit it while with his FLIR device he breaks the darkness of the night in search of the terrorists who are harassing the police station. He detects a large concentration of enemies in the streets surrounding the station, and a group waiting outside with five trucks, apparently the reserve. The crew of the AC-47T makes radio contact with the police personnel and informs them that help is already arriving, which encourages them to continue resisting.

The FAC Command and Control Center launches an AH-60L Harpy helicopter with all its weapons, and which also embarks two Selected Shooters on Aerial Platform - TEPLA. He also sends two Kfir C.10 equipped with laser-guided bombs to the scene, they fly at high speed because the situation is urgent.

On the ground, thanks to previous intelligence work, the guerrillas have identified the houses where the policemen live and have gone looking for them there. They have captured three who were not on duty, taken them to the main square and executed

them. It can already be inferred what will be the fate of those who resist...

All the crews of the air elements that act in the operation are in night mode, operating with Night Vision Goggles (NVG). When the Harpy helicopter arrives in the area, the AC-47T pinpoints with its FLIR laser the exact point where the enemy's reserve concentration is located. In turn, the Harpy engages them with his own FLIR, and after making sure that there are no houses nearby, he proceeds to a massive attack with rocket fire and GAU machine guns, the trucks in which the criminals tried to flee are destroyed, surrounded by the corpses of his men in reserve.

The images of the operation, captured by the Phantom's FLIR, are being transmitted online to the FAC Command and Control Center via data link.

The Harpy takes position on the town and is placed laterally, here the Selected Shooters on Aerial Platform (TEPLA) come into play. Who, using precision rifles to avoid collateral damage, shoot at the guerrillas who are attacking the police in the town, starting with those who are closest to the Police Station.

The guerrillas realize what is happening and begin to flee, apparently they had an escape plan because they progressively converge at concentration points on the outskirts of the town, forming two groups that flee in opposite directions. When the guerrillas are far enough from the populated center, the aircraft receive instructions from the Command and Control Center: the group that flees north will be attacked by the AC-47T Ghost, and the one that flees south will be laser-marked by the Harpy. III for an LGB attack. Sure enough, the ghost plane readies its GAU machine guns and when the plane is in position, it unloads thousands of bullets on the enemy concentration, eliminating them all.

The Harpy III remains in static flight at a safe distance from the target, which is moving on foot, about 80 guerrillas who are quickly fleeing towards the river, where they probably have boats waiting for them. The laser, imperceptible to the human eye, is on them. About five miles from the target, each of the Kfir drops an LGB Griffin bomb, already locked onto the laser, the planes make a sharp turn and return to their base at Air Combat Command No. 1. The bombs travel quickly the distance that separates them from the objective, to explode right in the center of the column, killing all the narco-terrorists. The Harpy records everything with her FLIR camera.

The policemen who were at the station can go out to assess the damage. Five of his companions have died and two are seriously injured, the station is in ruins, as well as some of the houses around it, as a result of the inaccurate impact of the "tatucos", apparently there are more than a dozen civilians who lost life, and 20 guerrillas are found killed inside the town with accurate shots to the head. Outside the town, the guerrilla unit was annihilated.

At dawn, trucks arrive with a Mobile Police Squad of the National Police, as well as personnel from the Prosecutor's Office to carry out legal expertise with the deceased. Ambulances attend to the wounded, the civilian population is in shock. The aircraft have returned to their bases to await a new mission, which is not long in coming.

The Colombian Air Force has a long tradition in supporting surface forces, mainly due to the issue of guerrilla and terrorist groups that have operated in the country for decades. Different fixed-wing and rotary-wing platforms have been acquired over the years, offering different tactical possibilities. In terms of aerial weapons, the constant has been the use of bombs, rockets and machine guns, and more recently sniper rifles.

The above narrative is fictitious, but it describes the typical operations that took place in Colombia until relatively recently, which contributed to bringing the FARC group to the negotiating table. The commanders of this group of criminals, seeing the general strengthening of the Armed Forces and that in particular the technical and operational capabilities of the FAC had been developed to the point of preventing any operation involving the concentration of their men in the rural environment, They thought of moving on to urban operations, where the firepower of the Air Force could not be used, but in the big cities of Colombia a highly technical police and different units of Urban Special Forces awaited them, not to mention the relentless and accurate TEPLA. Arriving at such a complicated situation for the guerrillas that they preferred to negotiate.

The Armed Forces do everything possible not to lose the capabilities acquired, and at the same time transform the doctrine, moving from an eminently anti-subversive approach to another more oriented to conventional deterrence. Even thinking of participating in multinational operations, under the UN flag and even with NATO, the European Union, or bilateral operations with Western allies. These operations could, of course, include a component of the Colombian Air Force.

Douglas Hernandez

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Libya, the stagnant war

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

General Khalifa Hafther, one of the contenders in the ongoing war in Libya.

Since April, after the start of the offensive by General Khalifa Hafther under the command of *the Libyan National Army* (LNA) against Tripoli (See: Libya: More blood than oil) , more than 1,200 civilians have been killed and nearly 300,000 displaced. victims of the stalled war being waged between Hafther's forces and those of the United Nations (UN)-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Those who finally were the two winning sides after the Western entente, which not only ended the government of Colonel Gadaffi, but also reduced what until February 2011 was the most developed nation in Africa.

Air strikes, in this scavenging war, are mostly carried out with drones. The United Nations estimates that, in the last six months, both sides have carried out close to a thousand drone missions. In addition to bombardments with Emirati and Egyptian F16s and artillery, with which they have destroyed some of the few hospitals that had remained standing after the beginning of the war against Gadaffi or those of the campaign, raised with urgency and financial resources by the UN or the European Union (EU). The same fate befell schools and refugee centers, while once again the Mitiga airport, the only operable one in Tripoli, was forced to close.

Haftar, a former Gadaffi general, who, after his defection from the Libyan army, lived for 25 years in the United States a few kilometers from the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, has the support of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Russia, and France and covertly also have the support of the United States, which officially supports the GNA, "led" by Fayez al-Sarraj the Prime Minister, irresponsibly anointed by the UN, also has the support of Turkey and Italy , the former colonial power in Libya, with a strong dispute with France, for oil exploitation.

Both sides, like various autonomous *Khatibas* (militias) such as the Seventh Khatiba of Tarhuna, 65 kilometers from Tripoli, or those of the cities of Misrata and Zintán, continue to receive constant military supplies from abroad, regardless of the fact that the UN established a arms embargo in 2011.

Both Hafther's army and that of the GNA have been responsible for massacres against the civilian population, since the April offensive began. On the 16th of that month rockets launched by the *Libyan National Army* fell on the Tripolitan district of Abu Salim, hitting several blocks, killing eight civilians and injuring at least four more. A similar attack on the town of Qasr bin Ghashir on May 14 hit a three-story building, killing at least five civilians and injuring nearly a dozen.

During the month of October, Unicef denounced the sharp increase in child victims. Three children, along with two women, were killed in an incident 16 km from Tripoli; three other girls along with their mother were injured when their home was hit by a rocket south of the capital; while a 13-year-old girl died and five others were injured when a fire caused by the

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effects of artillery broke out at her school in the city of Janzour, 18 kilometers from the capital.

On July 27, several missiles hit a field hospital near Tripoli airport, killing five doctors and rescuers and wounding eight more. According to the investigators, the fragments of the explosives found at the scene were of the *Blue Arrow 7 type* launched from a *Wing Loong drone* of Chinese origin, with a value of 2 million dollars per unit, with the capacity to fire a maximum of eight missiles each, operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA, one of the pieces of evidence that shows that other nations are directly involved in this war.

Ground fighting between the two armies, along with the different *Khatibas* , which operate for each side of at least 400 fighters each, takes place almost exclusively in a few desert districts on the southern outskirts of the capital. While, in almost all the neighborhoods of the city of Tripoli, the streets are obstructed, so that civil vehicular traffic can barely circulate, constantly stopped by checkpoints and trenches, in addition to the piles of garbage, which have not been seen for months. pick up.

Blame it on Moscow

Doctors at the Aziziya field hospital south of Tripoli, where victims with open wounds and mangled limbs from artillery fire used to arrive, reported that, since the beginning of November, they have been noticing that the dead arrive with small holes in the head or body product of projectiles that kill instantly and never leave the body, which clearly speaks of the presence of highly trained snipers. Different Western media directly accuse Russian mercenaries, since the lack of exit of the projectile coincides with the ammunition used by Russian forces in "other places", without being able to specify more than Syria, where Russian forces do operate at the request of President Bashar al- Assad.

According to journalistic reports from North American sources, the snipers would belong to the private Russian company *Wagner Group*, which would have already operated in Syria. The snipers are said to be part of some 200 Russian fighters who arrived in Libya a month and a half ago as part of a campaign by Moscow to reassert its influence in the Middle East and Africa.

General Osama al-Juwaili, the main commander of the forces aligned with the Tripoli government, has declared: "It is very clear that Russia is participating in this conflict" while other officials insist that more mercenaries arrive every week, although they do not explain why. where the funds come out to supply with dollars in cash, uniforms and footwear, as seen last week on the front line of Ain Zara. Nor with what is financed the purchase of the Turkish drones at 5 million each, manufactured by the company of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's son-in-law, Selcuk Bayraktar.

An element, although at this moment of little presence is the *Wilayat Barqa* , (Cyrenaica Province) the *Daesh* franchise , in Libya, which has just sworn his loyalty oath to the new *emir* Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurashi, after al-Baghdadi's death.

Daesh *has* practically disappeared since it was expelled from Sirte in 2016, maintaining some cells in areas of the lower south of the country, heavily persecuted by Khalifa Hafther's forces, although with the intense activity that the terrorist organization has in Niger and north of Mali, can regroup and operate, according to the political needs of the United States, as it has done on more than one occasion

By the end of 2019, a conference is expected to take place in Berlin, in order to achieve a resolution of the conflict, which for some organizers, if a solution is not agreed upon, the war could go on, with different alternatives, for long years in absolute irresolution. , as stuck as it is now.

Image Source:
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191125-sudan-militias-move-to-libya-to-support-haftars-forces/

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Refugees: Death en route to West Africa.

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Geographical location of The Gambia / Panoramic view of Banjul, the capital of The Gambia

A new shipwreck left at least 62 dead, this time off the Mauritanian coast, near the city of Nouadhibou, 470 kilometers north of Nouakchott, the country's capital. The accident occurred in the early hours of Thursday, December 5, when the boat involved, with a capacity for 180 people, was transporting about 150 migrants from Gambia to the Canary Islands (Spain), along the so-called "West Africa route".

According to the *Missing Migrants Project of* the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM), 158 people have died in 11 confirmed shipwrecks this year along the West African migration route, which stretches 1,400 kilometers from Cape Verde to the Islands. Canary Islands. Eight of these shipwrecks departed from Morocco and another two from Mauritania. During 2018, 43 people drowned in five shipwrecks, on this same route. The least traveled of all the sea routes used by traffickers who transport refugees to different European ports. The three main crossings are in the Mediterranean: the Western Mediterranean route, which from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla go to the south of Spain; that of the Central Mediterranean that from Libyan ports sail to the south of Italy and that of the Eastern Mediterranean that from the north of Egypt try to reach Calabria and Apulia, making this the most dangerous crossing.

The accident on Thursday 5, occurred when the ship collided with a reef, trying to approach the Mauritanian coast, to replenish fuel, water and food, to continue towards the final destination, the Canary Islands, where they have arrived until October 1. 470 people, 21 percent more than in the same period of 2018.

According to the Nouadhibou port authorities, after the shipwreck 85 people swam to shore, while 62 bodies were found dead. The figure is provisional since the original number of passengers could not be confirmed. Interior Minister Mohamed Salem ould Merzoug reported that 10 people were hospitalized in serious condition.

This new shipwreck becomes the deadliest produced on this route, the ship left Gambia on November 27 with a contingent in which the majority were between 20 and 30 years old, among the passengers there were women and children, their nationalities are unknown.

In recent months, the Mauritanian authorities have reported a sharp increase in illegal boats transporting mainly Senegalese migrants to the Canary Islands. While the Canarian authorities reported that only since mid-November some 250 people from different African countries have arrived on the islands.

In the early hours of last Wednesday, November 6, a boat with an unknown number of refugees, estimated between 12 and 16, was shipwrecked near the coast of the island of Lanzarote, in the area of Caleta de Caballo, in the municipality of Teguise, after the accident 8 bodies were rescued. Until last Thursday, the deadliest of the shipwrecks produced on the West African route, was the night of February 15, 2009, in which 25 people died. Accidents with lower cost of lives occur more and more frequently on the coasts of this Spanish archipelago. A week before the day six, four people died and one is still missing, when the canoe they were sailing in drifted for fifteen days, until it was located by an oil tanker some 380 nautical miles (703 kilometers) to the south. from Gran Canaria. At the end of October, a ship with 151 passengers was rescued when it was sailing aimlessly some 150 nautical miles (277 kilometers) from the Canary archipelago.

Of refugees and xenophobes

The Gambia, despite being the smallest country on the continent, with a population of approximately 2,100,000 inhabitants, has one of the highest

migration rates in sub-Saharan Africa, between 2014 and 2018 alone, more than 39,000 Gambians have arrived in Europe irregularly.

After the 22-year dictatorship of President Yahya Jammeh, who in 2017, after a surprise defeat in the elections, which provoked an attempted military coup, was forced to flee into exile, heading to Equatorial Guinea with the chilling figure of 11.4 billion of dollars, leaving state treasuries literally empty.

The corruption of the Jammeh government seriously affected the Gambian economy, which generated a lack of expectations in the younger sectors of the population, who have found their only hope in migration.

Thus, since Jammeh's flight, Europe began to put pressure on Gambian refugees to return to their country. Ignoring that Gambia's economy is far from giving development possibilities to its population. To which was added at the beginning of the year the bankruptcy of the British *Thomas Cook,* since tourism constitutes 30 percent of the national GDP. There are many Gambian refugees who, expelled from their places of asylum, particularly Spain and Germany, return to their country without any opportunity to reintegrate into work.

With this picture of the situation, and against everything that could be expected, The Gambia has a significant population of foreign refugees who arrived in the 1990s, thousands who were fleeing the civil wars that were then being waged in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

This migration crisis forced the Banjul government, together with the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in the early 2000s to set up five refugee camps for Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, which by 2005 were all closed. since its inhabitants had decided to return to their countries or settle in urban areas, particularly in Greater Banjul.

Another important quota of refugees has been provided by the crisis in Casamance, (Senegal), whose intermittent and low-intensity independence conflict since the 1980s has produced a constant and informal ebb and flow of migrants (See: Casamance, an invisible war.)

Regarding the refugees from Casamance, the government tried to establish them in various camps north of the Gambia River, but the Senegalese refused, arguing that it was too far from their original settlements. They are currently established near the border with Senegal, in some 86 villages. Given the ethnic and cultural closeness and subsistence strategies, the refugees are, in general, integrated with the local communities, which allows them to subsist without more difficulties than in their own country.

In 2006, the Gambian central government assigned an identity card to thousands of these refugees, which grants its bearers a series of rights such as those of dependent or self-employment work, freedom of movement and access to social services. .

So much generosity on the part of a dictator like former president Jammeh hides reasons more of political interest than humanitarian, the refugees from Casamane belong to the same tribe as the former president, the *Jola* , whom he used politically since, According to the opposition, Jammeh would have given them naturalization certificates and voter cards to not only increase their popularity, but also to act as a counterweight in the elections. On the other hand, Jammeh was accused by the Senegalese government of having given support to separatist movements such as the *Casamane Freedom Fighters*.

According to some experts, although the presence of the *Jola refugee community* has not suffered consequences despite its alliance with the dictator, they fear that if the economic course of the country does not improve and poverty and unemployment continue to increase, the outbreak xenophobic could occur, which will undoubtedly add more refugees to the West African Route.

La Espriella-Mataje Road Axis: Multimodality of Maritime Drug Trafficking

By Boris Brito Moreno (CPFG-EM), (Ecuador)

Drug trafficking is a crime that originates on land and ends on land, transportation and especially transportation by sea, the second link in the drug trafficking value chain, is a means to an end that seeks to unite both the producer and the consumer. , separated in most cases by thousands of kilometers away.

The logistics chain of drug trafficking by sea is completed with small "first mile" or "last mile" sections that make this illicit business "multimodal", from production centers to large consumer markets.

Multimodal international transport is the transfer of goods from one country to another using more than one means of transport (road, rail, air, sea or river) and without cargo breaking. In the case of drug trafficking by sea, multimodality stands out in the first and last section of the link, that is, from the processing centers to the storage nodes for transportation (caves in most cases) and finally to the consumers.

The drug that comes from the producing countries generally reaches the countries of first destination (Mexico and Central America), where it is stored and later shipped, mostly to the United States or taking advantage of the point of confluence of merchant traffic (chock point) such as the

Rutas del Narcotráfico. Fuente: USCG-JIATF-SOUTH

Panama Canal, to other destinations in the world. In this regard, the report of the Coast Guard Command with JIATF-South of May 2018, indicates that 70% of the drug that leaves the producing countries is stored in the countries of the first destination (USCG-JIATFS, 2018).

The same report indicates that: "90% of the cocaine that arrives in Central America by sea is later taken to the United States through Mexico by land," which suggests that the remaining 10% enters the United States. through the archipelagos and islands located between Baja California (Mexico) and the State of California (United States).

From the producing countries the case is no different, the drug must transit from the production centers to the collection centers and later to the loading nodes for its illegal transport, which can be legally constituted ports or, failing that, piers, beaches or inlets that provide the minimum logistical facilities for embarkation.

The means of transportation will depend on the logistical facilities available, as well as the customs, border and anti-criminal controls established by each of the national authorities, establishing a cost/benefit for criminal gangs. The swarm, for example, can use almost all known land and pedestrian routes, however, it requires a large number of people/loads to be able to reach a point of equilibrium that allows a significant amount of drug to start its transport by sea.

The same thing happens in river traffic, in this regard, CIMCON BSN No. 24/2018 indicates that: "It is necessary to indicate that the Putumayo River concentrates most of the border between Peru and Colombia; fluvial highway that also interconnects the countries of Ecuador and Brazil".

In the Putumayo River, as in the Amazon River, state control is relatively low, the presence of control agencies and/or military authorities in the vast jungle territories of the area is scarce and precarious; a situation that of course is taken advantage of by Transnational Criminal Organizations (hereinafter: TCOs) dedicated to drug trafficking to carry out their illicit activities (CIMCON, 2018).

In the border area of Colombia and Peru, various TCOs interact to coordinate the transport of narcotics (cocaine hydrochloride and marijuana), using the Putumayo and Amazonas rivers (binational border between the two countries) as well as their tributaries, to send the drug both to the Ecuadorian territory (to deliver it by

land to the ports and launch areas on the Pacific Ocean) and to the Brazilian territory (to deliver it by river to the ports and launch areas on the Atlantic Ocean).

In recent years, the Colombian-Ecuadorian border that borders the Eastern Pacific, that is, the department of Nariño (Colombia) and the Province of Esmeraldas (Ecuador) has become an exit corridor for drug trafficking, due to various reasons, among them the repositioning of the criminal gangs and the residual elements of the FARC, as well as the rugged geography of the area due to its configuration of the biogeographical Chocó.

In this regard, the 2018 semi-annual report on drugs from the Anti-Drug Directorate of the National Navy of Colombia (hereinafter: DICOD) indicates that: "the favorite areas for drug traffickers continue to be the river corridors of the Colombian Pacific, which due to their geography offer spaces with ideal concealment characteristics for the trafficking of illicit substances, inputs and precursors. Likewise, the aforementioned report indicates that there is an expansion of drug trafficking towards Ecuador both on the maritime and on land sides" (DICOD, 2018).

Rutas fluviales Fuente: www.saviabotanica.com

MODALIDADES COLOMBIA 2017 Fuente: CIMCON

MODALIDAD	TOTAL	PACIFICO	
SPSS	4	4	⬆
SPFS	1	1	⬆
RADIOBOYA	4	3	⬆
GO FAST	56	33	↗
DROGA DERIVA	11	6	↗
CALETAS	41	17	↘
CARGA	7	2	↘
PESCA ARTESANAL	30	7	⬇
PARASITO	7	1	⬇
CONTENEDOR	31	4	⬇
RECREO	5	0	⬇
PESCA INDUSTRIAL	2	0	⬇

Fuente: CIMCON

When making a comparison of the modalities of maritime drug trafficking in Colombia in 2017 contrasted with the events that occurred in the Pacific, it can be observed that the total of "SPSS", "SPFS" and "radio buoys" occurred in the Pacific and the modalities "go fast" and "drift drug" happened in a significant percentage. The "container" modality from the Pacific Ports of Tumaco and Buenaventura is comparatively low, however, this dynamic could change.

On the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, a binational development project executed jointly by both governments is taking shape: the trunk line that will link the ports of Esmeraldas (Ecuador) and Tumaco (Colombia).

On the Colombian side, this project is called "La Espriella-Río Mataje", which consists of 14 km of existing road and the construction of 6 km of new road, which also includes the construction of bridges over the rivers Panambi, Pusbí, San Juan y Mira and the international bridge over the Mataje River. This road axis will allow integration between Colombia and Ecuador and commercial exchange, especially for African palm crops and for the potential for agricultural exploitation in the area.

More than 70,000 inhabitants of the foothills, the Nariño Pacific coast and the Ecuadorian Pacific coast will benefit from the opening of the Espriella-Río Mataje highway, which, according to government authorities, will be inaugurated the following year.

The objectives established in the binational agreement to strengthen the border indicate that the execution of this work will strengthen the ties of brotherhood between the Afro-descendant communities of Colombia and Ecuador, will serve as a lifeline for the economy of the region and will allow the more than 1,000 small producers expand their commercial contacts.

EjeVial La Espriella - Mataje.
Fuente: www.elcomercio.com

In recent years, Tumaco has become one of the emblematic cases of the new scenarios of the Colombian armed conflict, since the residual elements of the FARC currently converge, such as the case of aliases "guacho" and criminal gangs, as well as the presence of the Mexican cartels, which is evidenced by the capture of criminals of this nationality and is also highlighted by the increase in the number of hectares of coca at the national level and the constant interrelation of its inhabitants with the drug trafficking value chain. In Espriella, for example, there are 450 families, of which about 150 work in oil palm companies, but a good part of the rest of the population lives from the coca business.

Fuente: www.tumaco-narino.gov

Once this binational trunk axis comes into full operation, the OCTs could use this first-rate road infrastructure to complete the "multimodality" of the illicit drug trafficking business, through land passage in cargo vehicles and containerized cargo of important amounts of drugs to the Ports of Esmeraldas and Tumaco, as well as the trafficking of precursors and even the passage of parts and pieces for the manufacture and assembly of semi-submersible devices and LPV's, taking advantage of the dense vegetation and the pipes formed by the tide by the estuaries that penetrate the land and the mouths of the rivers.

Something similar has already happened in the international bridge over the San Miguel River in the Department of Putumayo (Colombia) and the Province of Sucumbíos (Ecuador), the second binational border crossing (the first is the Rumichaca international bridge), which was recently used as part of the route chosen by the bus that, with the facade of a tourist ride, had an accident in Ecuador on August 14, 2018 and half a ton of kreepy-type marijuana was found inside.

This is corroborated in the Colombian newspaper El Universal, where it is stated: "In this sense, the authorities confirmed that the 637 kilos of marijuana that the criminal organization sent was loaded in Cali, it should have left through Ipiales (Nariño), but they diverted its route. to avoid the controls of the authorities, so they diverted through Popayán, Pitalito and Mocoa, where after their journey the accident was recorded" (El Universal, 2018) .

Fuente: www.eluniversal.com.co

There is no doubt that the construction of roads, infrastructures and nodal axes contribute to the economic and social development of the towns; It is therefore important that the authorities in charge of local and border controls in each of their areas of jurisdiction exercise effective control that prevents TCOs from using these "first mile" steps to access major transportation hubs and nodes. , necessary to consolidate the multimodality of drug trafficking, which is a business, but illegal. The La Espriella-Mataje road axis is expected to be inaugurated in August 2020.

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Iraq: Spring Again

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Anti-government protests in Iraq.

The Iraqi people have lived through political repression for decades since Saddam Hussein came to power. Hussein Saddam ruled the country with an iron fist for almost 25 years, (1979-2003) long enough to live through wars, like the one he led against Iran, or the one he suffered after invading Kuwait; sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing attempts against the Kurds, blockades and economic sanctions. Later, the North American military occupation, with the trail of blood that it opened, followed by religious terrorism, which is also confused in a civil war and now a kind of political stability in which the governments more or less naturally, more or less artificially, they succeed a Western-style democracy, forced to function in a tribal system, established long before the first Europeans reached the Euphrates.

Regardless of any historical period in modern Iraq, corruption has never ceased to plague the efforts of the Iraqi people, an evil endemic to every government since it seceded from the Ottoman Empire in 1919. This same claim now haunts Prime Minister Adil as well. Abdul-Mahdi, after two months of intense protests, presented his resignation to Parliament last Saturday, the 30th, and also asked its members to quickly form a new government to replace him.

The resignation was precipitated after the country's top Shiite religious leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, 89, who has never appeared in public, withdrew his support for him, in Friday's sermon, which was read by one of his assistants in the southern city of Najaf, one of the most important epicenters of the protests. Al-Sistani warned of a possible civil war if measures are not taken to prevent the protests, in addition to asking the government to reduce the disturbances. While another of the great and most influential Shiite clerics, Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr, declared the previous Thursday that if Abdul-Mahdi did not resign "it could be the beginning of the end for Iraq."

The Parliament that met on Sunday has accepted the resignation of the Prime Minister and now announces the resolution to the president who will have to name a successor to Abdul-Mahdi. With his withdrawal, the prime minister intends to placate the climate of turmoil in which the country entered, at the beginning of October, which has already left more than 400 dead and just over 8,000 injured. All of southern Iraq has been the target of protests, particularly in the cities of Najaf and Nasiriyah. In this last city, last Wednesday the 27th, the rapid reaction forces of the Ministry of the Interior fired on a group of demonstrators who were doing a "sit-in", killing about 30 civilians and injuring 160.

The massive protests began due to the repression against the camp that some 3,000 people had set up in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, three months earlier to demonstrate against corruption, unemployment and poor public services. The protests in the capital did not took time to replicate in the main cities of the country. According to the World Bank, one in five Iraqis lives in poverty, while youth unemployment reaches 25 percent, 20 percent of the population lives below the

poverty line and more than fifty are in a situation of food insecurity. Despite having the Euphrates and the Tigris, half of rural household's lack drinking water, also despite the fact that Iraq is the second largest oil producer in OPEC, behind Saudi Arabia.

There is a major housing crisis, due to the destruction of millions of homes due to war, civil and against terrorism. Mosul, the second largest city in the country, with almost a million inhabitants, for example, has been practically reduced to rubble and hundreds of thousands of people had to flee their homes initially due to the presence of Daesh, and later due to the systematic bombings of the United States, to dislodge the troops of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Post-Saddam Iraqi history shows that the agreement to confirm a new prime minister is a long and convoluted process given the deep rivalries of the political parties, in which religions and the tribal question play a primordial role, with the consequent waves of protests that result in a significant number of deaths and injuries.

As long as a new government is not established, Abdul-Mahdi and his ministers would remain in charge of the executive, until President Barham Salih formally appoints a new prime minister.

Some observers claim to see Abdul-Mahdi's resignation as a setback for Iran's "growing" influence in Iraq's domestic politics. Let us remember that Iraq is mostly Shiite with more than 60 percent of the almost 40 million inhabitants, a population located mainly in the south of the country, compared to 30 percent Sunni, which is located in the center and north of Iraq. Western media insist on showing that the parties with the highest parliamentary representation sympathize with Tehran and that it was Iranian officials who collaborated with Abdul-Mahdi so that he could form a government in October 2018, after reaching an agreement with Abdul-Mahdi and the current president Barham. Salih.

The anti-Iranian preaching managed to get a mob apparently led by pro-Western agents infiltrated in the demonstrations to burn down the Iranian consulate in the southern city of Najaf last week, which caused a strong police crackdown that left dozens dead. In Najaf, tensions increased around the tomb of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, considered a martyr for peace and unity in the country who died along with 75 other people after a car bomb attack in front of his mosque in August 2003. Now the tomb of the revered al-Hakim has become a target of protesters.

Who will give an answer first?

Fear and the fight against terrorism, during the last five years, have functioned as the great factor of agglutination of civil society and the political class that worked very well, especially with the Shiite community, "we had to stay united against the Wahhabi terrorism" that has that branch of Islam as its scapegoat. Now, after the apparent defeat of Daesh and tributary groups of al-Qaeda, after their laborious expulsion from Mosul, its de facto capital, in 2017, more than two years after the fall of Mosul, and almost three without significant attacks in Baghdad, including Sadr City, the neighborhood where the Shiite community is concentrated, about three, of the capital's seven million inhabitants, so the "common enemy" argument stopped working and the average Iraqi, it has other demands that it needs to cover, beyond security, and the protests could be nothing more than a natural way out of so many years of gagging out of fear or self-preservation.

After the abandonment of Iraq by the United States and the political growth of Shiism, naturally connected to Iran, Iraq has once again been placed on the Pentagon's radar, and while the demonstrations are largely justified, it would be more than innocent to believe that The virulence of the protests is not intended to undermine the Iraq-Iran link.

In these moments of high conflict is when the American and Jewish intelligence services know how to play their cards like few others, and it is no coincidence that the same thing is happening in Iran, (See: Iran: The protests of hate), even the possibility remains open for an "unexpected" emergence of Daesh. Al-Qaeda, or whatever you want to call it now. We will have to wait, since the bitter fruits of the Arab Spring will continue to break out both in Iraq and in Iran.

Image Source:
http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20191004/aumentan-40-muertos-duror-cuatro-dias-protestas-irak/1980692.shtml

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Hong Kong Ukrainian friends

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

Right-wing extremism in export: Ukrainian Nazis from the "Azov" battalion appeared at the protests in Hong Kong

For five years now, in Hong Kong, one of the most important financial centers in the world, there have been massive protests led by a diffuse group, which does not even seem to be very clear about the central objectives of its claims. In the last six months the demonstrations were continuous, and in them the violence has increased.

Although it is not necessary to be an expert to understand that the protests have a specific purpose, and that is to drive a stake into China, where it can start to bleed. In the first years of these protests, they wanted to use the infinite claims that the various communities of the Chinese universe have, so that that Hong Kong focus could light up in other parts of the country, as in the case of the Tibet Autonomous Region, where the West finances from Decades ago, the independence claims of the Buddhist clergy or the semi-autonomous province of Xinjiang in the northwest of the country, whose inhabitants of the *Uyghur ethnic group* , mostly *Muslim* , urge for the creation of an Islamic Republic, independent of Beijing, for which fundamentalist armed organizations linked to *al-Qaeda* and *Daesh* , such as the *Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement* (MITO) have carried out armed attacks even in the very square *Tian'anmen,* in the heart of Beijing, (See: China: Waiting for the barbarians), although the spread of the protests finally failed and today it is limited only to Hong Kong. The specific weight of China has thwarted the attempts of Western intelligence services to install the illusion of a "Spring", in the tragic style of what happened in Libya or Syria.

Since the beginning of these protests, obviously, the Western press has covered with particular attention and detail what is being carried out by, at most, 80,000 people, in a territory inhabited by some seven million people, in a country, China, with almost 1.4 billion inhabitants.

The former British colonial enclave, it was returned to Beijing in 1997, and has since enjoyed a semi-autonomous standard , with the central government responsible for defense and security as well as foreign policy, while local authorities control the judiciary, otherwise the civil liberties govern without restrictions.

The initial nucleus of the protests, which were pompously baptized as "The Umbrella Revolution," and which lasted almost three months, was made up of two university professors and, when not; an evangelist pastor named Roy Chan, with the slogan, obviously in English, *Occupy Central with Love and Peace* (OCLP), accusing the central government of being in a frank process of restricting public liberties with a systematic and discreet state control, in addition of feeling politically marginalized and economically plundered.

In the last six months, the protests have become increasingly violent with an epicenter in the main commercial and banking district, which has forced companies and businesses to close, in addition to generating significant chaos in vehicular traffic, including the popular citizen tram service. .

Protesters they have gone into action looting business premises, attacking the police with bows and arrows, launching fuel bombs, using catapults, which

caused numerous injuries, and throwing *Molotov cocktails* at police cars, for which the police have responded with tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets.

On Sunday, December 8, a new and important demonstration, demanding "democratic" elections to the legislative chamber and head of local government, and an investigation into the police action of the last six months.

The movement now led by the *Civil Human Rights Front* (CHRF) whose visible heads are the young Eric Lai and Jimmy Sham, have achieved a significant level of organization, which includes clandestine clinics in which doctors specialized in emergencies work on the wounded, psychologists who give free support to people affected by the repression and even graphic designers, for the making of banners. An encrypted *Telegram application* with dozens of channels is used for activist communication and even a network that has already allowed more than 200 activists wanted by the authorities to flee to Taiwan, where they receive economic and legal assistance. And among so many gadgets, a group of Christian activists identified with green vests, members of the *Church of the Good Neighbor* of the Northern District, directed by Pastor Roy Chan whose mission is to intervene in the police action to prevent the protesters from being detained, arguing that they are on a pious mission.

A call to the Ukraine

The interference of the United States in the encouragement and financing of this pro-Western and anti-Beijing movement has financed many of the groups that lead the marches, coordinated by the most conservative wing in Washington. While obscure characters like Marco Rubio and Steve Bannon are pressuring the US government and Congress to obtain sanctions against the government of President Xi Jinping.

Despite the infinite economic resources, coming from mysterious funds that sustain the "leaders" of the protests, no remarkable results have been achieved, other than the obvious condemnation of some institutions and thousands of articles and hours of television by pro-Western media. , the exaltation of the protesters, something that does not happen with the protests in Chile, Ecuador, or Colombia, perhaps I generated some doubts when it became known massively in recent days. The protests have been joined by none other than Ukrainian *neo -Nazis* , who have come to Hong Kong to openly participate in the anti-Chinese insurgency, along with members of other far-right organizations from Europe and the United States.

Since the beginning of the protests, the Hong Kong protesters have used the flags of the United States, the old Confederation and the United Kingdom, while singing the American national anthem. Which has made them a very attractive site for American white supremacists like the *Patriot Prayer group* from Oregon.

Although the most striking are the Ukrainians of the *Gonor group, residual members of the gloomy Azov* battalion, trained and armed by United States agents in Poland, prior to the coup against President Victor Yanukovych in 2014. Accused of war crimes after their participation in the conflict in the Republic of Donbass, in eastern Ukraine, financed by the *Zionist billionaire* Igor Kolomoisky. That during the "democratic" marches shine alongside those of the young Hong Kong fighters and idealists.

The *Gonor militiamen* , who arrived in the old British colony on December 1, proudly display their tattooed *swastikas* , along with other symbols of Nazi iconography, such as the legend " *Victory or Valhalla",* a compilation of writings by American neo-Nazi David Lane, leader of the terrorist group *The Order*, responsible for the murder of Jewish journalist Alan Berg in June 1984.

During the demonstrations, the leader of the Ukrainian fascist group Serhii Sternenko, *Leviy Sektor* (Right-wing Sector), was identified as being responsible for the fire at the Odessa *House of Trade Unions*, where 42 people died, during the May 2014 riots.

On its social networks on December 2, the group uploaded photos of its participation in the attack on the campus of the *Hong Kong Polytechnic University*, (PolyU), after Chinese authorities reported that a total of 3,989 incendiary bombs, 1,339 pieces of explosives and 601 bottles of corrosive liquid.

Nazi friends of *the Hong Kong Free Center* , the organization that is bringing together the protesters, defined their distinguished visitors as: "activists of the Revolution of Dignity and veterans of the defense war against Russia" quite a presentation and an alert for Beijing, which at some point, closer and closer, will be forced to act with the forcefulness of the case and ignoring the criticism.

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Kenya
Kenya Defense Forces

Kenya is a country located in East Africa, on the equator, with coasts on the Indian Ocean. It limits to the South with Tanzania, to the West with Uganda, to the North with Ethiopia, to the Northwest with South Sudan and to the Northeast with Somalia.

This country has an area of 580,367 km ^{2}, its population exceeds 45 million inhabitants and its capital is Nairobi. Kenya became independent from England in 1963, the nation adopted the form of government is semi-presidential, the official language is English and Swahilli

In Kenya, for the provision of voluntary military service, it is required to be between 18 and 26 years of age, this service is for both men and women. Those under the age of 18 can enter with parental consent. The contracts are for 9 years (7 years for the Kenyan Navy); Applicants must be Kenyan citizens and provide a national identity card (obtained at age 18) and educational certificate; Women serve under the same terms and conditions as men; retirement is mandatory at age 55.

The Kenya Defense Forces are the armed forces of the Republic of Kenya. The Kenya Army, Kenya Navy and Kenya Air Force comprise the national Defense Forces. The current Kenya Defense Forces was established and

its composition was stated in Article 241 of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010; The KDF is governed by the Kenya Defense Forces Act 2012. The President of Kenya is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces.

The Kenyan Army is organized into two armored brigades, four infantry brigades, one engineer brigade, one armored reconnaissance battalion (76th), three artillery battalions, three engineer battalions, one independent air cavalry battalion with 35 armed helicopters (Embakasi), five infantry battalions, a parachute battalion and a ranger battalion for low-intensity warfare.

Ranger Company D of the 20th Parachute Battalion is the only commando unit in the Kenyan Army trained to combat terrorist activities. It is part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and its predecessors. The main tasks of this unit include reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, infiltration and border patrol in joint operations.

Name	Type	Quantity	Source
Vickers Mk3	main battle tank	76	United Kingdom
Vickers ARVs	recovery tank	7 (4 with crane)	United Kingdom
mack trucks	AFV Conveyors		U.S
Panhard AML	armored car	72	France
Panhard M3	APC	fifteen	France
Ferret	armored car	twenty	United Kingdom
saladin	armored car	10	United Kingdom
shorland	armored car	8	United Kingdom
Saracen	APC	fifteen	United Kingdom
WZ551	APC	35	China
humvees	APC	100	U.S
Thyssen Henschel UR-416	APC	52	Germany
Land Rover Defender	utility	?	United Kingdom
PUMA M26-15	MRAP	150	South Africa
Mercedes Benz	utility truck		Germany
Oshkosh FMTV	troop transport truck		U.S
Sinotruk Steyr	troop transport truck	400	Chinese / Austrian
Leyland	Truck		United Kingdom
ACMAT	Truck 4.20 4x4 / 6.20 6x6		France
grinder	medium bridges		United Kingdom
BOV M11	armored reconnaissance vehicle		Serbian
Nora B-52	self-propelled artillery	30	Serbian
DCD Springbok	MRAP	102	South Africa
MD-500	utility helicopter		U.S
Harbin Z-9	utility helicopter		China
RQ-11 Raven	UAVs		U.S

Kenyan Army Vickers Mk-3 tanks taking part in a military parade.

The Kenyan Navy was established in December 1964, the headquarters is located in Mombasa. It has bases in Mombasa, Shimoni, Msambweni, Malindi, Kilifi and in Manda (located in the Lamu archipelago). The naval force is made up of patrol ships, lacking missiles. The largest of which is the P3124 KNS Jasiri, of Spanish origin, which displaces 1,400 tons and is 85 meters long.

Patrol boats KNS Shujaa and KNS Nyayo of the Kenyan Navy.

The Kenya Air Force was born in 1964 after the country's independence. It currently operates from the Laikipia bases in Nanyuki, the Moi base in Eastleigh Nairobi, the Mombasa base, the Madera base and the Nyeri base. In addition to operating the nation's air assets, the force has an anti-aircraft defense battalion.

Kenyan Air Force F-5 light fighters.

Since 1978, the F-5 has been the KAF's primary air defense fighter. A total of 29 were delivered: 12 F-5Es and 2 F-5Fs from the US, and 10 F-5Es, 3 F-5EMs and 2 F-5Fs previously in service with the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF). Former RJAF aircraft were upgraded to F-5EM standard before being delivered to the Kenya Air Force.

The helicopter fleet has been improved thanks to foreign aid. KAF received up to six AH-1Fs from the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) in 2017. Kenya's AH-1 fleet activity remains reserved and it is believed they will likely be used to train attack pilots before receiving new helicopters. attack MD530F. In 2016, 8 Bell Huey II helicopters were approved for delivery to the Kenya Air Force as part of the United States security cooperation program in sub-Saharan Africa. The Kenya Army's 53rd Tactical Helicopter Squadron received 6 Huey UH-1H helicopters. Meanwhile, the KAF received 9 AS550C3 helicopters to be used for security operations, as well as combat search and rescue, casualty and medical evacuation.

In October 2018, photographs had emerged showing KAF's Fennec AS550s equipped with weapons pylons and unguided rocket pods.

The Kenya Defense Forces have been participating in operations to support the stabilization of Somalia.

TRIARIUS