

TRIARIUS

Volume 5 - Issue 100
September 15, 2021

ISSN: 2538-9610
(on line)

Prevention and Security Bulletin on
Terrorism and the New Threats



2538-9610



COLOMBIA



ISSN: **2538-9610** (en línea)
Medellín - Colombia
Volume **5** - Number **100**
September 15, **2021**

Editor

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Analistas Triarius

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This bulletin is a publication of the **International Observatory on Terrorism and New Threats**. It is produced fortnightly, in pdf format, and its distribution is free.

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This newsletter has a Spanish version.

Editorial

We have reached the 100th issue of TRIARIUS magazine. It has been an honor for me to have worked all this time with such talented and generous people, who have sent us their articles and analyzes for free, for dissemination among our subscribers, thereby contributing to the strengthening of the security culture, and to the intellectual and professional growth of all our readers. We take this opportunity to thank our senior analyst, Guadi Calvo, for his perseverance, dedication and commitment. Your support has been decisive for the success of this project. We will continue to work hard to help make the world a better place. Let's go for more.

As usual, in this issue we present different analyzes on various world problems. The first article deals with the formation of the anti-Taliban resistance in the Panjshir, by a new version of the "Northern Alliance". This article mentions the leaders of this resistance movement, as well as the Taliban leaders who now make up the Governing Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It is worth noting that the latter have a lot of experience in war, and some of them were detained and tortured in Guantánamo, which allows us to infer what their position is towards the West.

Then, Guadi takes us to Africa, to inform us of the difficult situation caused by the presence of Daesh in the Congo, a terrorist organization that operates inside the country, with increasingly frequent and increasingly bloody attacks, and which is in full process of expansion, not only in terms of the number of combatants that it does not stop recruiting, but also in terms of the geographical extension that it intends to cover, already overflowing the borders of the Congo. There is concern that these groups will gain some support from the new Taliban government in Afghanistan.

The third article in this edition takes us to the Sahel, an African natural region plagued by terrorist groups, corruption, poverty, authoritarianism, and a thousand other problems. There France announces with great fanfare the "neutralization" of Adnan Abu al Walid al Sahraoui, the bloodthirsty leader of one of the most active groups. Guadi Calvo enlightens us on everything that surrounds this announcement, and warns us about the possible consequences of the "succession".

We end with a review referring to campaign rations. An essential element in modern military operations, especially in regions where geography prevents the normal supply of troops.

Know to win!

Douglas Hernández

Editor



TRIARY 100

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TRIARIUS

Among the survival skills that you should acquire or perfect, is the handling of firearms. In large cities, there are clubs, schools, and/or shooting galleries, accredited, with experience, and with all the security measures, which you can attend to receive basic training in the handling of various types of weapons, in particular, revolvers, pistols and shotguns. These are theoretical-practical courses that include the shooting range. If you already have experience, for example, if you were a military or police officer, in those clubs or schools, they rent you weapons and sell you ammunition so that you can range in an appropriate and safe environment, thus maintaining your capabilities, or increasing them. The way things are in the world, it's best to prepare for all kinds of eventualities. Cheer up! Get trained! Get ready!

On the cover, **Colombian Soldiers of the Special Forces.**

In this edition, the guest is the Colombian Army. See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who freely and disinterestedly have sent us their articles for this issue.

Panjshir, the Taliban's last battle?

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Ahmad Massoud, one of the resistance leaders, is the son of the Lion of the Panjshir, who fought the Soviets.

Although most of the international press agrees with the version that the anti-Taliban resistance in the Panjshir valley, a conglomerate of small units of the disappeared *Afghan National Army* (ENA) including commandos and special forces, together with the Militiamen from the *Northern Alliance*, now known as the *National Resistance Front* (FRN), had already been defeated after a week of fighting, a statement from the FRN's foreign affairs chief, Ali Maisam Nazary, was released, reporting that the fighting continues: "Both Commander Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh are in the country. They will never abandon their people. The people are rising up and facing the terrorists who are now in Kabul", adding: "Panjshir has not fallen. 60 percent of Panjshir is still under our control. It's a tactical retreat. The Taliban have entered

the lion's den and will suffer the consequences", thus confirming that the NRF forces remain operational in all strategic positions in the valley.

Ahmad Massoud, son of Ahmad Shāh Massoud, guerrilla leader who shone during the anti-*Soviet war* (1979-1992) thanks to the enormous resources provided by the "*Entente Cordiale*" of the United States and a dozen other countries, who saw the great possibility, at last, of defeating the undefeated *Red Army*, now he tries to imitate his father by roaring in the Panjshir, a mountainous area with few entrances and narrow passes, 150 kilometers northeast of Kabul, where he took refuge after the fall of Kabul, forming, together with Amrullah Saleh, the former vice president and head of the *National Security Directorate* of the fugitive, former president Ashraf Ghani, proclaimed himself interim

president of the country, as soon as Ghani's helicopter took height.

The anti-Taliban history of the Panjshir begins immediately after the *Soviet withdrawal*, with the outbreak of a civil war, with many ethnic connotations, between the *Talib* or *Taliban* (students of the Koran), formed in Pakistani *madrassas* financed by Saudi Arabia, mostly from the *Pashtun* ethnic group, the largest in the country, led by *Mullah* Mohamed Omar, against the *Northern Alliance*, *Mujahideen* of *Tajik* origin, the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, classified as moderate by the West, although there are many versions of the latter, led by Ahmad Shāh Massoud, *the Lion of the Panjshir*, who was defeated in the 1996-2001 civil war, although he managed to keep the Panjshir out of *Taliban control*, exactly until September 9, 2001, two days

before the demolitions of the towers, when two *al-Qaeda suicide fighters*, posing as journalists, managed to enter their camp and decapitate a lion.

Some versions indicated that Ahmad, 32, educated at the legendary British military academy *Royal Military College Sandhurst* and *King's College* London, returned to Afghanistan in 2016, having already fled to Tajikistan, immediately after the *Taliban* they broke through the defenses at Panjshir.

While nothing is known about Amrullah Saleh, given his oiled relations with both the CIA, many believe that he is an organic agent of the agency, and a "friend" of other intelligence agencies in the region and the West, so he could already be in a safe place, some versions insist that Saleh would have been a tactical withdrawal to return to the fight, better organized and reactivating its lines of international support and supply of materials.

Unlike what happened in the civil war of the nineties, this "remixed" version of the *Northern Alliance* would not have been able to establish supply lines with Tajikistan, since the *Taliban* had been in charge of capturing the provinces north of Panjshir (Khunduz, Tachar and Badakhshan), so that the soldiers of the new *emirate* were able to surround the valley and cut off any land route, preventing the arrival of weapons, ammunition, volunteers, food and fuel.

According to Indian sources, Pakistan would have collaborated with the *Taliban*, with aviation to hit the *Tajik resistance*. Another of the elements that played against the *National Resistance Front* is that, on this occasion, the United States, given its resounding defeat, have opted for a discreet exit from the forum, despite the fact that prior to the fall of Kabul, Massoud son, had

asked his father's old allies (the United States, the United Kingdom and France) to support him by sending him weapons and resources, to keep the resistance alive. On the other hand, New Delhi, which historically backed the *Northern Alliance* with funds and war supplies, would also have opted, like Washington, for a timely distancing. According to a statement from the *Taliban spokesman*, Zabihullah Mujahid last day six, the men of the *Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan*, advanced rapidly along a narrow road and took control of Bazarak, the provincial capital, so that the province "had been completely conquered."

Al-Qaeda takes to the skies

With the announcement of the formation of an "interim government", the *Taliban* not only overcome the presumptions that after the conquest of Kabul a bloody dispute would begin for the most important positions in the structure of the new *Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan*, but also, It practically confirms that the resistance of the Panjshir has been definitively defeated, those who had delayed the formation of the new *Shura* (government council).

The new government body is made up of twenty-two members, many of whom had been active combatants, in addition to having close ties with *al-Qaeda*, and having spent long periods in Guantánamo, which will have resonated strongly in the corridors of the *Pentagon*.

There are five of these twenty-two, who were detained in the center that illegally occupies Cuban territory, who obtained their freedom after the exchange for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in 2014, who had been a prisoner of the fundamentalists for five years.

The Iranian-style council will have a superior leader, almost with full powers, who with the title of *A mir-ul momineen* (Prince of Believers) will be occupied by *Mullah* Haibatullah Akhundzada, a religious scholar, judge and head of the judicial branch. Top *Taliban* leader since 2016 and a veteran of the *Anti-Soviet War*. To whom Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of *al-Qaeda*, took a vow of allegiance or *bayat* in 2016. The head of state will be Mohammad Hassan Akhund, another veteran of the *Taliban government* between 1996-2001, then governor of Khandahar and one of the leaders who most strongly opposed the surrender of Osama bin Laden, in the face of North American pressure. Sirajuddin Haqqani, for whom the United States offered 10 million dollars for his head, will continue as interior minister, a position he assumed informally with the capture of Kabul. That he has the factual power of being the leader of the *Red Haqqani armed organization*, founded by his father Jalaluddin in the 1980s and always an ally of the *Taliban*, and which has taken over the police control of the city of Kabul. In addition to very close ties with *al-Qaeda*, to the point that for many it is difficult to differentiate between the two organizations. Sirajuddin is even believed to be a covert leader of the organization founded by bin Laden.

Mullah Yaqoub will follow as defense minister, who has the honor of being the son of *Mullah* Omar, founder and first *Amir-ul momineen* and head of the *Taliban military commission* that oversees an important network of commanders and mid-field managers, by whom he is highly respected. Yaqoub is considered a front man who has already had serious clashes with *Taliban representatives* at the Doha (Qatar) conferences whom he accused of

"living in the luxury of Doha" while trying to impose conditions on the fighters who participate in fighting on the ground and has also had clashes with the Haqqani, particularly with Khalil, Sirajuddin's uncle, and current interim refugee minister.

Also, in one of the most influential positions is *Mullah* Abdul Ghani Baradar as Acting First Deputy Head of State, Baradar has co-founded the *Taliban* with *Mullah*

Omar. Detained for more than eight years in Guantanamo and Pakistan, after his release he would lead the Doha negotiations.

Another of the prominent places is held by *Mullah* Taj Mir Jawad, the first intelligence deputy. Jawad was head of the operational group, which the US Army called the *Kabul Attack Network*, which organized different operations in the capital, in addition to managing the combatants' resources.

The configuration of the new *Shura* of the *Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan*, with the majority of men openly linked to the war and many of them to al-Qaeda, shows that they have not been afraid of interpretations by the United States and that they are willing to the Panjshir was not his last battle.

Image Source:

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/08/27/hidden-british-life-afghanistans-last-hope/>

Guadi Calvo

(Argentina) Argentine writer and journalist. International Analyst specialized in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.



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Islamic State expands in Africa

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Congolese fighters on patrol.

Almost imperceptibly, for the big international press, the *Daesh* or *Islamic State* (ISCAP), also called the *Allied Democratic Forces* (ADF), has not only settled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but also, with constant attacks, expands while strengthening ties with "sister" organizations, which operate in the rest of the continent.

The ADF, founded in 1985, whose origins are verified as an insurgent force of Ugandan origin, which tried to overthrow the Kampala government, settled in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in the east of the Republic in the mid-1990s. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in the midst of the civil war that ended with the overthrow of Mobutu Seseko after 32 years in power (1965-1997), being one of the more than 120 armed groups that operated in the east of the DRC, triggered by the two regional wars that raged almost

continuously between 1996 and 2003, claiming millions of lives.

The ADF, relaunched their actions from 2013 and taking positions increasingly closer to *Muslim fundamentalism*, for which, according to data from the *Catholic Church* of the DRC, from then until the beginning of 2021 it would have produced more than six thousand deaths. After the arrest of its founder, Jamil Mukulu, in Tanzania in 2015, a *Catholic* converted to *Islam*, who became a fanatic, after a stay in Saudi Arabia, who was succeeded by his lieutenant, Seka Musa Baluku, a forty-three-year-old Ugandan, who accelerated the process of radicalization of the old insurgency.

The ADF made their *baya't* (loyalty oath) to the *emir* of global *Daesh*, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, in July 2019 and since then they have proclaimed themselves as *Madina in Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen* or MTM (The city

of monotheism). and the holy warriors), increasing their operations, not only in specific actions, but also in their ferocity, having registered -according to a *United Nations report-*, during the past year the death of 849 civilians. According to Baluku American sources, he would have sworn allegiance to *Daesh*, when as of 2017 his organization lost its means of financing.

In this greening of the ADF - MTM, it also launched an aggressive recruitment campaign in which it aims to integrate into its ranks, not only young Congolese, but from all of East Africa, which is why in their propaganda videos they use languages and dialects such as Tanzanian *Kiswahili*, Ugandan *Luganda*, or Rwandan *Kinyarwanda*, in addition to *Arabic* and French. in search of the hundreds of thousands of young people, discriminated against for ethnic reasons in addition to the

lack of opportunities for both education and work; abandoned by the vast majority of governments with an authoritarian bias and deeply corrupt.

The current offensive that it is developing in the south of Ituri province, leaving the most frequent areas of its operations, the neighboring Beni territory, in the province of North Kivu, marks its intention to expand.

Since June 1, the MTM has carried out 66 attacks in southern Ituri. This has caused the death of at least 207 people, in addition to having kidnapped another 171, reaching nearly 1,200 dead in early September, and causing the displacement of a million people. Attacks have been made both against civilian targets, as well as the security forces and the *Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (FARDC).

Since 2017, the year in which the first contacts between the ADF and *Daesh* were registered, and represented the lowest in operations of the former ADF, the actions have increased exponentially, while the operational areas have also had a very significant increase, which for some sources would reach 364%

The increase in attacks by the MTM or ADF is simply verified, taking into account that in the first eight months of the year it carried out 28 double-digit massacres, while throughout last year "only" twenty-two massacres of that intensity. Most of the operations in Ituri were carried out in Irumu in the south of Ituri and along National Route 4 (RN4), focusing on the outskirts of the cities of Boga and Tchabi. The RN4 is a fundamental road for the economy of the region

since it links a large part of the Congolese northeast with Uganda.

All in all, it must be taken into account that according to regional experts they affirm that the integration of the ADF into global *Daesh* cannot be fully confirmed, since no preponderant role of *the Islamic State has been detected* in ADF operations. in financial assistance, logistics, material and even with the transfer of militiamen.

Meanwhile, two years after taking office, Félix Tshisekedi, the president of the DRC, has not articulated strategies for the resolution of the armed conflict, refusing to activate measures, such as the combatant demobilization program, offering them immunity, housing and work.

Transit to death

National Route 4 (RN4), has become the epicenter of the fundamentalist attacks, given that it is one of the main routes in the area and taking advantage of its extension and the fact that an innumerable number of towns and villages settle on its side, it is practically impossible for the FARDC, the security forces, and the contingent of *the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (MONUSCO), to give them protection, so it is easy for fundamentalists to choose their target, hit and withdraw practically without be detected.

Therefore, along the RN4, the main attacks against the civilian population have taken place. Just as an example we could point out those that occurred last May in the Rubingo displaced persons camp, near the city of Boga, where 55 civilians were murdered. On July 13, in which about twenty bodies

belonging to residents of different villages near the city of Idohu, appeared lifeless and most of them decapitated. In an ambush on the outskirts of Idohu, on July 30, a convoy of trucks to supply these towns was attacked. On August 3, another 16 people were also found dead near Idohu. On the third of this month, MTM militiamen attacked a village in the Irumu area, about fifty kilometers north of Idohu, also close to the RN4, killing fifteen people and kidnapping two women. Three days later, in Djugu, another village further north, ten displaced women were raped by an armed group.

Beyond these attacks against civilians, mostly *Christians*, members of the MTM have been detected, practicing *da'wah* (preaching) in populations with a *Muslim majority*, "inviting" the villagers to return to the *Salafist path*.

This past Saturday the eleventh, the FARDC reported that four fundamentalist rebels of Ugandan origin had been killed in Ndimo, a city in Irumu, in the province of Ituri, where a state of siege is in force, to prevent the continuation of the violence of the rebels. While it was known that in the exchange of shots two civilians were killed "by the fire of the terrorists".

Daesh, with Khatibas competing with *al-Qaeda*, now fueled by the Taliban's victory in *Afghanistan* in a continental war stretching from Libya to Mozambique, from Nigeria to northern Mali, and from Niger and Burkina Faso to Egypt and Somalia, where both organizations continue to open fronts and deepen their struggle, in a war where at the moment the fire seems to encompass everything.

Image Source:

<https://voi.id/en/berita/80143/suspected-congolese-militants-attack-a-village-19-dead>



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Organizan:

France "neutralizes" another emir

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahraoui

For several weeks, it has been rumored that the French forces operating in the Sahel have finally located and managed to "neutralize" the *emir of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara* (EIGS), which was only confirmed this past Wednesday, September 15, by the French President Emanuel Macron, in a twitter, in which he confirms the death of Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahraoui and qualifies said operation as a "great success", of the *Operation Barkhane troops*, who for nine years have been trying defeat with the fundamentalist insurgency that broke out in 2012 in the north of Mali, and since then, has not only permeated the borders of Burkina Faso with great force, where they have practically paralyzed the entire north of that country, and towards Niger, where the *mujahideen*, have hit hard in the

western region of Tillabery, close to the border with Mali, where 550 people, mostly villagers, have been killed so far this year alone. While Western troops operating in that region are applying the *remove the water from the fish method*, forcing thousands of villagers to leave the area, to prevent the insurgency from gaining support and cover, from the population local, as they have applied in the Central American wars, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

Although Paris, which has more than 5,000 troops from *Operation Barkhane* since 2014, an operation that replaced *Serval*, which has been operating in the region since the end of 2012. In addition to France in that area, they have a military and intelligence presence. The United States, Germany and the United Kingdom and other European countries, to which are

added the armies that make up the *Sahel Group Five* (GS5) made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, have not managed to stop that insurgency, made up of small *khatibas* (brigades or fractions) that operated in the region, each doing what they could, on the tenuous border between fundamentalist terrorism and common crime, specializing in smuggling, human trafficking, drugs, kidnapping for ransom, and even providing protection for the transit of large drug shipments that from Brazil and Mexico reach the Gulf of Guinea, to continue by land to the Mediterranean, where with much more luck than that the refugees manage to reach the European coasts.

The overwhelming presence of European and American troops has made these small *khatibas*

structured into two large blocks as of 2017, the *villagers* of the *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin* or *Islam Support Group and the Muslims* (JNIM,) and the franchise of the *Daesh* or *State Islamic para in the Great Sahara* (EIGS) force led by Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahraoui.

Thierry Burkhard, chief of the French Army General Staff, reported that the operation that ended al-Sahraoui's life was carried out in the Angarous forest, in the region of the three borders, (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), after his presence was detected in that place. On August 17, a drone hit a motorcycle carrying two men. After hitting them, a commando group, supported by drones and *Mirage planes*, were able to arrive five days later at the place where the *emir had been assassinated*, being able to reliably identify that the body belonged to al-Sahraoui. This attack could become fundamental for the actions of *Daesh* in the region since after the *Barkhane bombing campaign* between February and June of last year there had been a significant decrease in EIGS actions, which, during 2020, claimed ninety operations and only thirty so far this year, the last being on June thirteenth.

The death of al-Sahraoui, who had taken his oath of allegiance or *baya't* to the then *Caliph Ibrahim*, (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), founder, spiritual and military leader of *Daesh*, who died in 2019, in 2015 and was appointed *emir* of EIGS, the following year, he recalls another "great success" of the French troops in the Sahel, when in June last year the death of a key figure in the formation of the JNIM, Abdulmalik Droukdel, was announced, who was "neutralized" in the north of Mali (See: Sahel: The death of the emir).

A five million dollar dam

After the ambush, in October 2017, near the village of Tongo-Tongo, in the Tillabery region (Niger), in which four North American *Green Berets died*, along with thirteen Nigerien soldiers and another eleven were disappeared (See Niger: What is Trump hiding in the desert?) and after proving that al-Sahraoui's men were responsible for the attack, the United States *Department of State classified al-Sahraoui as a "specially classified" global terrorist according to* with a decree of the North American executive and the EIGS as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" on May 16, 2018, after which a reward of five million dollars was established for the death or capture of who was the head of the group.

Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahraoui, until making his *baya't* al *Daesh*, had been a spokesman for the *Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa* (MUJAO), one of the many *khatibas* operating in the Sahel, linked to *al -Global Qaeda*, which would later merge into JNIM.

The MUJAO would finally end up allying in 2013, with *Muthalimin* (those who sign in blood) led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the civil war in his country (1991-2002) and Afghanistan, to form *al-Qaeda in the Maghreb Islamic* (AQIM).

After the appearance of *Daesh*, finally a split from *al-Qaeda* produced in Iraq in January 2014, a strong conflict broke out between Belmokhtar and al-Sahraoui, who by 2015 would go over to al-Baghdadi's forces, not only politically, but also military, having registered important armed confrontations, which continue to take place to this day, despite the fact that both organizations, the *Islamic State in the Greater Sahara* and the *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin*, are targeted by

thousands of more than a dozen regular armies operating in the Sahel.

Although the death of al-Sahraoui would be absolutely confirmed, according to President Macron, the deaths of both Abdulmalik Droukdel, finally confirmed last year, and that of Belmokhtar, who has been given "neutralized", had also been announced many times. on several occasions, which has never been confirmed.

After living part of his youth in Algeria, where al-Sahraoui, he would have enrolled in armed Islamist groups, linked to the FIS (*Islamic Salvation Front*), one of the great animators of the Algerian civil war that in more than ten years caused 200,000 dead. al-Sahraoui would have participated in October 2011 in the kidnapping of three humanitarian aid workers in the *Saharawi* refugee camp in Tindouf (Algeria), for which the MUJAO demanded a ransom of some 18 million dollars.

Between the end of 2019 and January 2020, the al-Sahraoui group carried out various operations against military camps in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, killing hundreds of troops.

This escalation of violence led France at the anti-terrorist summit in January 2020 in the city of Pau (France), together with the nations that make up the *G5 Sahel*, to label the EIGS as a "priority enemy", on which they had to focus their efforts. military actions.

According to some intelligence services, they classify al-Sahraoui as an extremely cruel leader, who concentrated all his power in himself and who had never considered the possibility of reducing civilian deaths when planning his operations. To the point of inadvertently applying *Sharia law* to the civilian population, having applied the penalty of

amputation of hands and feet to petty thieves discovered in a communal market. With the death of *Emir Adnan Sahel*, but the struggle for his succession may open another one of unknown characteristics. Abu al-Walid al-Sahraoui, not only is a bloody chapter closed in the

Image Source:
<http://loquesomos.org/tag/adnan-abu-al-walid-al-sahraoui/>



The campaign rations

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



There you can see an individual portion of "mondongo", a typical Colombian dish, and a portion of "panela".

The phrase "an army marches on its stomach" attributed to Napoleon, realizes the importance of military logistics. Without good logistics that provide the army with everything it needs; military operations will fail. The quoted phrase makes a direct allusion to the issue of food, above ammunition and other supplies. Being what, offering the troops poor or inadequate food will not only lower morale, but will also physically weaken the personnel. Needless to say, the absence of food will lead inexorably to the failure of the campaign, and to defeat.

In large-scale conventional military operations, units carry their "logistics trains" with them, including field kitchens, with their crew of ranchers well stocked with food and fuel, to provide troops with hot, conventionally cooked meals. These foods are regularly distributed to the troop, conditions permitting.

However, in anticipation of cases where it is not possible to operate normally, and the personnel's food must be guaranteed, combat rations (also called campaign rations) are used, which consist of non-perishable food, with enough calories to hold the soldier for a certain time, packed to be easy to transport in the campaign backpack.

Among the situations that hinder or prevent the supply of hot food to the troops, despite having field kitchens and ranchers, we find:

- a) The proximity of the enemy discourages the use of field kitchens, since they have a high thermal signature, difficult to mask against infrared devices, and also emit smoke, recognizable to the naked eye.
- b) If the enemy cuts the supply lines and prevents the arrival of food, fuel, or other elements necessary for the normal operation of the ranch.
- c) A fast forward that separates the frontline units from the logistics trains, overextending the supply lines.

- d) The need to maintain secrecy regarding the concentration of troops at some point on the front or border. There, in addition to the radio silence, the strict disciplinary measures, and the limitation of movement, the effective concealment of vehicles, equipment, and personnel, makes it necessary to limit or eliminate the emissions that would be produced by field kitchens.
- e) Infiltration operations, which by their very nature require the utmost secrecy and discretion, require not lighting fires that give away the position.
- f) Special operations personnel in missions that require stealth, such as operations behind enemy lines, long-range reconnaissance operations, the use of snipers, surveillance operations, and observation posts.
- g) Natural or man-made events that destroy infrastructure and prevent the normal development of logistics activities with organic equipment and personnel to the units.
- h) Others of a similar tenor.

In ideal terms, the country should be able to produce field rations in sufficient quantity to supply the troops under the aforementioned conditions, as well as produce them in regular cycles to replace those that are consumed, and produce them with sufficient quality to feed soldiers and provide them with well-being, for example, by providing typical foods from the different regions of the country, and not things that are foreign to them. For this reason, receiving donations of campaign rations from other country(ies) may not be a good idea, since it prevents the development of national production, and does not fit the regular diet or the characteristics of the kitchen. of the country itself.

The national production of campaign rations not only enhances the resources and logistical capacities of the Armed Forces, but also strengthens national producers, in the understanding that technically the ration is not produced, but rather is "assembled" (packed) , and each of its components can be acquired in the national market from different companies, with which a cooperation agreement can be made. Let's produce our own field rations.

Image Source:
www.militaryforces.org

Douglas Hernandez

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World Anti-Terrorist Forces

Audentes Fortuna Iuvat



Republic of Colombia

Colombian National Army



The Colombian National Army (EJC) is the legitimate ground military force operating in the Republic of Colombia. According to the Political Constitution of that country, its main mission is to defend the sovereignty, independence, integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order.

Missions and functions

- Conduct military operations aimed at defending the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,
- Protect the civilian population, private and state resources, to help create an environment of peace, security and development, which guarantees the constitutional order of the nation.
- It contributes to the generation of stabilization spaces in coordination with the other State entities to comply with the Territorial Consolidation Policy in accordance with its mission in the face of any internal or external threat.
- Safety of Energy and Road Infrastructure.
- Disaster Risk Management.
- Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources
- International cooperation.
- Contribution to the Development of the Country.

Control line

In the National Army of Colombia, the line of command goes, from highest to lowest authority, as follows:

- Republic President
- Minister of National Defense
- General Commander of the Military Forces
- Army Commander
- Commander of Division or Special Units
- Brigade or Task Force Commander

- Battalion Commander
- Company Commander
- Platoon Commander
- Squad Commander

Organization of the Colombian National Army

The Organization of the National Army of Colombia was restructured through provision number 00041 of February 26, 2016 where it is organized by headquarters and departments.

Organic Structure

Army Command (COEJC)

1. General Inspection of the National Army (CEIGE)
2. Army of the Future Transformation Command (COTEF)
3. Strategic Communications Directorate (DICOE)
4. National Army Research Control Directorate (DICOI)
5. Army Sergeant Major Office (OSMEJ)

Second Command of the National Army (SECEJ)

1. General Assistantship (CEAYG)
2. Technological Support Command of the National Army (COATE)
3. Financial and Budgetary Command (COFIP)
4. Directorate for the Application of Army Transparency Standards (DANTE)
5. Directorate of International Relations of the National Army (DIRIE)
6. Office of Disciplinary and Administrative Affairs (OADAS)

Chief of Staff for Planning and Policies (JEMPP)

1. Personnel Department (CEDE1)
 1. Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning (DIPEP)
 2. Strategic Directorate of Human Potential (DIPOH)
 3. Directorate of Information Systems and Personnel Statistics (DISEP)
 4. Directorate of Research and Innovation and Personnel Development (DIDEP)
2. Department of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (CEDE2)
 1. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Strategic Planning Directorate (DIPEI)
 2. Interagency Cooperation Directorate (DICOO)
 3. Department of Data Protection and Files (DIPDA)
 4. Administrative Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DIADI)
3. Operations Department (CEDE3)
 1. Directorate of Operational Plans (DIPLO)
 2. Organization Directorate (DIORG)
 3. Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Security (DISIC)
 4. Directorate of the Operational Statistical System (DISEO)
4. Logistics Department (CEDE4)
 1. Planning and Logistics Strategy Directorate (DIPEL)
 2. Directorate of Technical Structuring (DIETE)
 3. Directorate of the Logistics Information System (DISIL)
5. Planning Department (CEDE5)
 1. Strategic Planning Department (DIPLE)
 2. Project Management Department (DIGEP)
 3. Budget Planning Directorate (DIPAP)
 4. Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (DISEV)
 5. Quality Management Department (DIGEC)
6. Department of Communications (CEDE6)
 1. Directorate of Planning and Policies C5 (DIPOC)
 2. Prospective and Innovation Department C5 (DIPIC)
 3. C5 Project Management (DIPCO)
7. Department of Military Education (CEDE7)
 1. Direction of Instruction and Training Planning (DIPIE)
 2. Directorate of Education Planning (DIPED)
 3. Department of Planning in Science and Technology (DIPTE)
8. Fiscal Management Department (CEDE8)
 1. Fiscal Sustainability Directorate (DISFI)

- 2. Directorate of Analysis and Administrative Development (DIADA)
- 9. Department of Comprehensive Action and Development (CEDE9)
 - 1. Directorate of Strategic Plans for Comprehensive Action and Development (DIPAI)
 - 2. Directorate of Civil and Military Cooperation (DICMI)
 - 3. Directorate of Civil Affairs and Interinstitutional Coordination (DIACO)
- 10. Department of Military Engineers (CEDE10)
 - 1. Direction of Engineering Strategies and Policies (DIESP)
 - 2. Directorate of Engineering Planning (DIPLI)
 - 3. Directorate of Combat Engineers (DINCO)
 - 4. Engineering Management Department (DIGEI)
- 11. Comprehensive Legal Department (CEDE11)
 - 1. Directorate of Planning and Legal Policies (DIPOJ)
 - 2. General Business Directorate (DINEG)
 - 3. Directorate of Operational Law and Human Rights (DIDOH)
 - 4. Diffusion, Promotion and Prevention Directorate (DIDIP)
 - 5. Directorate of Comprehensive Legal Defense (DIDEF)
 - 6. Directorate of Support for the Transition (DITRA)
 - 7. Directorate of Analysis for Institutional Strengthening (DIAFI)

Force Generator General Staff Headquarters (JEMGF)

- 1. Personnel Command (COPER)
 - 1. Personnel Management (DIPER)
 - 2. Directorate of Human Management by Competencies (DIGEH)
 - 3. Health Department (DISAN)
 - 1. Oriente Medical Dispensary (DMORI)
 - 2. Cali Medical Dispensary (DMCAL)
 - 3. Bucaramanga Medical Dispensary (DMBUG)
 - 4. Medellin Medical Dispensary (DMMED)
 - 5. Tolomaida Medical Dispensary (DMTOL)
 - 6. Southwest Medical Dispensary (DMSOC)
 - 7. Gilberto Echeverri Mejia Medical Dispensary (DMGEM)
 - 4. Directorate for the Preservation of the Integrity and Security of the Army (DIPSE)
 - 5. Directorate of Family and Welfare (DIFAB)
 - 6. Directorate of Military Detention Centers (DICER)
 - 7. Department of Social Benefits (DIPSO)
- 2. Reserve Recruitment and Control Command (COREC)
 - 1. Recruitment Directorate (DIREC)
 - 2. Reservations Control Directorate (DICOR)
 - 3. Information Technology and Communications Directorate (DIRIC)
 - 4. Recruitment Services Support Company (CPAPR)
- 3. Education and Doctrine Command (CEDOC)
 - 1. Direction of Instruction, Training and Retraining (DITER)
 - 2. Directorate of Education (DIEDU)
 - 3. Department of Science and Technology (DITEC)
 - 4. Army Doctrine Center (CEDOE)
 - 1. Direction of Lessons Learned (DILEA)
 - 2. Department of Production Doctrine, Organization and Equipment (DIPOE)
 - 3. Preparation Standards Directorate (DESTA)
 - 4. Directorate of Symbols, Distinctives and Heraldry (DISDI)
 - 5. Direction of Management, Standardization and Diffusion of Doctrine (DIGED)
 - 5. Army Historical Study Centers (CEHEJ)
 - 6. Instruction, Training and Retraining Brigade (BRIER)
 - 1. Battalion of Instruction, Training and Retraining Type (BITER)
 - 7. Military School of Cadets "General JOSE MARIA CORDOVA" (ESMIC)
 - 8. Military School for NCOs "Sergeant INOCENCIO CHINCA" (EMSUB)
 - 9. School of Professional Soldiers "SOLDIER PEDRO PASCASIO MARTINEZ" (ESPRO)
 - 10. Military Education Center (CEMIL)
 - 11. National Training Center (CENAE)
- 4. Logistics Command (COLOG)
 - 1. Procurement Department (DIADQ)
 - 2. Logistic Support Brigade No. 1 in General Support (BRLOG01)

3. Logistical Support Brigade No. 2 in Direct Support (BRLOG02)
4. Logistical Support Brigade No. 3 in Direct Support (BRLOG03)
5. Military Engineers Command (COING)
 1. National Center Against Improvised Explosive Devices and Mines (CENAM)
 1. Antiterrorist Analysis Directorate (DIATE)
 2. Explosives and Mine Wars Directorate (DIGMI)
 3. Military Demining Directorate (DIDEM)
 4. Directorate of Innovation and Development Against Improvised Explosive Devices (DIDAE)
 5. Humanitarian Demining Directorate (DIDEH)
 6. Canine Department (DICAN)
 2. Special Brigade of Military Engineers (BRING)
 3. Construction Brigade (BRCON)

Head of Operations (JEMOP)

- Operations Area G-3 (G-3)
- Army Fire Coordination (COOFE)

First Division of the National Army (DIV01)

1. Second Brigade, Barranquilla
2. 10th Armored Brigade, Valledupar
3. Combined Arms Task Force, Buenavista

Second Division of the National Army (DIV02)

1. First Brigade, Tunja
2. Fifth Brigade, Bucaramanga
3. Thirtieth Brigade, Cúcuta
4. Vulcan Task Force
5. Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA) No. 3

Third Division of the National Army (DIV03)

1. Third Brigade, Cali
2. Twenty-Third Brigade, Pasto
3. Twenty-Ninth Brigade, Popayan
4. Cauca Specific Command
5. Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA) No.2
6. Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA) No 4

Fourth Division of the National Army (DIV04)

1. Thirty-first Jungle Brigade, Carurú
2. Twenty-Second Jungle Brigade, San José del Guaviare
3. 7th Brigade

Fifth Division of the National Army (DIV05)

1. Sixth Brigade, Ibagué
2. 8th Brigade, Armenia
3. 9th Brigade, Neiva
4. Thirteenth Brigade, Bogotá
Presidential Guard Battalion
5. Zeus Operational Command

Sixth Division of the National Army (DIV06)

1. 12th Brigade, Florence
2. Twenty-Seventh Jungle Brigade, Mocoa
3. Twenty-sixth Joint Jungle Brigade, Leticia
4. Operational Command, Jupiter
5. Brigade Against Drug Trafficking (BRCNA), Larandia

Seventh Division of the National Army (DIV07)

1. Fourth Brigade, Medellín
2. Eleventh Brigade, Montería
3. Fourteenth Brigade, Puerto Berrío
4. Fifteenth Brigade, Chocó

5. Seventeenth Brigade, Carepa
6. Joint Task Force Titan
7. Joint Task Force Achilles

Eighth Division of the National Army (DIV08)

1. 7th Brigade, Villavicencio
2. Sixteenth Brigade, Yopal
3. Eighteenth Brigade, Arauca
4. Twenty Eighth Brigade Puerto Carreño
5. Task Force Chiron
6. Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA) No. 1

Air Assault Aviation Division of the National Army (DIVAA)

Special Forces Division

1. Commando Training Battalion
2. Special Forces Battalion No.1 Juan Ruiz
3. Rural Special Forces Battalion no. 2 Francisco Vicente Almeida
4. Rural Special Forces Battalion no. 3 gr. Pedro Alcantara Herrán y Zaldua
5. Rural Special Forces Battalion no. 4 ct. Jairo Ernesto Maldonado Melo
6. Special Forces Battalion no. 5MY. Francisco Garcia Molano
7. Urban Special Forces Group AFEUR
8. Urban Antiterrorist Special Forces Group AFEAU Alpha component

Great Commands

1. Military Intelligence Combat Support Command (CAIMI)
 - Military Intelligence Brigade No. 1 (BRIMI1)
 1. Strategic Military Intelligence Battalion (BAIME)
 2. Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (BINGE)
 3. High Mobility Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (BIGAM)
 4. Cyber Intelligence Battalion (BACIB)
 5. Intelligence Research, Development and Innovation Battalion (BAIDI)
 6. Company USA BRIMI1 (USA)
 - Military Intelligence Brigade No. 2 (BRIMI2)
 7. Military Intelligence Battalion (BAIMI)
 8. Signals Intelligence Battalion (BINSE)
 9. Military Intelligence Knowledge Management Battalion (BAGCI)
 10. Company USA BRIMI2 (USA)
 - Military Intelligence Services Support Battalion (BASIM)
2. Military Counterintelligence Combat Support Command (CACIM)
 - Military Counterintelligence Brigade No. 1 (BRCIM)
 1. Military Counterintelligence Battalion (BACIM)
 2. Border Counterintelligence Battalion (BACIF)
 - Military Counterintelligence Brigade No. 2 (BRCIM2)
 3. Military Security Battalion (BASMI)
 4. Civil Security Battalion (BASEC)
 5. Information Security Counterintelligence Battalion (BACSI)
 6. National Army Credibility and Reliability Battalion (BACCE)
 - Military Intelligence Operational Management Battalion (BAGOP)
 - Counterintelligence Services Support Battalion (BASCI)
3. Communications and Cyber Defense Operational Support Command (CAOCC)
 1. Communications and Cyber Defense Operational Support Group (GAOCC)
 2. Special Communications Brigade (BRCOM)
4. Strategic Deployment Command.
5. Comprehensive Action Support Command (CAAID)
 1. Comprehensive Action and Development Support Brigade No. 1 Norte Cúcuta
 2. Comprehensive Action and Development Support Brigade No. 2 Sur Cali
6. San Andres and Providencia Army Component (COMEJ)
7. Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA)
 1. FUDRA No.1
 2. FUDRA No.2
 3. FUDRA No.3


4. FUDRA No.4
8. Infantry Battalion No. 3 Colombia (BICOL3)
9. Special Command Against Transnational Threats (CECAT)

Military Forces Operational Units

- Joint Task Force Omega
- Joint Task Force Hercules
- Urban Antiterrorist Special Forces Group (AFEUR)

Special Units

- Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA)
- Light Cavalry Brigade (BLICA)/Plan Meteoro companies
- Urban Antiterrorist Special Forces Group (AFEUR)
- Infantry Battalion No. 3 Colombia (BICOL3)
- Unified Action Groups for Personal Liberty (GAULA)
- Ground Operations Battalions (BATOT)
- High Mountain Battalions (Paramo de Sumapaz, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Sierra Nevada del Cocuy, Farallones de Cali, among others).
- Humanitarian demining battalions.





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